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Between 2010-2017, 150,000 of Burundian refugees, whose families fled to Tanzania in the 
1970s, received citizenship in Tanzania. This thesis explores how the experience of 
naturalisation shaped Burundian refugees’ views of citizenship, and considers how this can 
help develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context. 
My research traces the implementation and aftermath of naturalisation in Ulyankulu settlement 
and the city of Dar es Salaam between 2014 and 2017, focusing on and foregrounding former 
refugees’ experiences and narratives of citizenship and displacement. The methods employed 
in this study were ethnographic in nature and included repeated visits to the research sites, 
living with the community members, learning Kiswahili, and conducting over 160 interviews. 
Unlike the existing studies of naturalisation which focus solely on the settlements, this thesis 
adopts a multi-sited approach, which incorporates insights from both rural and urban settings, 
drawing parallels and contrasting the various experiences and perspectives. 
The thesis builds on the existing literature on citizenship, displacement and their nexus (Arendt 
1973; Malkki 1995; Kibreab 1999; Warner 1999; Kelly 2006; Long, 2013a; Bakewell 2011; 
Brun 2015; Grabska 2015; Hammar 2014, 2018), contributing new empirical and conceptual 
insights on the complexity of evolving citizenship for those who are long-term displacees. 
Drawing on former refugees’ experiences and narratives, the thesis puts forward a new concept 
of ‘probational citizenship’ which aims to capture the temporality, uncertainty, and ongoing 
struggles for recognition in displacement. Former refugees living with ‘probational 
citizenship’ experience a paradoxical interplay of both safety and uncertainty about their 
status, which dominates their lives and shapes their actions post-naturalisation. To shed light 
on these processes, the thesis brings together a combination of key aspects of citizenship in a 
context of displacement and settlement, not often addressed at the same time, namely political 
representation, land rights, mobility, and materiality of citizenship.   
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Lay Summary  
 
Between 2010-2017, 150,000 of Burundian refugees, whose families fled to Tanzania in the 
1970s, received citizenship in Tanzania. This thesis explores how the experience of 
naturalisation shaped Burundian refugees’ views of citizenship and considers how this can 
help us to develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement 
context. This study relied on ethnographic methods, including repeated visits to the research 
sites, living with the community members, learning Kiswahili, and conducting over 160 
interviews. Unlike the existing studies of naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania 
which focus solely on the settlements, this thesis adopts a multi-sited approach, which 
incorporates insights from both rural and urban settings. To shed light on the processes of 
naturalisation, the thesis brings together a combination of key aspects of citizenship in a 
context of displacement and settlement, not often addressed at the same time, namely: political 
representation, land rights, mobility, and materiality of citizenship. Drawing on former 
refugees’ experiences and narratives, the thesis puts forward a new concept of ‘probational 
citizenship’ which aims to capture the temporality, uncertainty, and ongoing struggles for 
recognition in displacement. Although this study focuses on the specific case of naturalisation 
of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, I advance an argument that the notion of ‘probational 
citizenship’ and the protracted uncertainty regarding one’s legal status is becoming 
increasingly common in the experiences of naturalised citizens and their families, as well as 
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When I met Alida, she was sitting on a large tree trunk in front of her house. She 
jumped off to welcome me and my research assistant Mr Mtasha and before we even 
sat down, she started telling her story. She reiterated how in 2008, her family was 
asked a life-changing question that they did not see coming: do they want to return to 
Burundi or stay in Tanzania and apply for Tanzanian citizenship? The decision was 
meant to be made by the head of the household on behalf of all the family members, 
and her husband wanted to register them for repatriation. Alida insisted that she and 
her five children would not go anywhere, and she held her ground. When we asked her 
why she did not want to return Burundi, she said: ‘I do not know anyone in Burundi 
and I do not have anything in Burundi. What if my husband leaves me, I would be 
alone there, without anything. My life is here in Tanzania’ (int. 2016).  
Alida fled to Tanzania with her grandmother when she was a child. The two of them 
escaped ethnic violence and mass killing which tore Burundi apart in 1972. In 
Ulyankulu, they were reunited with Alida’s uncle, who helped them and who raised 
her as his daughter. Her parents and her siblings were killed during the massacre in 
Burundi and Alida never went back. She married young and moved to a small, but neat 
house on a large plot of land inherited by her husband. In 2008, the couple faced a 
fundamental decision between returning to Burundi or remaining in Tanzania. After 
many arguments, Alida and her husband applied for Tanzanian citizenship, and they 
received their citizenship certificates in 2015. She invited us to her house and proudly 
showed us a laminated copy of the certificate and said: ‘Why is citizenship certificate 
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so important? Because it allows me to stay here, no problems will happen. I can live 
here in peace’ (int. 2016).  
Alida walked with us to the main road, from which we caught a motorcycle to go back 
to Kaswa village at the centre of Ulyankulu settlement. She waved at us smiling, 
covered in a pink scarf. Her story is one of many of 220,000 Burundian refugees, who 
in 2008 were asked to make a momentous choice between repatriation and 
naturalisation under the Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS).  
TANCOSS was an agreement between the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Burundian Government and Tanzanian 
Government. Initially, TANCOSS included three pillars: voluntary repatriation to 
Burundi, processing of citizenship applications for those who opted for naturalisation 
in Tanzania, and relocation of the naturalised refugees from the refugee settlements to 
other regions of Tanzania (Kuch, 2016). Presented with this choice, almost 79% of the 
refugees opted for Tanzanian citizenship and 21% decided to return to Burundi (SA3, 
2007). The relocation plan for the naturalised refugees was subsequently suspended 
and former refugees were permitted to choose if they wish to leave or to remain in the 
areas of the settlements. Despite setbacks and challenges in implementation, by 2015 
the majority of former Burundian refugees have received Tanzanian citizenship and 
many of them decided to remain in the settlements where they lived for decades. 
The TANCOSS agreement had global significance. At roughly the same time when it 
was announced, the UNHCR launched an initiative to ‘reinvigorate possibilities for 
solutions to protracted refugee situations’ (UNHCR, 2008, p. 1) which culminated in 
an Executive Committee Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations (2009). 
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‘Protracted refugee situation’ was defined as one in which refugees find themselves in 
a long-lasting and intractable state of limbo, where their lives may not be at risk, but 
their basic rights and essential economic, social and psychological needs remain 
unfulfilled after years in exile (UNHCR, 2009). The case of Tanzania was quickly 
identified as an opportunity to implement the global policy on protracted refugee 
situations and demonstrate its ability to help secure solutions for refugees (Milner, 
2014, p. 554). The proposed naturalisation and repatriation strategy became a high-
profile initiative, attracting a total of $103 million for implementation (UN Tanzania, 
2010). By June 2010, most of the applications for naturalisation had been approved 
and many considered the policy to be a resounding success (Milner 2014, p.  554). 
The counter-narrative that this case offered captured my attention and imagination. 
Between 2014-2017, I visited Tanzania on three extended research trips. During the 
three study periods, I interviewed over 160 people (many on multiple occasions) living 
and working in and near Ulyankulu settlement, the town of Tabora and the city of Dar 
es Salaam. I also conducted 34 focus group discussions and interviewed 18 academics, 
local and international NGO staff, and government officials. My research focused on 
the naturalisation aspect of TANCOSS, however I also collected secondary data about 
people’s family members and friends who repatriated to Burundi. Ability to return to 
the field sites several times allowed me to see the unfolding results of the mass 
naturalisation policy over time. Rather than analysing the impact of TANCOSS at one 
fixed point in time, I had an opportunity to study the non-linear nature of 
naturalisation, with all its’ promises, pitfalls, and unexpected turns of events.  
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As the research developed, I discovered that naturalisation was implemented 
incompletely, which led to further uncertainty in the lives of the former refugees. This 
unusual context of long-term displacement, mass naturalisation, and subsequent 
protracted uncertainty created a unique space for bringing to light the complexity of 
evolving citizenship for those who are long-term displacees. Drawing on observations 
as well as people’s stories and narratives, this project explored the following question: 
How did the experience of displacement and naturalisation shape Burundian 
refugees’ understanding of citizenship and how do these insights help us to 
develop the concept of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement 
context?  
1.1. Rethinking citizenship in displacement  
 
Questions of citizenship and belonging have long been asked in relation to displaced 
populations (eds. Brysk and G. Shafir, 2004; Kibreab, 1999; Malkki, 1995; Moulin & 
Nyers, 2007; Polzer, 2009; Warner, 1999) and a lot has been written about restoration 
of citizenship in displacement (Bradley, 2008; Hovil & Lomo 2015; Long, 2013a; Van 
Hear, 2006). Displacement, broadly, is an act, experience or effect of some form of the 
enforced dislocation of people from their homes, typically because of war, persecution, 
or natural disaster (Hammar, 2014, pp. 4-5) and it is characterised by a subjective and 
temporal condition of uncertainty. The context of displacement heightens the 
importance of citizenship as access to citizenship, or lack of thereof, determines many 
migrants’ and refugees’ chances for accessing rights. In other words, the power of 
citizenship is revealed in its absence, and therefore contexts of displacement generate 
new critical insights about citizenship theory and practice. 
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The existing literature approaches the dynamics of citizenship in displacement in two 
different ways. On the one hand, legal and policy-oriented work focuses on the 
understanding of displaced people as citizens or non-citizens, the formal processes 
available (or not available) to them, and the consequences of exclusion from formal, 
statutory citizenship or asylum (Costello, 2015; eds. Edwards & Ferstman, 2010, 2007; 
Manby, 2009; Milner, 2009). On the other hand, many contemporary scholars writing 
on citizenship in displacement focus on the importance of informal processes, claim 
assertions, protest and other forms of local agency and practice (Moulin & Nyers, 
2007; Agier, 2008; Hanafi, 2010; Holzer, 2012, 2015; Ilcan & Rygiel, 2015; Ilcan, 
2018; Lecadet, 2016; Omata, 2017). As such, most of the available literature on 
citizenship in displacement focuses on de facto citizenship, showing that although 
many displacees are denied formal citizenship and rights, they claim and assert them 
in informal struggles. Thus, the existing debates often rely on the distinction between 
de jure and de facto citizenship, differentiating between formal, legal and informal 
ways of belonging.  
 
Following Lazar (2012), I observe that when non-citizens or second-class citizens 
make claims to full citizenship, the nature of citizenship itself changes in the process 
(p. 345). Through an in-depth exploration of the process of naturalisation of Burundian 
refugees under Tanzanian Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS), my 
analysis sheds light on how long-term refugees in settlements and in the cities 
experience access to formal, institutional citizenship and what struggles they face in 
the process of claiming substantive rights following naturalisation. Drawing on this 
case study, I argue that the distinction between de jure and de facto citizenship fails to 
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capture the complexity of evolving citizenship in displacement, necessitating new 
approaches that encompass the uncertainty and temporality of both formal and 
informal modes of belonging in displacement.   
 
The thesis explores the processes of evolving citizenship for the long-term displacees 
by bringing together a combination of key aspects of citizenship in a context of 
displacement and settlement, seldom addressed at the same time, namely: political 
representation, land rights, mobility, and materiality of citizenship. Rather than 
deconstructing the concept of citizenship itself, the thesis explores how experiences 
and priorities of the displacees can shift and alter the established elements of 
citizenship. Based on insights from former refugees’ experiences and narratives, I put 
forward a new concept of ‘probational citizenship’ which aims to capture the 
temporality, uncertainty, and ongoing struggles for recognition in displacement. 
Former refugees living with ‘probational citizenship’ experience a paradoxical 
interplay of both safety and uncertainty about their new status, which dominates their 
lives and shapes their actions post-naturalisation. The notion of ‘probational 
citizenship’ is not intended as an all-encompassing analytical framework. Rather, it 
functions as a lens for bringing together various interrelated narratives and experiences 
and for working out their significance in the wider, global context.  
 
The contribution of this project is threefold. First, the thesis provides new empirical 
data on an under-researched policy, analysing both implementation and aftermath of 
TANCOSS. In contrast to the existing studies on this topic (Hovil, 2016; Kweka, 2015; 
Milner, 2014; Miletzki, 2014;), the thesis adopts a long-term perspective, tracing the 
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consequences of TANCOSS beyond the initial distribution of citizenship certificates. 
Moreover, unlike the existing studies, which focus solely on the refugee settlements, 
the thesis adopts a multi-sited approach, which incorporates insights from both rural 
and urban settings, drawing parallels and contrasting the various experiences and 
perspectives.  
 
Secondly, the thesis contributes to the existing literature on the nexus of citizenship 
and displacement (Bradley 2008; eds. Brysk & G. Shafi, 2004; Hammar, 2014; Hovil 
& Lomo, 2015; Kibreab, 1999; Long, 2013a; Malkki, 1995; Moulin & Nyers, 2007; 
Polzer, 2009; Warner, 1999) by proposing a new concept of ‘probational citizenship’. 
The concept of ‘probational citizenship’ aims to encompass the uncertainty, 
temporality and ongoing struggles for recognition which characterise both formal and 
informal modes of belonging in displacement. Apart from this main theoretical 
contribution, the empirical chapters of the thesis speak to the various angles of 
citizenship in displacement and contribute new knowledge to the following bodies of 
literature: the existing literature on Burundian refugees in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995; 
Daley 1989; Sommers, 2001a; Turner, 2010),  refugee politics in camps (Agier, 2008; 
Lecadet, 2016, Omata, 2017), citizenship and land rights in contexts of migration and 
displacement (Jackson, 2006; Geschiere, 2009; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2001; Lentz, 
2013; Boas & Dunn, 2013) and the role of mobility in displacement (de Haas, 2009; 
Long, 2013b; Long & Crisp, 2010; Maple, 2016).  
 
Finally, besides the intention to present new ethnographic material and contribute to 
the theoretical debates on citizenship and displacement, this dissertation brings 
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attention to the precarious situation of the former Burundian refugees in Tanzania and 
the relevance of their experience in the wider, global context. The decision of the 
Tanzanian government to grant citizenship to over 150,000 refugees must be 
recognised and applauded. At the same time, however, it needs to be acknowledged 
that the incomplete implementation of naturalisation by the various involved 
stakeholders created a responsibility gap that renders the former refugees vulnerable. 
This thesis aims to bring attention to the risks and challenges that former Burundian 
refugees face in Tanzania post-naturalisation. Although this study focuses on the 
specific case of naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, in the Conclusion, I 
advance an argument that the notion of ‘probational citizenship’ and the protracted 
uncertainty regarding one’s legal status is becoming increasingly common in the 
experiences of naturalised citizens and their families, as well as other first and second-
generation migrants in the Global North. 
1.2. Thesis’ structure   
 
The thesis explores the subject of citizenship in displacement by bringing together a 
combination of key aspects of citizenship in a context of displacement and settlement, 
not often addressed at the same time, namely: political representation, land rights, 
mobility, and materiality of citizenship. These aspects of citizenship were selected to 
reflect the concerns and priorities shared by former refugees in qualitative interviews. 
In interviews, I paid close attention to which aspects people chose to focus on, which 
questions were considered more relevant, and ultimately which facets of citizenship 
are at the core of how former refugees conceptualise citizenship in displacement. The 
order of the chapters follows the logic of moving from the broader understanding of 
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citizenship in its political dimension to the more specific, individual experiences and 
concerns. The first three chapters following the Introduction set out the necessary 
background and context, outline the analytical framework and present the research 
methods. The empirical chapters start with the subject of political representation, 
moving to the issue of land rights, the crucial role of mobility in displacement and, 
finally, the importance of the materiality of citizenship documents in displacement. 
Below, I present the chapters’ outlines.  
 
Chapter 2 briefly outlines the background and context vital for the analysis developed 
in the subsequent empirical chapters. The first part of the chapter outlines the origin 
of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, with a focus on the individuals and families who 
fled to Tanzania in 1972. This section explains the reasons behind refugees’ flight and 
introduces the settlements where they were hosted (and where the central part of this 
research was conducted). The next part discusses the development of Tanzanian 
refugee policy and the context in which Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy 
(TANCOSS) was proposed, designed and implemented. Step by step, the chapter 
explains the turns and twists of the negotiations and the resulting pitfalls of the policy. 
It argues that a responsibility gap was created and that the policy was implemented 
incompletely which affects how former Burundian refugees conceptualise their new 
status following naturalisation.  
 
Chapter 3 presents key conceptual frameworks and theories relating to citizenship and 
displacement. The chapter begins by engaging with the small, but influential body of 
literature on Burundian refugees in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995; Daley, 1989; Sommers, 
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2001a; Turner, 2010) which allows for developing a more grounded, historical 
perspective on Burundian refugees’ attitudes towards Tanzanian citizenship. From that 
discussion, the chapter moves into outlining the relevant tenets of citizenship theory 
and explaining the focus on politics, land, mobility, and materiality as the key 
analytical elements of citizenship in this thesis. Next, the chapter differentiates 
between operation and relational definitions of displacement, explaining the 
relationship between displacement and migration and defining the concept of 
displacement for the purpose of this thesis. Finally, the chapter introduces the debates 
on the restoration of citizenship in displacement and the distinction between de facto 
and de jure citizenship. The chapter argues that the existing conceptualisations do not 
capture the temporality and uncertainty of displacement and that the distinctive process 
of evolving citizenship in displacement does not receive sufficient attention. To 
address this gap in knowledge, the final part of the chapter defines the contours of 
citizenship in displacement and proposes a concept of ‘probational citizenship’.  
Chapter 4 outlines the research methods employed in this study. In order to seek 
answers to the research question, I chose to rely on extensive, multi-sited 
anthropological fieldwork with a focus on formal and informal interviewing. This 
method was chosen as the most appropriate for approaching sensitive and complex 
subjects in the context of vulnerability and protracted uncertainty. The empirical 
material was collected during three visits to Tanzania: the first one took place when 
the process of relocation was suspended (March-April 2014); the subsequent study 
followed the majority of the former refugees receiving their citizenship certificates 
(April-June 2015); and the final stage of fieldwork traced changes since the 
distribution of citizenship certificates (May 2016-March 2017). The long-term scope 
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of the project allowed for repeated visits to the sites pre-and post-naturalisation and 
for conducting follow-up interviews with the key participants.  
 
The areas of data collection included eight villages in Ulyankulu Division, the nearby 
Urambo Town, Tabora Town, and the city of Dar es Salaam. Conducting research in 
both rural and urban sites aimed to capture the experiences and livelihoods of 
individuals and families who left Ulyankulu and established their lives in urban 
centres. Moreover, incorporating an urban component sets this research apart from the 
existing studies of naturalisation of Burundians in Tanzania (Hovil & Kweka, 2008; 
Hovil & Kweka 2009; Kweka, 2015; Hovil, 2016; Miletzki, 2014; Nordic Consulting 
Group, 2010; SA3, 2007) which focus only on the refugee settlements.  
 
The first empirical chapter, Chapter 5, tackles the problem of the transition in 
governance from refugee settlements to ‘settlements of citizens’, and the kinds of 
opportunities, frustrations, and tensions that this process entailed. The chapter 
demonstrates how the settlement’s governance was transformed incompletely; 
creating a hybrid system where former refugees continue to live under camp 
governance despite having citizenship. For the people concerned, this creates 
ambiguous lines of authority and incites uncertainty about the future, which I identify 
as the characteristics of ‘probational citizenship’. I show, however, how the new 
citizens navigate these altered forms of governance and attempt to assert their new 
status by voting in national elections, joining political parties, and attempting to elect 
a local councillor. Although many studies discuss refugees’ political organisations in 
camps, not much attention has been given to a post-camp scenario, in which refugees 
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access citizenship. This chapter contributes new knowledge on the topic of camp 
governance post-naturalisation, and it brings attention to the importance of active and 
participatory elements of citizenship in displacement. 
 
Chapter 6 explores how former Burundian refugees were able to access land in exile 
and how, following naturalisation, they seek recognition of their land rights.1 The 
chapter discusses in detail how in Ulyankulu, while seeking recognition of their land 
rights, former refugees rely on claim-making strategies that are not confronted by the 
discourse of autochthony. Instead, they seek recognition of their rights based on the 
long-term productive use of the land, land transactions with local Tanzanians and 
engagement in land disputes. In this chapter, I suggest that the strategies employed by 
former refugees indicate that people are trying to convert land access, which they have 
enjoyed for decades, into land rights. The chapter argues that access to citizenship 
documents increased people’s sense of entitlement to the land in Tanzania and it 
generated new opportunities and new avenues for claim-making. At the same time, 
however, the state’s engagement in the area following naturalisation has destabilised 
the previous tenure system, creating new uncertainties. Here, I analyse the interplay of 
safety and uncertainty regarding land access through the lens of ‘probational 
citizenship’. For the former refugees, recognition of rights to land is a crucial marker 
of citizenship, and in this chapter, I show how their claim-making practices both 
reinforce and reinterpret the link between land and membership in the nation-state. 
 
1 I published some ideas presented in this chapter in Kuch, A. (2018). Land and exile: revisiting the 
case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, Critical African Studies,10:1, 108-125 but the material in the 
PhD is not a direct reproduction of that publication. 
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In Chapter 7, I discuss the role of mobility in displacement. Former Burundian 
refugees I met in Tanzania repeatedly told me that freedom of movement is one of the 
most important advantages of the newly acquired citizenship status, despite evidence 
that people have been moving extensively to and from the settlements since the 1970s 
with minimal official sanction. Moreover, people who have never left the settlements 
and do not intend to do so, believe firmly that freedom of movement is a crucial benefit 
of naturalisation. Chapter 7 explores the significance of these narratives, asking what 
has changed in people’s experience of movement following naturalisation and what 
does that reveal about the importance of mobility in the process of affirming 
citizenship in displacement. The main finding of this chapter is that access to 
citizenship documents allows for beginning the transition from movement to mobility 
which is key in former refugees’ conceptualisation of citizenship in displacement. The 
benefits of citizenship, however, are not stable or evenly distributed, and in the latter 
part of the chapter I discuss how class differentiation impacts refugees’ ability to take 
advantage of the opportunities created by naturalisation. Many of my interlocutors 
narrated the benefits of freedom of movement in future-oriented terms, revealing that 
mobility as a capability is still a probational rather than a fundamental right.  
 
The last empirical chapter focuses on the materiality of identification documents, 
approaching citizenship in its visible, material form.2 Although citizenship is more 
than a document, documents become more and more necessary to prove and assert 
 
2  I published some ideas presented in this chapter in Kuch, A. (2017). Naturalization of Burundian 
Refugees in Tanzania: The Debates on Local Integration and the Meaning of Citizenship 
Revisited. Journal of Refugee Studies, 30(3), 468-487 but the material in the PhD is not a direct 
reproduction of that publication. 
 
 30 
one’s formal status. In Chapter 8, I show how former refugees treat their new 
citizenship documents in their material form and how close attention to these practices 
reveals an ongoing interplay of safety and uncertainty. Following Hammar (2018) and 
Kelly (2006), I believe that studying and looking at citizenship documents and the way 
people treat, use, and understand them, can give insights into how they conceptualise 
citizenship itself. Paying close attention to the materiality of naturalisation highlights 
both the benefits of certification such as safety and ability to plan for the future, as 
well as the new uncertainties and vulnerabilities created with access to citizenship 
documents. Drawing on the existing literature, I explore why uncertainty and safety 
occupy a central space in the lives of the displacees and how the perspective of former 
refugees accentuates contradictory tendencies of certification. Building on these 
insights, I expand on the notion of ‘probational citizenship’ and show why former 
refugees speak about their citizenship in probational terms. 
 
Besides the intention to present new ethnographic material and to make a theoretical 
contribution to the understanding of the complexity of evolving citizenship in 
displacement, this dissertation also aims to bring attention to the precarious situation 
of the 1972 Burundian refugees and its broader relevance. In the Conclusion, I put 
forward an argument that the experience of ‘probational citizenship’, narrated by 
former Burundian refugees in Tanzania, has global significance. Thinking through the 
lens of developing ‘theory from the South’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012) and drawing 
on recent cases of deportation and denaturalisation in the United Kingdom (UK) and 
the United States (US), I suggest that the notion of ‘probational citizenship’ and the 
protracted uncertainty regarding one’s legal status is becoming increasingly common 
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in the experiences of naturalised citizens and their families, as well as other first and 






2. Background and context  
 
 
This chapter provides background and context necessary for the analysis developed in 
the subsequent empirical chapters. The first part of the chapter outlines the origin of 
Burundian refugees in Tanzania, with a focus on the individuals and families who fled 
to Tanzania in 1972. This section explains the reasons behind people’s flight, 
introduces the settlements where they were hosted, and discusses the links between 
naturalisation and repatriation. The next part examines the details of Tanzania 
Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS). It argues that a responsibility gap was 
created as the policy was implemented incompletely which had an impact on how 
former Burundian refugees conceptualise citizenship following naturalisation.  
 
2.1. Burundian refugees in Tanzania: the cycles of displacement  
 
Reasons for flight 
 
Following a decade of instability since independence from Belgium in 1962, Burundi 
was riven by rivalries and antagonisms between and within the different ‘ethnic’ 
groups (Hutu and Tutsi) which were reinforced by the colonial categories (Russell, 
2015). A military coup had established a republic in 1966, and as the years passed it 
increasingly became dominated by a group of Tutsis. Every attempt made by Hutu 
leaders to overthrow the government – in 1965, 1969, 1972 – ended in failure and 
brutal repression. In 1972, Hutu militias organised an uprising and attacked Tutsi 
civilians. In response, the army was called to exterminate all individuals suspected of 
being involved in the assassinations. For two months the army moved across the 
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country, methodically killing people of Hutu origin, targeting skilled and educated 
members of the society (Lemarchand, 1996).  
 
It is estimated that 100,000 to 300,000 were killed and hundreds of thousands fled to 
the neighbouring states, with the majority ending up in Tanzania (Uvin, 2009). 
Because the reprisals were directed at the educated Hutus, peasants were better able to 
flee the country and thus constituted the bulk of the refugee population (Daley, 1989). 
After escaping the ethnic violence and finding refuge in Tanzania, the 1972 Burundian 
refugees were first hosted in transitory camps in Kigoma region, from which they were 
relocated to three rural settlements in Mpanda and Rukwa regions: Mishamo, Katumba 
and Ulyankulu (now referred to as the ‘Old Settlements’). In Chapter 4., the main 
research site, Ulyankulu settlement, is discussed in detail. 
 
 
Figure 1. Map showing the location of the Old Settlements and refugee camps in Tanzania. Source: UNHCR 
2014. 
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Civil war in Burundi  
 
In Burundi, Union for National Progress (UPRONA) became the single political party 
in a totalitarian system that aimed at a total exclusion of the Hutu population from 
political participation, access to education, and employment (Ngaruko and 
Nkurunziza, 2000, p. 390). Although the regime was trying to prevent protests by 
forging national unity (Lemarchand, 1994, 108), these efforts did not succeed. When 
violence erupted in 1988, the international community began putting pressure on 
Burundian elites to democratise national politics (Reyntjens, 1993). However, in 1993 
the first Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye was assassinated, and a civil war broke out.  
 
Over 300,000 are estimated to have been killed, and more than one million people 
were displaced during the civil war that lasted until 2005 (Daley, 2006, p. 658).  The 
civil war generated another massive wave of refugees, many of them fleeing to 
Tanzania for the second or third time. Despite major similarities and kinship links 
between the various groups of refugees, Burundians who fled in the 1990s were hosted 
in different camps than the 1972 population and were treated as a ‘separate’ caseload. 
This division had real consequences, as people registered in the 1990s’ camps did not 
qualify for the naturalisation which was offered to the people whose families fled to 




‘No peace no war’ in Burundi 
 
The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (2000) for Burundi arose from a 
regional initiative and was signed in August 2000 (Daley, 2007, p. 338). The civil war, 
however, continued despite the efforts of the international community to create a peace 
process. Officially, the war ended in 2005 with the establishment of a power-sharing 
transitional government and the installing of a democratically elected government. 
Daley (2006) and other observers, however, have argued that Burundi continued to 
exist in an in-between state popularly termed ‘no peace no war’ (p. 658).   
 
The fragility of this in-between state became evident in April 2015, when civil unrest 
broke out in Bujumbura. People came out on the streets to protest President 
Nkurunziza’s third term in office, which runs counter to the Arusha Agreement’s 
terms. Following these events, 100,000 Burundians fled again to Tanzania. In total, 
since April 2015, hundreds of people have been killed, and more than 250,500 have 
fled to Rwanda, Congo, Uganda, and Tanzania as a result of political violence 
(Fleming, 2015). The tensions in Burundi continue and Tanzania continues to host 
over 220,000 Burundian refugees (IOM, 2018). Their security, however, is tenuous, 
and both Tanzanian and Burundian governments have issued multiple statements 




The returning repatriates  
 
Although this project focuses primarily on the naturalisation aspect of the Tanzania 
Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS), the political situation in Burundi and 
the experiences of the repatriates are both directly relevant to this research. 
Approximately 45,000 refugees decided to repatriate as part of the UNHCR-organised 
repatriation scheme under TANCOSS and many others left individually over the years. 
Those who still had relatives in Burundi and were able to regain their property settled 
in the areas they were familiar with. Many others, however, were housed in Peace 
Villages built for the purpose of reintegrating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 
returning refugees (Falisse & Niyonkuru, 2015).  
 
During fieldwork, I collected secondary data about people’s relatives and friends who 
repatriated to Burundi. I found that many of the repatriates returned to Tanzania, 
unable to regain their land and re-establish their livelihoods in Burundi. People’s social 
networks had become extremely weak back in Burundi and when in May 2015 civil 
unrest broke out many repatriated refugees fled again to Tanzania. Some of them want 
now to receive Tanzanian citizenship but TANCOSS had stated clearly that the 
decision to opt for repatriation could not be reversed. The experiences and stories of 
the repatriates are crucial because they influenced how those who opted for 
naturalisation perceive their Tanzanian citizenship, which I explore further in Chapter 
8. Therefore, although this research project focuses primarily on the experience of 
naturalisation and evolving citizenship in displacement, it maintains a holistic 
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perspective which incorporates the social worlds and kinship links of the former 
Burundian refugees across borders.  
 
2.2. Tanzanian Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS)  
 
 
This section discusses the details of TANCOSS, the reasons and motivations behind 
this policy, the role of influential individuals in governmental and non-governmental 
agencies, and the challenges in implementation. The section argues the policy was 
poorly designed and implemented incompletely, leading to a responsibility gap, where 
neither the international stakeholders nor the Tanzanian government feel responsible 
for further incorporation of the settlements into the regional and national governance. 
Before moving to a discussion of TANCOSS, I first briefly outline the evolution of 
Tanzanian refugee policy, which allows to situate TANCOSS in a historical context.  
 
Evolution of Tanzanian Refugee Policy  
 
A lot has been written about the evolution of the Tanzanian refugee policy (Chaulia, 
2003; Chimni, 2004; Landau, 2008; Milner, 2014; Rutinwa, 2002). Although my 
research focuses primarily on the experiences of the people affected by TANCOSS 
rather than a strict policy development analysis, a brief outline of the progression of 
Tanzanian refugee policy provides a necessary context. Researchers find that 
Tanzanian refugee policies fall into three distinct periods from Independence to the 
present. 
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From 1962 to 1985 Tanzania hosted tens of thousands of refugees fleeing both wars 
of national liberation in Southern Africa as well as post-colonial conflicts in the 
neighbouring states. Several authors have attributed the ‘Open Door’ policy to both 
ideological and pragmatic considerations, pointing to Nyerere’s genuine commitment 
to Pan-African ideals, as well as the opportunities that refugees provided for attracting 
resources for the development of remote and under-populated regions (Armstrong, 
1991; Kweka, 2007). In line with these priorities, the 1972 group of Burundian 
refugees was allocated land to farm and live on in three sites: Ulyankulu, Katumba and 
Mishamo. The evolving situation of that group of refugees is the focal point of my 
analysis.  
The second period came in 1985 with the economic disarray, the end of President 
Nyerere’s presidency, and the beginning of President Mwinyi’s term as President. 
Mwinyi embarked on the Economic Recovery Programme, which was associated with 
some decisive measures aimed at reducing public spending (Kweka, 2007). The 
growing numbers of refugees, deteriorating security situation in the region, economic 
hardships induced by the Structural Adjustment Programs, as well as the decreasing 
levels of funding, all converged to make the Tanzanian state less inclined to host 
refugees (Landau, 2008; Whitaker, 2002). This was the political situation when the 
enormous displacement in the region happened following the Great Lakes crisis and 
the influx of hundred thousand people further radicalised the asylum climate 
(Whitaker, 2003).  
The border closure with Rwanda in 1995 and the expulsion of the Rwandese refugees 
in 1996 marked the start of the third period of refugee policies in Tanzania (Rutinwa, 
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1996). In 1998, the government passed a new Refugees Act, followed by 2003 
Tanzanian National Refugee Policy, which restricted movements of refugees to camps 
and limited economic activity. Consequently, Tanzanian authorities began rounding-
up refugees living outside the camps and ‘forced deportations were common’ (Chaulia, 
2003, p. 161). The use of anti-refugee rhetoric increased, and Nyerere’s reference to 
refugees as ‘resident guests’ was replaced by public discourses about refugees as 
‘threats to national security’ (Collier, 2011).  
On the surface, it seems that Tanzania went through a massive shift from a more open-
door policy which emphasised self-sufficiency and local integration, to a current more 
restrictive policy of encampment. In fact, however, although refugee regime in 
Tanzania became progressively more restrictive, the Tanzanian government always 
discouraged spontaneous settlement (Holborn, 1975). In other words, restrictions on 
refugee mobility and preference for organised settlements over self-settlement where 
always key markers of the Tanzanian refugee regime. What has changed is the logic 
of what types of settlement schemes are seen as beneficial from the perspective of the 
state’s interests. In the 1970s, rural settlement was seen as the major device by which 
states could exercise control over refugees and benefit from their labour (Daley, 1989). 
Therefore, at that time, rural settlement was the most attractive and politically feasible 
response to displacement. This has changed with time, as encampment and aid 
provision became the more mainstream methods of refugee protection. Although the 
1970s policy of rural settlements significantly improved refugees’ economic self-
reliance in comparison to the later encampment practices, it is important not to idealise 
it. From the perspective of the refugees, control of movement, control of labour, and 
exclusion from the local decision-making defined their experience of displacement in 
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the Old Settlements. The implementation and aftermath of TANCOSS must be seen 
against that backdrop.   
TANCOSS: the impetus behind a comprehensive refugee policy 
The 2005 election manifesto of Tanzania’s ruling party, CCM, included a pledge to 
make Tanzania refugee-free by 2010 (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010), which 
reflected the objectives 1998 Refugees Act and 2003 Tanzanian National Refugee 
Policy. In 2006, the Government of Tanzania informed the UNHCR that it intended to 
close the remaining camp (Mtabila) for 1993 Burundian refugees in Tanzania by 
encouraging voluntary repatriation. Initially, these discussions were not meant to 
address the situation of the 1972 Burundians living in the Old Settlements. In June 
2007, however, at a meeting of the Tripartite Commission, the governments of Burundi 
and Tanzania expressed their desire to close all of the refugee camps in Tanzania, 
including the Old Settlements established in the 1970s (Milner, 2013). UNHCR 
accepted the proposal to close Mtabila camp which hosted refugees from 1993. 
However, it managed to negotiate an alternative solution for the 1972 refugees. 
 
The tripartite meeting recommended the establishment of Old Settlements Task Force 
charged with finding a set of durable solutions for the Old Settlements. First steps were 
to conduct a population census and an independent socio-economic study of the Old 
Settlements, which comprised of individual registration and intention survey (Nordic 
Consulting Group, 2010). The survey collected personal details and recorded the 
choice of either voluntary repatriation or application for naturalisation. The decision 
for either repatriation or naturalisation was supposed to be made by the head of the 
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households on behalf of other family members which led to many tensions. 
Nonetheless, the survey was conducted, and the outcome of that survey indicated an 
overwhelming preference for naturalisation: 79% (171,629) of refugees identified the 
acquisition of Tanzanian citizenship as their preferred durable solution, with the 
remaining 21% (45,547) opting for repatriation (SA3, 2007). Based on these results, 
the Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy (TANCOSS) was formulated, and the 
strategy document was disseminated in early 2008. The agreement outlined three 
pillars: voluntary repatriation to Burundi, processing of citizenship applications for 
those who wished to pursue naturalisation in Tanzania, and relocation of naturalised 
refugees from the settlements to other regions of Tanzania. 
 
Creating the opportunity for mass naturalisation  
It is worth noting that naturalisation of refugees is not a new phenomenon in Tanzania 
and earlier groups included the naturalisation of Rwandese refugees in 1980 (Gasarasi, 
1990). However, the 1972 group was the first one where the offer was extended to 
Burundians and to such a large number of refugees as well as through individual 
processing rather than by decree. Interviews with stakeholders conducted for this 
research reveal that the motivation to offer naturalisation was linked to the Nyerere’s 
pan-African policies at the time of arrival of this groups of refugees, the significant 
economic contribution made by the refugees, and the ethnic affiliation and peaceful 
co-existence with the host population. Furthermore, a crucial element of the design of 
this policy was a personal commitment of influential individuals. 
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The then Minister of Home Affairs (MOHA), Joseph Mungai, played a major role in 
promoting naturalisation, because of his personal knowledge of the settlements 
(Nordic Consulting Group, 2010, pp. 26-27). He had been Minister of Agriculture (at 
the age of 28) when the Burundians came in 1972 and had been part of the decision to 
settle and allocate land to them (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010, p. 27). Lawrence 
Masha, the new MOHA minister following Mungai, continued the naturalisation 
process. Masha maintained, in line with his predecessor, that forced repatriation of the 
1972 group could lead to serious security problems in Burundi.  
Furthermore, in his research Milner (2013, 2014) exposes the importance of the 
personal relationship between the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs in 2007, Lawrence 
Masha, and the UNHCR Representative to Tanzania, Yacoub el Hillo, in making 
TANCOSS feasible. He notes that Masha and el Hillo had developed a close working 
relationship already in the 1990s and their ability to cooperate was key in pushing the 
TANCOSS strategy forward (Milner, 2014, p. 562).  
Another important incentive was provided by large funding meant for implementation 
of TANCOSS. The appeal, with two-year budgets for both Tanzania and Burundi, was 
originally at USD 34.2 million, and USD 22.5 million was spent in 2008. The budget 
for 2009, originally at USD 11.5 million was then revised upwards to USD 28 million, 
most of which was funded (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010, p. 41). Ultimately, a total 
of USD 103 million was included in the 2011-15 United Nations Development 
Assistant Plan (UNDAP) meant for relocation and integration of naturalised refugees 
(Milner, 2014, p. 561). These investments were central in negotiating naturalisation: 
they included promises of development on the district level, boosting Tanzania’s 
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reputation as a progressive refugee-hosting state, and a possibility of attracting more 
funding for development projects in the near future.   
 
Challenges and delays in implementation 
  
Notwithstanding the existing motivation of the key figures in the government and the 
potential benefits of donor’s investments, the process stalled in the years 2010-2014. 
Until October 2014, it was unclear if the process of naturalisation would be completed 
and several statements by the Government of Tanzania during this period suggested a 
declining commitment to the process and the possibility that the decision to grant 
citizenship could be reversed (for details see Milner 2013, 2014). However, despite 
the major delays and setbacks in the process, in October 2014 President Kikwete 
travelled to the settlements to inaugurate a citizenship certificates distribution 
ceremony. The main reason for the delay was caused by the shift in approach towards 
local integration of refugees who opted for naturalisation. 
 
Initially, the naturalisation pillar assumed that refugees would be resettled from the 
settlements to 21 designated regions in Tanzania and that the refugee settlements 
would be closed. In 2010, a National Strategy for Community Integration Programme 
(NaSCIP) was developed to serve as the blueprint for the implementation of this 
integration scheme. However, due to opposition by local politicians in the locations 
chosen as well as the resistance of the international community to support this strategy 
of relocation of refugees, the implementation of the NaSCIP was suspended. This 
episode shows a major conflict in what UNHCR and local government saw as the best 
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approach to integration. Ultimately, the UNHCR’s advocated solution was accepted, 
and the government decided that the new Tanzanians could remain in the existing 
settlements and those who wished to relocate could do so accordingly with their wishes 
and resources. 
 
At this stage of the policy implementation, in 2011, Oakland Institute has exposed that 
the initial insistence on relocation of refugees from the settlements has been motivated 
by a prospective land deal. The report by Oakland Institute (Freedman, 2012) stated 
that AgriSol, a major U.S. energy company3, was meant to benefit from the forcible 
eviction of the refugees by leasing 800,000 acres of Katumba and Mishamo 
settlements. A spokesperson for AgriSol Tanzania denied these allegations and 
claimed that the government had been the one that had instigated the movement of 
refugees and that AgriSol was informed that the refugee camps were closed or in the 
process of being closed before they engaged in the deal (Freedman, 2012). Due to 
public pressure, the company initially announced that it will delay involvement in the 
deal until refugees are resettled and finally it withdrew from the initial agreement. 
Although this scandal has been resolved before I started fieldwork, it offers critical 
insight into the precarious situation of the former refugees and it shows that the 
ultimate solution of allowing former refugees to remain in the settlements was not 
aligned with the original vision of the Tanzanian government. This had fundamental 
consequences for how integration of the former refugees, both in terms of local 
 
3 AgriSol Energy Tanzania, the company behind the Tanzanian operations, was a partnership venture 
between Rastetter’s AgriSol Energy and the Tanzania-based Serengeti Advisers Limited. Iddi Simba, 




governance and land, has been conducted (which I discuss in detail in Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6).  
 
Despite these challenges and insecurities, from 2015 onwards, over 160,000 of the 
people living in the settlements have received their certificates. Due to a fundamental 
shift in integration policy and the permission for the former refugees to remain in the 
Old Settlements, the Government devised a new strategy for the local integration 
programme: the Tanzania Strategic Plan for Local Integration of the New Citizens 
(TANSPLI). According to the stipulations of TANSPLI, two actions will be 
undertaken regarding changing the status of the settlement area. The first will be the 
removal by the Minister for Home Affairs of the refugee-designated status over the 
settlement areas and incorporation of the settlement into the local governance 
structure. The second action will be changing the designated status of the area. This 
will mean the creation of a master land use plan for the settlement and the surrounding 
areas, followed by the registration of villages in each settlement and provision of 
preliminary documentation for land rights. The timeline for these transformations, 
however, is uncertain, and at the time of writing (2018), the stipulations of TANSPLI 
have not been implemented.  
  
Responsibility gap and the lack of accountability  
 
Now that the people concerned are no longer labelled refugees but have become 
citizens instead, they have fallen into a responsibility gap. What I mean here is that 
because they were granted naturalisation, they are no longer considered to fall under 
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the protection of UNHCR. As one UNHCR official told me on condition of anonymity: 
‘We have done our part. They are not refugees anymore and they are not our 
responsibility’ (int. 2014). At the same time, however, the settlements inhabited by 
former refugees have not yet been incorporated into the Tanzanian state structure and 
remain under the supervision of the Ministry of Home Affairs; with no political 
representation or secure access to land. In the words of an official at the Ministry of 
Home Affairs: ‘We kept our part of the deal and distributed citizenship. But none of 
the promises materialised’ (int. 2017). According to the civil servants interviewed 
(both in Dar es Salaam and in Tabora region), the donors (UNHCR, the World Bank, 
UNDP, European Union) promised the Tanzanian Government that major investments 
will follow the distribution of citizenship, but these promised never materialised. From 
the perspective of the donors interviewed, the Tanzanian Government did not deliver 
naturalisation within the timeframe agreed and therefore funding meant to support this 
initiative was redirected to support refugees in other emergencies, including the recent 
war in Syria. These ambiguities have led to a political stalemate between humanitarian 
organisations and the government, with each claiming the other has not kept its 
promises.  
 
This sentiment has far-reaching consequences. The failure of international 
organisations to contribute to the integration of the 1972 Burundian refugees has been 
used by President Magafuli as an argument against engaging in prospective durable 
solutions policies. In late January 2018, the Tanzanian President announced in a public 
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speech that one of the reasons for pulling out of the UN's Comprehensive Refugee 
Response Framework (CRRF)4 was the disappointing experience of TANCOSS:   
 
We are leaving the framework due to the experience we had when we gave 
citizenship to over 160,000 refugees. The international community has 
promised it would provide funds to facilitate their housing and other things but 
surprisingly to date no money has been given (CGTN, 2018).   
 
Thus, the incomplete implementation of TANCOSS is now used by the government 
as a trump card for justifying a more hostile policy environment towards other 
refugees.  
 
The TANCOSS agreement and subsequent TANSPLI strategy document left it 
ambiguous who would be responsible for implementing the administrative, 
developmental and social programs that were designed to turn former refugee 
settlements into properly integrated towns and villages. TANSPLI proposed three 
pillars for implementation: Legal Integration Pillar (Pillar 1), Social and Economic 
Integration Pillar (Pillar 2) and Governance and Administration Pillar (Pillar 3). These 
pillars covered addressing outstanding legal status issues and access to legal rights, 
reform of the governance and administration of the settlements, socio-economic 
investments in support of local integration, as well as administrative and 
administration costs.  
 
4 CRRF proposes that refugees should be included in the communities from the very beginning and 
the initiative is meant to provide lasting solutions to refugees, including integration into communities. 
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The TANSPLI strategy was forward looking and ambitious, however it was never 
implemented. In late 2018, governance in the settlement remains in transition. On the 
one hand, legally speaking, the Old Settlements have the status of a designated area 
under the Refugees Act 1998 (GOT, 1998). On the other hand, former refugees 
received citizenship and are now allowed to move, access education freely, and vote 
in national elections. The promises that accompanied naturalisation, however, have 
not yet been fulfilled. In the current transitional period, the power over politics and 
land governance in the settlements remains vested in the Settlement Officers appointed 
by the Director of the Refugee Department at the Ministry of Home Affairs. Despite 
naturalisation, former refugees are unable to appoint local political representatives 
from the community or to seek recognition of their rights to land (more in Chapter 6).  
 
Without political representation, the new citizens are not able to influence the local or 
district policies and without accountability mechanisms in place, the recipients of 
TANCOSS policy are also unable to hold humanitarian organisations accountable (see 
Barnett & Wiess, 2008; Tan & Schreeb, 2015; Souter, 2014). The interviews with 
members of the international organisations (UNHCR, the World Bank) that initiated 
the process reveal that they have no sense of responsibility regarding the outcome of 
TANCOSS and have no plans for addressing the precarious situation of the new 
citizens. Thus, the incomplete and problematic implementation of the various pillars 






This chapter provided context for understanding the analysis that follows in the 
subsequent theoretical and empirical chapters. The first part of the chapter briefly 
introduced the reasons behind the flight of Burundian refugees in 1972. It discussed 
the links between repatriation and naturalisation, exposing how the continued 
instability in Burundi has an impact on how former Burundian refugees in Tanzania 
perceive their new citizenship as a symbol of safety and security. The main part of the 
chapter elaborated on the context in which the policy of TANCOSS was designed and 
implemented. Here, the challenges in implementation and the subsequent 
consequences were discussed. The evidence shows that the incomplete 
implementation of naturalisation has created a responsibility gap, leaving the new 
citizens outside the Tanzanian government structures and beyond the concern of the 
international organisations. In the next chapter, I develop a theoretical framework for 
expanding the understanding of evolving citizenship in displacement.  
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In the past our parents used to tell us about the importance of going back to Burundi. 
Now we are mature, we have our own families and can make our own decisions 
(int. 2014). 
 
In the processes of both non-citizens’ claims to citizenship and of second-class 
citizens’ claims for full citizenship, the nature of citizenship itself changes  




This research asks how did the experience of displacement and subsequent 
naturalisation shape Burundian refugees views of citizenship and considers how these 
insights help to develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a 
displacement context. In order to approach these questions, this chapter develops an 
analytical framework which introduces the relevant themes and identifies the key 
shortcomings in the existing literature. In this effort, I aim to forge new connections 
between the existing disciplines and bodies of literature including citizenship studies, 
African studies, and migration and forced migration studies. 
 
The chapter opens by engaging with the small but influential body of literature on 
Burundian refugees in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995; Daley, 1989; Sommers, 2001a; 
Turner, 2010). These works highlight how people’s aspirations and dispositions 
towards Tanzanian citizenship have changed over time, which provides a more 
comprehensive understanding of the context in which TANCOSS was developed, 
implemented and understood by the people concerned. Revisiting the earlier studies 
against the backdrop of TANCOSS opens spaces for both observing the continuity of 
key themes and challenging the established analysis with new empirical insights.   
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The second part of the chapter outlines the relevant theories of citizenship. First, I 
briefly introduce the main tenets of citizenship theory and I outline why exclusion, 
inequality and the diverging understandings of citizenship as ‘right’ and citizenship as 
‘privilege’ are the main tensions in citizenship theory (Bosniak, 2006; Bezabeh, 2011; 
Castles & Davidson, 2000; Castles, 2005; Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Wimmer & 
Glick Shiller, 2002). I use this discussion to bring attention to what it means to be a 
citizen in Tanzania and how is that removed from the normative citizenship ideal 
(Kelsall, 2003; Makulilo, 2012; Kabyemela, 2017). Next, I turn to citizenship in 
African studies (ed. Hunter, 2016; MacLean, 2011; Mamdani, 1996; Smith, 2013), 
discussing the relationship between belonging and land, and the new insights that the 
context of displacement can bring into the existing debates. Finally, I look at the 
contemporary literature on ‘acts of citizenship’, which locates citizenship in claim-
making processes, beyond legal and institutional recognition. Instead, this body of 
literature (Holston & Appadurai, 1996; Lowe, 1996; Ong, 1999; Lazar, 2012) focuses 
on citizenship as a practice and explores the differences between formal and informal, 
active citizenship.  
 
The second key theoretical concept in this thesis is displacement. In the third part of 
the chapter, I evaluate the relevant literature on displacement, outlining the existing 
debates on the difference between displacement and migration and defining how I 
understand and use the concept of displacement in my research. Here, I briefly outline 
the concept of durable solutions and in relation to it I differentiate between operation 
and relational definitions of displacement. In defining displacement, I draw on insights 
 53 
from Bakewell (2011), Brun (2015), Grabska (2015), Hammar (2014), Lubkemann 
(2008), and my own qualitative work.  
 
In the fourth part of the chapter, I scrutinise the existing literature on restoration of 
citizenship in displacement and situate my research in relation to these efforts 
(Bradley, 2008; Hovil & Lomo 2015; Long, 2013a; Van Hear, 2006). I observe, 
however, that the distinctive process of evolving citizenship in displacement does not 
receive sufficient attention in the existing studies. To illustrate this, I outline the 
distinction between de jure and de facto citizenship and the shortcomings of this 
debate. I argue that the existing approaches fail to account for the experiences of the 
people concerned and that a more nuanced understanding of citizenship in 
displacement is needed. I propose a concept of ‘probational citizenship’, which I 
develop in conversation with a growing body of literature on different forms of 
citizenship that blur the boundaries between citizenship and non-citizenship 
(Menjívar, 2006; Bosniak, 2008, Nyers, 2010, 2018; McNevin, 2011; Rigo, 2018). All 
of the existing concepts of ‘ambigious’ (Mhurchú, 2014), ‘irregular’ (Nyers, 2010) 
citizenships, however, have been developed in the Western context, and they fail to 
account for the specific characteristics of citizenship in displacement in Africa.  
 
Moreover, I argue that what is missing from the existing conceptualisations of 
citizenship in displacement is close attention to the essential aspects of displacement 
such as uncertainty and temporality. Thus, the aim of this chapter is to lay out an 
analytical framework for approaching and understanding citizenship in displacement. 
Rather than deconstructing the concept of citizenship itself, in this thesis I explore how 
 54 
experiences and priorities of the displaced can shift and alter the established elements 
and understanding of citizenship. 
 
3.1. Burundian refugees in Tanzania: past and present  
  
There is a limited, though influential, body of literature on Burundian refugees in 
Tanzania including the work of Liisa Malkki (1992, 1995, 1996), Patricia Daley (1989, 
1991, 2013), Marc Sommers (1995, 2001a) and Simon Turner (2004, 2010). 
Engagement with these studies allows for gaining a long-term perspective into how 
Burundian refugees’ aspirations and dispositions towards Tanzanian citizenship have 
changed. The decision of the majority of Burundian refugees in Tanzania to apply for 
naturalisation stands as a counterpoint to the earlier narratives, which emphasize 
protection of refugee status and repatriation (Malkki, 1995). My work was developed 
in conversation with these earlier studies, tracing the reasons and determinants behind 
people’s decision to remain in Tanzania. As such, engagement with the existing studies 
anchors the analytical framework in the specific context of Burundian refugees in 
Tanzania and at the same time provides an entry point into the ensuing, broader 
conceptual discussions of citizenship and displacement.  
 
Identity and belonging in displacement 
  
In Purity and Exile, Liisa Malkki (1995) expands on the postmodern notion of 
deterritorialised identity (Clifford, 1992; Hannerz, 1996; Soysal, 1994; Appadurai, 
2001), exploring how it plays out and transforms when applied in the context of forced 
migration. Following ethnographic research with Burundian refugees in Mishamo 
 55 
camp and in Kigoma town in the 1980s, she develops a compelling argument that the 
Hutu refugees in Tanzania have re-territorialised themselves in displacement, where 
the homeland became a moral destination, rather than a territorial or topographic entity 
(Malkki, 1992). To achieve that, she contrasts the purist notion of identity constructed 
in the camps with the pragmatic processes through which some Burundian refugees 
assimilated and established livelihoods in Kigoma town. She discusses elements such 
as intermarriage with citizens, obtaining documentation and seeing a return to Burundi 
as undesirable, and shows how these stood in contrast with the priorities and desires 
of the population living in the camp (Malkki, 1995a).  
 
Malkki finds that those living in Mishamo camp created an elaborate ‘mythico-history’ 
of the Hutu people, which gave significance and meaning to exile, and promised a 
collective return to Burundi. Other refugees, who had assimilated in a more urban 
setting of Kigoma, shaped their identities in response to the circumstances of their day 
to day lives. In line with postmodern notions of deterritorialised identity, Malkki 
rejects assumptions of simply linking people to places, and instead proposes a more 
nuanced perspective that highlights the making of identity and the meaning and power 
that people extract from the social location they inhabit (Malkki, 1992, 1995a). Her 
work is a critique of a ‘sedentarist’ bias (1995, p. 208), which she defines as a tendency 
to conceive of people’s movements as problematic in a world of normal, ‘rooted’ 
citizens, attached to territories. This analysis does not imply a denial of the importance 
of place in the construction of identity, but it shifts the emphasis from static to dynamic 
modes of identification. 
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Gaim Kibreab (1999) criticises Malkki for making an artificial distinction between the 
camp and the town refugees, which according to him disregards the reality of continual 
migration of individuals and families between these locations. Moreover, Kibreab 
questions the validity of Malkki’s findings from Kigoma, arguing that the precarious 
legal situation of refugees living in towns could have likely functioned as a restrain on 
their willingness to admit attachment to a foreign territory. In her exploration of town 
refugees, Malkki was also criticised for overstating a romantic vision of 
‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘juggling’ of identities, which could be re-narrated as a 
necessity, a pragmatic survival strategy rather than an ideal. Kibreab, in contrast to 
Malkki, emphasises the practical as opposed to affective aspects of belonging, 
observing that the reality of nation-state systems and the prohibitive migration laws 
necessitate stronger attachment to the place of origin, which provides an individual 
with freedoms that cannot be obtained in exile (Kibreab, 2003). He brings attention to 
the factors that motivate peoples’ desire to return to their homes and maintains that in 
contemporary Africa access to resources (i.e. land and citizenship) is critical in 
conceptualizing belonging (Kibreab, 2003). Therefore, by arguing that ‘territory 
remains the major repository of rights and membership’, Kibreab (1999, p. 387) urges 
us to reconsider the objective existence of deterritorialised identities.  
 
In this thesis, I continue the debates began by Malkki and Kibreab, taking the existing 
analysis a step further by complementing and challenging it with the new empirical 
material. The new context of mass naturalisation allows for developing a further 
understanding of what significance does citizenship status and access to land have for 
long-term and sustainable integration of refugees. Building on Malkki’s and Kibreab’s 
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insights allows for adopting a longitudinal perspective on citizenship in displacement, 
both continuing and challenging the earlier conversations.  
 
Valuing refugee status over citizenship  
  
Another important contribution to the literature on Burundian refugees in Tanzania 
has been made by Marc Sommers in his book Fear in Bongoland (2001a). In the book, 
Sommers (2001a) relates the events from the time of Mrema’s ultimatum. In 1992, 
Augustine Mrema, then Tanzanian Minister of Home Affairs, announced that 
Burundian refugees had three months to decide whether they wished to repatriate or 
become Tanzanian citizens. Mrema’s ultimatum was a result of compounded efforts 
of the Burundian and Tanzanian governments to assure Burundian refugees that 
conditions in Burundi were stable and peaceful. Mrema’s ultimatum was never upheld, 
but it stirred up the debates about the choice between naturalisation and repatriation 
for the 1972 Burundian refugees in Tanzania.  
 
Sommers (2001a) labels the events of 1992 ‘a crisis in the lives of all Burundian 
refugees in Tanzania’ (p. 196) and argues that refugees responded to the ultimatum 
with fear and anxiety. He relates feelings of helplessness and panic that spread among 
the people with whom he was acquainted. Sommers argues that the people concerned 
did not want to seize the opportunity to apply for Tanzanian citizenship, but at the 
same time they did not think that Burundi was safe enough to return to. Likewise, 
explaining the reception of the Ministry’s ultimatum, Malkki (1995) cites a letter from 
one of her informants, who wrote: ‘It seems therefore that 90% of the people of 
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Mishamo will prefer to regain their native country, included in that myself and my 
family’ (p. 278). 
 
Based on fieldwork conducted in 1986, and subsequent correspondence with her 
informants, Malkki (1995) holds that assimilation at the level of naturalisation was 
resisted and refused by the majority of the Burundians living in the camps, as it 
signified abandoning the hope of a collective return to the ‘homeland’. At that time, 
naturalisation was seen as detrimental for the construction of deterritorialised Hutu 
identity in exile, which was constructed through notions of ‘purity’ and ‘marginality’ 
(Malkki, 1992, p. 35). Thus, Malkki (1995) presents an argument that for the 
overarching purpose of constructing a collective identity, Hutu refugees in Tanzania 
wanted to remain in a categorical state of displacement, both ‘legally and socially’ (p. 
209).  
 
The narrative of protecting a refugee identity against naturalisation is a common thread 
in all works on Burundian refugees in Tanzania. Daley’s (1989, 1991) early research 
on Burundian refugees focuses on the settlement of Katumba. Although Daley’s early 
work does not focus on questions of belonging and citizenship, she notes that very few 
refugees seized an opportunity to apply for citizenship, as refugee status was 
considered to bring more benefits. In line with Daley’s (1989) observations, Turner 
(2004) shows how maintaining a refugee status can provide a more attractive 
alternative to the national citizenship of Tanzania because it gives ‘access to the 
resources offered by the international community’ (Turner, 2004, p. 231). Moreover, 
he notes that for refugees who continue to believe strongly in the Burundi nation, 
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retaining a refugee status helps to also protect a hope and possibility of return (Turner, 
2010, p. 239).  
 
Malkki (1995), as well as Daley (1989), Sommers (2001a) and Turner (2010), do not 
reflect on the possibility of naturalisation for Burundian refugees in Tanzania. At the 
time of their research, the potentiality of naturalisation was not a dominant theme 
among the refugees as many still hoped for a possibility of returning to Burundi. As 
years passed, people’s perceptions of the value of refugee status and citizenship began 
to transform.  
 
From refugee status to citizenship: changing perspectives on naturalisation 
 
In 2007, when given a choice between repatriation and naturalisation, almost 80% of 
1972 Burundian refugees opted for Tanzanian citizenship. The decision of the majority 
of Burundian refugees in Tanzania to apply for naturalisation stands as a counterpoint 
to the earlier narratives. A mythical vision of a Hutu identity contingent on retaining 
the refugee status, which was observed and described by Malkki (1995) and Sommers 
(2001b), seems to have transformed and the decision of the majority of Burundian 
refugees to apply for Tanzanian citizenship emphasizes the practical rather than 
affective aspects of belonging (Kibreab, 2003).  
 
The recent decision of hundreds of thousands of Burundian refugees to opt for 
Tanzanian citizenship, instead of returning to Burundi, indicates that the sense and 
strategies of belonging have transformed over time. Both the people and their concerns 
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have changed, and the decision to opt for naturalisation is an evidence of that shift. It 
is crucial to note that at the time of the intention survey, 78% of refugees were born in 
Tanzania, and only 22% were born in Burundi (SA3, 2007, p. 17), and this extended 
time spent in exile was reported as one of the most important reasons for opting for 
naturalisation in Tanzania. Other markers included lack of trust in sustainable peace 
in Burundi, acquired familiarity with Tanzania and the Kiswahili language, access to 
land, better employment and livelihood opportunities, and a mix of personal 
obligations and aspirations.  
 
As Hannah Arendt observed, finding oneself outside of the tightly organized closed 
community of nations becomes ‘the greatest danger’ (1973, p. 294). Burundian 
refugees’ decision to apply for Tanzanian citizenship can be conceptualised as an 
attempt to reimagine and reconstruct their place in the tightening of the categorical 
order of nation-states. In her analysis, Malkki (1995) argued that refugees’ insistence 
on their liminality became meaningful as a central element of constructing a collective 
Hutu identity. According to Malkki (1992), refugees extracted meaning and power 
from the social location they inhabited, and their insistence on retaining their refugee 
status functioned as a symbol of the ultimate ‘temporariness of exile’ (p. 35). Today, 
in contrast, it is citizenship that has become a way of accessing power and asserting 
one’s identity. Instead of subverting the national categories, Burundian refugees devise 
strategies for reinventing and reimagining their place in the Tanzanian state as citizens. 
Naturalisation, however, is not a static, singular event. Rather, as the narratives of 
Burundian refugees in Tanzania illustrate, it is a long and non-linear process which 
encompasses elements such as registration, accessing documents, and asserting rights 
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that come with the new status. This new context requires new conceptual tools to 
capture the process of evolving citizenship in displacement.  
 
3.2. Key tenets and tensions of citizenship theory  
 
 
The status of citizenship marks the membership of individuals in a state. Citizens 
possess a range of civil, political and social rights which are accompanied by a series 
of obligations to the community and the state. Citizenship, in its aspirational form, 
leads to securing equal treatment and participation of all in the state. The reality of this 
ideal, however, has always been different, and the two main tensions in citizenship 
theory are inequality and exclusion; both between and within states. In the simplest 
terms, citizens differ from non-citizens in the extent of voting rights, freedom of 
movement, ability to run for political positions, and ability to own land and property. 
Ability to exercise these and other rights, however, depends on social and economic 
resources, which leads to inequality between citizens. In this section, I discuss the 
origin and key tenets of citizenship theory with close attention to the main tensions in 
citizenship theory, mainly inequality, exclusion and the divergent views of ‘citizenship 
as a right’ and ‘citizenship as a privilege’.  
 
Social and political citizenship  
 
Contemporary writing about citizenship presents citizenship as both a status, which 
accords a range of rights and obligations and as an active practice. Bosniak (2006), 
following Shklar (1995), categorises citizenship in three different ways: first, as a legal 
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status, which encompasses civil, political, and social rights. In that understanding, a 
citizen is a legal person acting according to the law and having the right to claim the 
law’s protection. Second, as a state of active engagement in the community, where 
citizens are political agents actively participating in a society’s political institutions. 
Third, as membership in a political community. Bosniak (2006) expands on the 
concept of citizenship to include a cultural orientation and a source of a distinct form 
of identity, including individual identity, collective identity, and social integration.  
 
As J.G.A Pocock’s (1992) well-known work demonstrates, the contemporary thinking 
about citizenship, such as Bosniak’s (2006) categorisation, has its conceptual origins 
in the early Athenian and Roman conceptions, which carried forward to our time. From 
the Roman model, we derive thinking about citizenship as legal status and the widely 
shared understanding of citizenship as rights. The Aristotelian view of active 
citizenship puts at the centre of citizenship's political dimension, emphasises citizens' 
participation and approaches membership as a practice of collective self-governance. 
Roman tradition is closely reflected in the work of British sociologist T. H. Marshall 
(1983), who is best known for his description of citizenship as constituted by a 
tripartite structure of civil, political, and social rights.  
 
Drawing on the context of post-war welfare state in Britain, Marshall (1983) 
elaborated a notion of social citizenship, a rights-based model of citizenship under 
which citizens are entitled to services (such as housing, education, health). Access to 
services was meant to allow citizens full participation in British society. Marshall 
(1983) equated community with the nation and viewed membership in that community 
 63 
as primarily an individual ownership of a set of rights and corresponding duties. 
Citizenship, in that perspective, is primarily a legal status ascribed to individuals; with 
rights and benefits given to each by the nation-state. The now normative definition of 
citizenship by T. H. Marshall is: ‘Citizenship is a status bestowed on those who are 
full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal [emphasis added] 
with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed’ (Marshall, 1983, 
p. 253). This definition of social citizenship remains the foundation for studies of 
citizenship and social policy. 
 
Marshall’s social citizenship, however, has been criticised for undermining civil 
liberties and being unable to offer real equality to marginalised groups. Marshall’s 
critics exposed the tension between civil and social rights, arguing that the universal 
aims of the welfare state contradicted the individual aims of each citizen. Revi (2014) 
shows that Marshall was aware of the limitations of this conceptual framework, but 
‘nonetheless held the provision of social rights to be a valuable normative project’ 
(Revi, 2014, p. 454). In other words, Marshall believed that social citizenship, even if 
difficult to achieve, was a valuable, normative approach worth striving for.  
 
Anthropologists and political scientist have challenged the rights-based approach 
arguing that meaningful membership is more than the possession of rights and 
responsibilities. Rather, it is something that needs to be maintained and requires active 
participation: active citizenship (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Lister, 1997; Mouffe 
1992; Oldfield, 1990). This civic republican version of citizenship goes back to 
Aristotle and can be traced through the work of Alexis de Tocqueville, Rousseau, 
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Hannah Arendt, among others. From Greek times, the participation of citizens in 
politics was considered essential for creating the sense of community necessary for 
political life (Fotopoulos, 1997). That participation was meditated ‘not only through 
voting but also through speech and deliberation’ (Castoriadis, 1992 as cited in Lazar, 
2012, p. 340). For those who follow this tradition, citizenship denotes the process of 
democratic self-government and the practice of active engagement in the life of the 
political community. In contrast to the liberal tradition which emphasises protecting 
individual freedoms, the republican model prioritises citizens’ active participation in 
decision-making.  
 
The different models are not, of course, mutually exclusive. Some elements of each 
co-exist in the various conceptualisations of citizenship. The differences are created 
by the aspects (status, rights or participation) that are foregrounded. Understanding the 
schematic difference between the civic republican version of citizenship and the liberal 
tradition, however, is helpful for explaining the distinction between the notion of 
‘citizenship as a privilege’ and ‘citizenship as a right’. The proponents of the liberal 
tradition prioritise protection of individual freedoms and rights over active 
participation and they approach and conceptualise citizenship as a ‘right’. This 
approach to citizenship has been instrumental in shaping many international laws and 
‘the right to a nationality’ is now enshrined in a series of international legal 
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). On the 
other hand, the civic republican version of citizenship emphasizes that citizenship is a 
privilege that needs to be gained and maintained through various behaviours and 
practices depending on the context. In that conceptualisation, deprivation of 
 65 
citizenship through denaturalisation becomes justifiable. In reality, however, the 
distinction between these two versions of citizenship is not clear-out. The authorities 
in power, naturalised citizens and other members of the society can express different 
and conflicting perspectives on the question of citizenship being a right or privilege 
and these can overlap and change over time.  
 
Key tensions in citizenship theory  
 
As an ideal, the concept of citizenship evokes virtues of equality in access to rights 
and political participation among the members of the same polity. The reality, 
however, has always been different, and the problems of inequality and exclusion 
constitute the two main tensions at the core of citizenship theory. Despite the claim 
that liberalism provides universal citizenship to all members of the polity, various 
disadvantaged groups and minorities have challenged that premise (Kymlicka, 1994). 
Discrimination based on class, gender, ethnicity, religion, and other criteria exists in 
most nation-states, and it has always meant that various groups enjoy varying degrees 
of rights and privileges within the same polity (Wimmer, 2002; Castles, 2005).  
 
Inequality in access to rights and privileges among citizens of one polity has always 
meant that some people could not be full citizens (Castles & Davidson, 2000). 
Depending on the country, the result is an internally divided society with differentiated 
citizenship. Citizenship manifests unevenly across space and time as well as within 
particular political or social communities, producing what Bezabeh (2011) refers to as 
‘graduated citizenship’, characterised by differently-valued positions on a hierarchical 
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‘citizenship ladder’. Another aspect of inequality of citizenship is that not all 
citizenships are equally valuable. Tanzanian citizenship or EU member state 
citizenship offer very different access to visas, travel, employment, scholarships, and 
benefits. Thus, citizenship is inherently unequal both within and between states.  
 
Inequality of citizenship is exposed by the movement of people and the exclusion of 
migrants and refugees from citizenship. The growing international movement of 
people questions the basis for belonging to one nation-state and exposes the inherent 
exclusionary tendencies of citizenship (Brubaker, 1992; Castles & Davidson, 2000; 
Bosniak, 2006). From the perspective of movement, national citizenship is not an 
equalising measure; but rather a mechanism that protects the privilege of the few 
(Joppke, 2010; Jones, 2016). Brubaker (1992) was the first to articulate the inherent 
tension in citizenship as both ‘internally inclusive’ and ‘externally exclusive’. 
Internally inclusive stands for citizenship allowing for only one formally equal 
membership status within society. Externally exclusive, on the other hand, denotes 
citizenship’s capacity to exclude all foreigners from equal membership status 
categorically. Brubaker (1992) has demonstrated that although seemingly 
contradictory, these two tendencies of citizenship are intrinsically interrelated.  
 
In the context of lived experiences and circumstances of Burundian refugees, these 
tensions of inequality between citizens of the same country as well as between citizens 
and non-citizens are exposed and aggravated. The people I worked with experienced 
exclusion on the basis of their status as ‘refugees’ and their marginalisation manifested 
itself especially through movement control, lack of ID documentation, and inability to 
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make political decisions about their immediate surroundings. After being politically 
silenced for decades, today, former refugees aspire to a normative ideal of citizenship, 
emphasizing active political participation, mobility and land rights as crucial element 
of citizenship. Their aspirations, however, need to be seen the local and national 
context of Tanzania, where many Tanzanian citizens also feel disempowered and 
disfranchised (Kelsall, 2003; Makulilo, 2012; Kabyemela, 2017). Acknowledging 
these paradoxes and thinking about the situation of the former refugees in the broader, 
national context is crucial for fully understanding the experiences of displacement and 
consequently the ways in which former refugee conceptualise citizenship.   
 
Capabilities Approach and citizenship 
 
In order to flesh out the complexities of evolving citizenship in displacement, I turn to 
Sen’s Capabilities Approach (CA). Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, have 
developed capabilities approach (CA) framework which claims to provide practical 
and analytical guidance to understand, measure and promote freedom (1993). 
Capabilities approach proposes that a person’s capability represents the effective 
freedom of an individual to choose between different functioning combinations – 
between different kinds of life – that a person has reason to value. According to Sen 
(1999), the various kinds of resources we have should never be misunderstood as goals 
in their own right. Rather, they are needed to achieve certain functionings and to be 
able to choose between different functionings. The number of potential functionings 
is unlimited ranging from very basic ones, such as being sufficiently nourished or 
having access to adequate housing, to complex ones, such as having self-respect or 
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being able to participate in society (Sen, 1989). The question of the ability to choose 
between different functionings, different kinds of life, is crucial in the capabilities 
approach and it proves fruitful when applied in the context of my case study.  
 
Although the CA has been broadly applied by philosophers, political theorists and 
development practitioners, it has only occasionally been applied to issues of 
citizenship explicitly (see Deakin, 2005; Pfister, 2012). In addition, the broad literature 
on citizenship has taken up the CA only rarely and, if at all, then mostly with regard 
to the specific dimension of social citizenship (Pfister, 2012, p. 241). Scholars have 
pointed out that it is not clear how the CA relates to rights (Deakin, 2005), that the CA 
does not account for structural inequalities (Lewis & Giullari, 2005) and that it ignores 
power relations and power struggles which are essential for understanding citizenship 
(Zimmermann, 2006).  
 
The CA is certainly not a citizenship theory, and this is not how I apply it in this thesis. 
Rather, I see the strength of the CA approach in its’ attention and focus on the different 
lives people are able to live rather than on abstract conditions. The CA provides 
concrete tools and markers that reveal how different individuals and groups achieve 
(or fail to achieve) the functionings they desire. In the context of my case study, the 
CA is helpful for discerning the differentiation within the Burundian refugee 
community, for understanding the specific challenges of displacement, and for 
creating analytical space for individual choices and desires in relation to citizenship. I 
hold that capability, understood as a freedom to achieve various lifestyles (Sen, 1999, 
p. 75), is a productive lens for researching the tangible and intangible changes in 
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Burundian refugees’ lives following naturalisation, which would otherwise remain 
invisible, such as mobility, safety, and ability to plan for the future.  
 
3.4. Citizenship in African Studies  
 
Researchers have examined how state institutions have shaped the construction of 
political identities as well as the normative content of citizenship in Africa (ed. Hunter, 
2016; MacLean 2011; Mamdani, 1996). In many places, institutions that affect 
people’s lives face a crisis of legitimacy and citizens express disillusionment with 
governments, expressing concern over their lack of responsiveness to the needs of the 
poor (Narayan et al., 2000). In fact, as Hunter (2016) observes, there is a perception 
that Africa is suffering from so-called ‘crisis of citizenship’ (p.1). Moreover, many 
scholars argue that the return of multiparty politics gave rise to new dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion which have led to the denial of rights and privileges to those 
designated as ‘strangers’ (Dorman, Hammett & Nugent, 2007). Geschiere (2011) 
observes that the exclusion of ‘strangers’ and ‘migrants’ proved to be a fruitful 
political strategy on a continent where movement has always been the norm and 
discourses of autochthony become a powerful tool for expression of exclusion and 
inclusion. It is crucial to highlight that even those who ‘enjoy the legal status of 
citizenship and the political rights that flow from it face difficulties in approaching the 
state as active citizens engaged in ruling themselves’ (Hammar, 2016, p. 1). Thus, 
inequality between citizens and non-citizens as well as citizens and second-class 
citizens, is aggravated in many African countries, including Tanzania. These 
inequalities of citizenship and exclusion strategies are often exposed in relation to land 
rights.   
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Land, citizenship and the discourse of autochthony  
 
Land and citizenship are intertwined, both in Western thought, as well as in the more 
specific African context. According to Mahmood Mamdani (2001), in contemporary 
Africa, access to rights and ability to exercise political agency are informed by the 
notion of ‘indigeneity’, which directly links belonging to the land. He argues that these 
autochthonous discourses are rooted in the colonial tendency to define every citizen as 
either native or settler. Under colonialism, identity and land became increasingly 
intertwined (Boas & Dunn, 2013). In Sudan, the distinction between settlers and 
natives became official, from administration to law. There, ‘native’ were treated 
preferentially and non-natives were discriminated against in access to land, settlement 
disputes, and participation in governance (Mamdani, 2001). Upon independence, as 
Mamdani (2001) contends, Africans seized the legal language of rights and citizenship, 
but reproduced the colonial mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion. 
 
The contemporary literature on autochthony has been shaped primarily by Ceuppens 
and Geschiere (2005), Geschiere (2009), Jackson (2006), and Geschiere and 
Nyamnjoh (2000). These works explore and try to account for the intensification of 
the politics of belonging and exclusion, especially in Francophone Africa. The logic 
of autochthony holds that people can only claim belonging and ownership in places 
where they can demonstrate some ancestral affiliation (Geschiere & Nyamnjoh, 2000, 
p. 448). Following Mamdani, Patricia Daley (2013) argues that ‘indigeneity’ has 
become the de facto basis for access to citizenship rights in Africa. Migrants’ and 
refugees’ access to land has become a contentious issue, leading to violent clashes 
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between the ‘native’ and ‘incoming’ populations in many countries across the 
continent including Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Kenya 
(Boas & Dunn, 2013). I argue, however, that there is a risk that this emphasis on 
autochthony hides other instances and quiet cases of integration, in which autochthony 
is not the dominant trope through which citizenship or land rights are claimed, as this 
thesis demonstrates in the case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. 
 
It is crucial to stress here that it is the ‘discourses of indigeneity’ rather than 
‘indigeneity’ per se that is the crux of the debate. Autochthony is a strategy, not a fact 
– it is an attempt to reify claims about identity and obscure the dynamic processes of 
identification (Boas & Dunn, 2013). In the Politics of Origin (2013), Boas and Dunn 
bring attention to the function of land and landlessness in the making of contemporary 
identity in Africa, and observe how because of its ambiguity and plasticity, the 
discourses of autochthony are employed to validate claims of belonging and 
ownership. Boas and Dunn (2013) define autochthony as a ‘discourse that links 
identity and space and thus allows the speaker to establish a direct claim to a territory 
by asserting that he or she is an original inhabitant and a son of the soil’ (Boas & Dunn, 
2013, p. 2). As evidence shows, the discourses of autochthony are malleable and 
adjusted to respond to the current political needs and realities (Geschiere, 2009, p. 62).  
 
The denial of a right to citizenship has far-reaching consequences. In fact, as Manby 
(2009) argues, it lies at the heart of many conflicts in post-colonial Africa. In the book 
Struggles for Citizenship (2009), she discerns a relationship between peace, security, 
and national citizenship law in seven different countries in Africa. She argues that 
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political leaders seek to buttress their support among one part of the population, 
consequently excluding others by abuse and manipulation of citizenship laws. The 
denial of the rights to citizenship becomes a first step in denial of other rights, and 
ultimately, such political strategies lead to economic and political struggles, or even 
war. Geschiere and Nyamnjoh (2000) support this argument and show that 
autochthony discourses have gained strength in connection to the democratisation 
processes in Africa in the 1990s.  
 
The discussions of autochthony and the importance of land ownership for political 
belonging are crucial in relation to my case study. 1972 Burundian refugees were given 
access to land to live and farm on. Over the decades, they strengthened their access to 
land within the settlements through productive use of land, land transactions, and the 
recognition of Tanzanian neighbours. Following naturalisation, land became a key 
marker of citizenship for the former Burundian refugees. In Chapter 6, I explore the 
strategies that former refugees employ to make claims to land following naturalisation 
and I argue that the paradigm of autochthony does not capture the concerns of 
accessing land in this particular context of displacement, which exhibits different 
characteristics.  
 
3.5. Citizenship as a claim-making process  
 
Anthropologists and other scholars (see Holston & Appadurai, 1996; Lowe, 1996; 
Lazar, 2012; Ong, 1996; Smith, 2013) have examined how states make citizens under 
various citizenship regimes and how citizens make themselves as political subjects 
through practices of claim-making. In this conceptualisation, citizenship as an 
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analytical category is a practice of articulating claims to rights on the state or other 
institutions. This can take various forms from refugees making claims on camp 
authorities (Ilcan, 2014) to slum dwellers making claims to the city through the illegal 
residence and house building (Holston, 2009). Bloemraad (2016) expands this notion 
and argues that claim-making can occur between the individual and the state but also 
between fellow citizens and non-citizens.  
 
Thinking about citizenship as claim-making has its roots in the feminist critique of 
classical notions of citizenship, which undermined the idea that a private domain exists 
distinct and insulated from state and law. Thanks to feminist contributions, citizenship 
has gained substantial release from its conventional association with the traditionally 
defined public sphere and thinking about what constitutes the domain of political has 
been expanded (Okin, 1992). The feminist critique also inspired a burgeoning body of 
literature on acts of citizenship that emphasise that people can engage in citizenship 
practices even when lacking legal status and political membership (Werbner & Yuval-
Davis, 1999). 
 
This mode of analysis disrupts the conventional dependency of citizenship on the 
statist model, and it expands the boundaries of the concept. The crux of this mode of 
analysis is that citizenship is something that must be enacted or claimed, and these 
claims can be made on various institutions, not necessarily the state. In the book Acts 
of Citizenship, Isin (2008) defines acts of citizenship as: ‘Those acts that transform 
forms (orientations, strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, 
aliens) of being political by bringing into being new acts as activist citizens (claimants 
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of rights and responsibilities) through creating new sites and scales of struggle’ (p. 39). 
Following Isin’s earlier work, in the recent Handbook of Global Citizenship Studies, 
Isin and Nyers (2014) define citizenship broadly as an ‘institution’ mediating rights 
between the subjects of politics and the polity to which these subjects belong. 
 
The idea of substantive citizenship and claim-making as citizenship-making practice 
has been elaborated by Holston and Appadurai drawing on case studies from the 
impoverished urban metropolis of India and Brazil. Holston and Appadurai (2003) 
argue that: ‘Struggles over the nature of belonging to the national society […] are 
particularly evident in the social movements of the urban poor for rights to the city. 
They are especially associated with the emergence of democracy because they 
empower poor citizens to mobilise around the redistributive right-claims of 
citizenship’ (p. 302). These processes of claim-making, as Holston and Appadurai 
show, are ‘unprecedented in many cases because they create new kinds of rights 
outside of the normative and institutional definitions of the state and its legal codes 
[...] by affirming access to housing, property, sanitation, health services, education, 
child care, and so forth on the basis of citizenship’ (p. 302). The literature on ‘acts of 
citizenship’ is relevant for my case study because it sheds light on what strategies non-
citizens and second-class citizens (or, in my case, former refugees) employ to claim 
rights and what rights are accessible to them. 
 
The result of these struggles is that not only do more people become beneficiaries of 
socio-economic rights, but also through that experience the very conception of right 
and citizenship changes. Rights, in that conceptualisation, are not something that 
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citizens receive and possess; rather, rights become more of a claim upon the world, a 
‘claim upon society for the resources necessary to meet the basic needs and interests 
of members rather than a kind of property some possess and others do not’ (Holston 
& Appadurai, 2003, p. 302). The underlying reason why the claim-making processes 
are successful is based on new urban workers confidence that because they contribute 
to the public sphere economically, they should be as well allowed to contribute morally 
and politically.  
 
Contemporary approaches to citizenship increasingly conceptualise everyday 
interactions as an important domain in which citizenship is manifested (and denied), 
highlighting a distinction between formal and substantive aspects of citizenship. In this 
thesis, I use the term ‘formal citizenship’ to denote the legal-statutory dimensions 
associated with universalised, formal rights and obligations, as well as citizenship 
documentation. When I refer to ‘substantive’ or ‘active’ citizenship, I think broadly 
about how ‘the array of civil, political, socio-economic, and cultural rights people 
possess and exercise’ (Holston & Appadurai, 1996, p. 190). Holston and Appadurai 
(1996, p. 190) argue that much of the turmoil of citizenship derives from discrepancy 
between theory and practice of citizenship, where in theory full access to rights 
depends on membership but in practice that which constitutes citizenship substantively 
is often independent of its formal status.  
 
Although I find the distinction and interaction between formal and substantive 
citizenship helpful for my framing of citizenship in displacement, I disagree with 
Holston and Appadurai’s (1996) observation that ‘formal citizenship is less necessary 
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for access to substantive rights’ (p. 190). Holston and Appadurai (1996) maintain that 
because in many places in the world institutions that affect people’s lives face a crisis 
of legitimacy, there is an increasing consciousness that for many people, in practice, 
formal, national citizenship is a meaningless idea (Heater, 1999, p. 3). My findings 
stand as a counterpoint to this analysis and drawing on the experiences of former 
Burundian refugees, in this thesis I explore the tangible and intangible benefits of 
formal, state citizenship and the significance of the materiality of citizenship 
documents in displacement. Before turning to the discussion of the complex interplay 
of de facto and de jure citizenship in displacement, I first outline the contours of the 
concept of displacement.  
 
3.6. The relational and operational concepts of displacement  
 
Displacement, broadly, is an act, experience or effect of some form of the enforced 
dislocation of people from their homes, typically because of war, persecution, or 
natural disaster (Hammar, 2014). As such, the concept has a long history itself, and it 
constituted the human experience of violent conquest, occupation, enclosure, 
enslavement, dispossession, forced resettlement, with their profound individual as well 
as collective consequences (Hammar, 2014, p. 4-5). In recent history, however, 
displacement emerged as a concept and as an object of study. This was linked to 
humanitarian efforts meant to address the situation of migrations and refugees in the 
post- Second World War era. Focusing on typologies of causes, and forms of physical 
dislocation or removal, relocation, and resettlement, an entire humanitarian regime has 
come into being aimed at protecting or assisting those categorised within this 
framework (Harrell-Bond, 1986). As Hammar (2014) observes, in that solution-
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oriented context, ‘displacement’ has evolved as an operational rather than relational 
concept.5 In this part of the chapter, I discuss the difference between migration and 
displacement and define how I understand and use the concept of displacement in this 
study. Before moving to that discussion, however, I first briefly discuss the legacy of 
Hannah Arend’t understanding of causes and consequences of displacement and the 
origin and context of ‘durable solutions’.   
 
Refugees in the nation-state-territory triad  
 
In Origins of Totalitarianism (1973), Hannah Arendt maps out both the process 
through which refugees were created and the results of this enforced alienation. She 
points out to how the structure of a tightly organised community of nations where 
human rights are only realised when one is a citizen is the underlying cause of the 
suffering encountered by those in displacement. In Arendt’s words, ‘finding oneself 
outside of the tightly organised closed communities of nations becomes the greatest 
danger’ (1973, p. 294).  
 
In the field of migration studies, Arendt’s lasting contribution can be located precisely 
in her identification of the causes and consequences of displacement. Arendt identifies 
the source of ‘refugeehood' in the structure of the international order rather than in the 
direct conditions that force people to migrate. It is crucial here that migration and 
borders existed before and movement of individuals or whole groups of people for 
 
5 Operational concept of displacement is understood here as a solution-oriented theorisation of 
displacement whereas relational concept of displacement shifts attention the relations and dynamics 
that shape the experience of displacement. 
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political or economic reasons is not unprecedented. What is unprecedented, as Arendt 
(1973) writes, ‘is not the loss of a home but the impossibility of finding a new one’ (p. 
293). 
Starting from this premise, refugees and migrants lack the citizens’ unproblematic 
grounding within a territorial space which deprives them of access to rights (Soguk, 
1999, p. 10). As such, refugees and other migrants are a challenge to the conventional 
conceptions of membership in the political community (Soguk, 1999) because they do 
not conform to the definition of citizens as members in a nation-state. In that 
framework, refugees and other migrants are constructed in contrast to the ‘normal’, 
rooted citizen. While the citizen remains rooted in the territorial space, the refugee is 
seen as uprooted from the community of citizens.  
The anthropologist Liisa Malkki (1992, 1995) was among the first to link the critique 
of the ties between people and territories to nationalist discourses. In her work, Malkki 
explores how sedentarist thinking permeates both ‘nationalist discourses and […] 
scholarly studies of nations, nationalism, and refugees’ (1992, p. 25). Taking the 
metaphor of roots and rootedness seriously, she provides a schematic exploration of 
how ordinary language reflects taken-for-granted ways of thinking about identity and 
territory: 
Motherland and fatherland, aside from their other historical connotations, 
suggest that each nation is a grand genealogical tree, rooted in the soil that 
nourishes it. By implication, it is impossible to be a part of more than one tree. 
Such a tree evokes both temporal continuity of essence and territorial 
rootedness (Malkki, 1992, p. 28). 
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Building on the recent shift in anthropology, Malkki exposes how sedentarism is so 
pervasive in our thinking that it is almost invisible. It is not just a theoretical 
observation, as sedentary metaphysics is key in legitimising the international nation-
state system and structuring responses to displacement. In other words, seeing the 
world as rooted and bounded dominates and shapes social practice and policy. In the 
next section, I turn to a brief discussion of durable solutions and the operational 
understanding of displacement.  
 
Durable solutions  
 
The administrative apparatus that deals with the phenomenon of displacement (often 
also termed forced displacement or forced migration) as a social and legal category of 
global dimensions emerged and developed only toward the end of the Second World 
War (Zolberg et al., 1983). This is not to say that before that people did not migrate 
and seek refuge, but techniques and processes for managing them did not exist in its 
modern form. The first formal, global instrument put in place was the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, later supplemented by the 1967 
Protocol (Gottwald 2012).6 The Convention proposed a definition of refugee, which 
stated that:  
 
Refugees is a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group 
 
6 These agreements were a legacy of earlier attempts at Refugee Conventions and earlier agencies 
with specific mandates (e.g. Nansen’s repatriation agreement with Russians back in 1921), however 
1951 Convention differed in terms of scale and reach.  
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or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it [...] 
 
142 states adopted the 1951 Convention and these agreements mandated the United 
Nation Higher Commission to Refugees (UNHCR) to facilitate what became known 
as three durable solutions7: local integration in countries of asylum, resettlement to 
third countries, and voluntary repatriation (Gottwald, 2012). In essence, durable 
solutions are an attempt to rebuild refugees’ relationship to a territorial state, and they 
refer to any measure that ends refugee status for the individuals or groups involved 
(Yacob-Haliso, 2016, p. 53). It is essential to highlight here that 1951 Convention and 
UNHCR statutes were shaped by the context of Cold War tensions and reflect the 
political concerns of that time. For that reason, none of this related to the specific 
African context and the agreements said almost nothing about voluntary repatriation. 
 
In 1969 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) expanded the existing definition to 
reflect Africa's history of colonial uprisings and internal political and military 
uprisings. The primary concern was to establish a definition that addresses a large 
number of Africans fleeing conflict arising from the struggles against 
colonialism. The OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
 
7 Although not specifically coined as ‘durable solutions’ in the 1951 Convention, as this policy term 
entered into usage only in the 1970s. 
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Problems in Africa (the OAU Refugee Convention) was enacted in 1969 and came 
into force in 1974. In result, the definition added an external dimension to the primary 
internal threats identified in the UN Convention. The OAU proposed that the term 
‘refugee', besides encompassing the Convention definition, should ‘also apply to every 
person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events 
seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or 
nationality’, was forced to ‘seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin 
or nationality’. Also, while the 1951 Convention recognised the right of refugees to 
return to their places of origin, the OAU explicitly stressed that repatriation had to be 
voluntary.  
 
Tracing the development of displacement as a concept and an object of study, Hammar 
(2014) exposes the shortcomings of the above conceptualisation of displacement and 
proposes a relational (rather than operational) definition of displacement. This is 
particularly important for the analytical framework I am developing in this chapter 
because it shifts the attention from solution-oriented theorisation of displacement to 
the relations and dynamics that shape the experience of displacement. The relational 
understanding of displacement aims to capture the experience of displacement in a 
holistic way, prioritising the experiences and concerns of migrants and refugees. In the 
following paragraphs, I define how I understand and apply the concept of displacement 
in this thesis and I explain the qualitative difference between migration and 




Defining the contours of displacement  
 
Trying to define the contours of displacement brings us to the heart of theoretical 
debates at the core of forced migration studies. Forced migration as an academic study 
emerged only in the 1980s as a multi-disciplinary area. In very broad terms, within the 
discipline, we can discern two opposing but intertwined trends. On the one hand, some 
scholars advocate for widening the scope of forced migration to capture other 
displaced people whose experiences are parallel with those of refugees, such as 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) (Cohen, 2004; DeWind, 2007). On the other hand, 
others call for maintaining a sharp distinction between refugees and other displaced 
people to maintain the legal protection granted to refugees under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention (Hathaway, 2007). 
 
Bakewell (2011) suggests that the terms ‘displacement’ and ‘migration’ are often used 
interchangeably causing semantic confusion. A clear definition of the terms does not 
solve the underlying debate; however, it provides more accurate terminology that can 
move the debate forward. Through a detailed mapping of the migration processes, 
Bakewell (2011) suggests that displacement can be viewed as a particular subset of the 
broader migration space. For the purpose of this project, it is crucial to outline and 
clarify the characteristics of displacement because the experience of displacement has 
had profound consequences on how former Burundian refugees in Tanzania 
conceptualise naturalisation and citizenship. Drawing on insights from Bakewell 
(2011), Hammar (2014), Lubkemann (2008), Brun (2015), Grabska (2015) and my 
own qualitative work, in this thesis I think about displacement as an enforced, complex 
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and subjective condition of uncertainty which manifests itself through multiple 
temporalities.  
 
As Hammar (2014) argues, force (enforcement to move and to be unable to move) sets 
displacement apart from other notions such as migration, transnationalism or mobility 
more generally (De Bruijn et al., 2001). Thus, the notion of force is critical to the 
concept of displacement. It is important here, however, that what is meant as force 
ranges from overt forms of physical violence or threats to life and survival to more 
subtle and invisible ways in which people are compelled to move. Crucially, this 
approach also takes into consideration psychological dimensions associated with force 
(such as fear or desperation).  
 
Another important characteristic of displacement is that it may result in a continuous 
state of being displaced that can be maintained over time and reproduced through 
generations. Thus, as Bakewell explains (2011) 
 
 Unlike being a migrant, the condition of displacement does not become fixed 
with the end of movement; it remains an ongoing condition which is concerned 
with a separation from “home”, the place of origin from which people were 
compelled to move. It is about not being where one wants to be, and as often 
described in terms of exile […] (p. 23).  
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This means that it is possible for people to be born into the condition of displacement 
(Bakewell, 2011). Thus, rather than a process, displacement is better understood as a 
condition or a particular ‘state of being’ (Bakewell, 2011, p. 22).  
 
Thirdly, displacement is a ‘subjective condition which is based not just on one’s 
history (were you once displaced?) but also one’s ongoing sense of displacement’ 
(Bakewell, 2011, p. 23). In other words, displacement is not an objective state, but 
people can perceive themselves as displaced. This means that the condition of being 
displaced can be separated from personal experience of movement (migration). As 
Lubkemann (2008) argues ‘“refugee studies” or “forced migration studies” has 
coalesced and developed around the largely unquestioned propositions that migration 
is a requisite aspect of “displacement” (i.e. to be “displaced” one must always have 
moved) and that displacement is inevitably the product of movement under crisis 
conditions (i.e. if you migrate in a crisis context you will suffer displacement)’ (p. 
456). Indeed, as Lubkemann’s work (2008) in the context of Mozambican Civil War 
demonstrates, some people who experienced the most severe consequences of 
displacement have never physically moved. 
 
Finally, following Hammar (2014) and others (Brun & Fabos, 2015; El-Shaarawi, 
2015; Turner, 2016), I think about displacement in spatial and temporal terms. 
Spatiality is a necessary but not isolated element of displacement. Movement in any 
direction, or no direction (stuckness), is always necessarily spatial, and ‘space in itself 
always matters and is always relational’ (Hammar, 2014, p. 10). This definition of 
displacement urges us to pay attention to actual and symbolic locations or places, 
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including those from which people are forced to move and those they move to or are 
unable to leave (Lubkemann, 2008).  
 
Spatiality intertwines with temporality and displacement needs to be seen through a 
multi-temporal lens (Hammar, 2014). The experience of displacement can precipitate 
a changed relationship to time: to the past, and even more so to the future, each 
affecting relationships with the present (Vigh, 2008). Understanding time changes 
under conditions of displacement and sustained crisis, which subsequently affects 
people’s ability to plan for and to imagine a future (Vigh, 2008). The lens of 
temporality requires thinking about displacement as a condition rather than an event, 
and ‘whereas it is relatively easy to know when someone has migrated and when their 
migration (process) ends, it is never so clear when displacement occurs or when that 
displacement ends’ (Bakewell, 2011, p. 23). 
 
This line of thinking about displacement accentuates uncertainty as an important 
characteristic of the experience of displacement. In recent studies, El-Shaarawi (2015), 
Brun and Fabos (2015), Grabska (2015) show how the spatial and temporal aspects of 
uncertainty are central to the experiences of conflict-induced displacement. Drawing 
on cases from Georgia, Jordan, Egypt, Kenya and beyond, the authors observe that 
uncertainty about the future becomes a dominant characteristic of the experience of 
displacement, generating radical and protracted anxiety. As El-Shaarawi (2015) 
observes, in some ways, a rhetoric of uncertain future appears to be a tautology. Is not 
the future always uncertain? However, in the case of exile and displacement, ‘perhaps 
what is important is not the existence of uncertainty but the extent to which uncertainty 
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becomes the focus of attention in contexts of displacement, with destabilising effects’ 
(El-Shaarawi, 2015, p. 53). Moreover, the long duration of many conflicts and, by 
extension, of displacement creates new, liminal spaces in which refugees and IDPs 
create their lives (Agier, 2008; Horst, 2006; Turner, 2004). The pervasiveness of 
uncertainty is especially visible in the context of refugee camps, where refugees’ 
mobility is controlled and their ability to plan is restricted, but it is also experienced 
by urban refugees and asylum seekers living beyond the boundaries of camps.  
 
In parallel to protracted uncertainty, the existing literature on displacement emphasises 
displacees’ agency and shows how displacement both disrupts and ‘produces’, causing 
impossibility and opportunity, loss and gain (Hammar, 2014). These paradoxes lead 
to a context of significant differentiation, where gender, generational, mobility-related, 
and socioeconomic differences have an impact on the varying effects uncertainty has 
on migrants and refugees (Grabska & Fanjoy, 2015; Omata, 2017). In this research, I 
pay close attention to differentiation in displacement, observing how the opportunities 
created by naturalisation are unevenly distributed. To sum up, in this thesis I think 
about displacement as an enforced, complex and subjective condition of uncertainty 
which manifests itself through multiple temporalities and spatialities. In the next 
section, I examine how a more expansive understanding of displacement has led 





3.7. Restoring citizenship in displacement  
 
The trinity of ‘durable solutions’ is essentially predicated on the restoration of a 
refugee’s status as a citizen. However, in practice, the conventional durable solutions 
are dominated by technocratic logic where displacement is more about physical 
dislocation than political exclusion. In contrast, at the core of more radical 
conceptualisations of solutions to displacement is a recognition that we need to focus 
on the denial of refugees’ political rights as citizens, rather than continue seeing the 
‘refugee problem’ in term of simply physical dislocation. Thus, a unifying thread in 
progressive scholarship on displacement is the emphasis on restoration of ‘meaningful 
citizenship’. 
 
Critical approaches to durable solutions 
 
Most of the current critical studies on restoration of meaningful citizenship in 
displacement focus on the question of repatriation. While the legitimacy of repatriation 
programmes has been addressed before (Warner, 1994; Harrell-Bond, 1989), return 
processes have only recently begun to receive systematic normative attention (Bradley, 
2008, 2014; Long, 2011; Omata, 2013). These studies rethink the conditions of 
repatriation, bringing in questions of justice and the social contract. As Bradley (2008) 
states: ‘The goal of a just return process must be to put returnees back on an equal 
footing with their non-displaced co-nationals by restoring a normal relationship of 
rights and duties between the state and its returning citizens’ (p. 286). The studies also 
foreground the refugee agency and reveal the complexity of decision-making in 
protracted exile, thus refuting a notion that repatriation is always the ‘ideal’ solution 
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for the population concerned (Omata, 2013). In practical terms, they encourage 
conceptualisation and design of responses to displacement that are built on the premise 
that ‘home’ is a political space where citizenship can be realised (Long, 2013a).  
 
An important contribution to critical approaches to durable solutions has been put 
forward by scholars who emphasise the notion of mobility as a ‘solution’ to 
displacement (de Haas, 2010; Crisp & Long, 2010; Maple, 2016; Chatelard, 2010; 
Capo, 2015). Already in 2003, Van Hear argued for a shift in policymaking to 
encompass transnational diaspora and their migratory patterns. Capo’s (2015) research 
with Bosnian and Croatian refugees supports Van Hear’s thesis. She shows how the 
formation of a transnational social field in refugee diaspora operates as an ‘enduring 
solutions’ to the condition of displacement (Capo 2015). Crisp and Long (2010) show 
how it is now increasingly recognised that ‘human mobility provides an important 
means for people to improve their standard of living and to contribute to the 
economic and social life of their countries of origin and destination’ (p. 56). Long 
(2014) argues that migration might even offer a ‘fourth solution’ to complement the 
conventional solutions of repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. The existing 
studies question the mutual exclusivity of various durable solutions and advocate for 
adopting a transnational connections’ perspective. Linked to it are studies that 
emphasise the importance of refugees’ freedom of movement (Maple 2016) and 
advocate for facilitating refugees’ mobility to enable them to come up with their 
transformative solutions. There is growing recognition that refugees’ mobility is a 
positive asset that can contribute to their lasting protection (Crisp & Long 2010) 
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and in Chapter 7 I analyse in more detail the significance of mobility in 
displacement.  
 
Debates about restoration of citizenship in displacement have been especially 
prominent in relation to the Great Lakes Region and this literature is directly relevant 
to the case study of Burundian refugees. The case of Burundi, with its continuous 
cycles of displacement and re-displacement, mirrors broader trends in Africa’s Great 
Lakes region8. Since the 1960s, the region experienced successive and multiple civil 
wars, genocidal violence and forced displacement of at an incomparable scale, and an 
estimated four million people have lost their lives and a further four million have been 
forcibly displaced both within and across the borders (Daley, 2006, p. 303; Prunier, 
2009). Despite countless peace building interventions and negotiations, the cycles of 
violence and displacement in the region continue (Stys, 2015). As Daley observes, 
‘war affected communities are finding it difficult to find safe spaces whether for 
asylum or within their countries of origin’ (Daley, 2013, p. 893).  
 
Between 2008 and 2015 the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) 
commissioned a series of research case studies in East and Central Africa coordinated 
by Lucy Hovil and Zachary A. Lomo. The IRRI team collected data and examined 
conflict and displacement in the light of the crisis of citizenship in the following 
countries: Tanzania, Burundi, North Kivu, Uganda, South Sudan, Congo and Rwanda. 
Based on that extensive study, Hovil and Lomo (2015) argue that (in)ability to realise 
 
8 The region comprises the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; formerly Zaire), Rwanda, Burundi, 
Tanzania and Uganda 
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citizenship is both the cause of and the solution to displacement. They conclude that 
the roots of continued displacement in the Great Lakes Region are at least partially a 
result of an endemic and systemic inability of many people to realise citizenship in a 
meaningful way. IRRI report puts forward an argument that if ‘lacking the benefits of 
citizenship is one major cause of displacement, ensuring parity in the enjoyment of its 
benefits is also a solution to the crisis’ (Hovil & Lomo, 2015, p. 40). They argue that 
the international processes initiated for the region (e.g. the International Conference 
on the Great Lakes Region) never tackled the inability to realise citizenship as an 
explicit problem (Hovil & Lomo, 2015, p. 48).  
 
What exactly is meant by realising citizenship in a meaningful way in a context of 
displacement is less clear. From the literature, one gets an impression that the 
restoration of meaningful citizenship is a state where an individual’s rights can be 
protected by normal state responsibilities (Haddad, 2008). This is achieved by 
reestablishment of the former or creation of new ‘social bonds’ between the 
individual/community and a state. Thus, scholars who emphasise restoration of 
meaningful citizenship in displacement fall back on a definition of citizenship as full 
inclusion of individuals in a territorial nation-state, with marginal attention to how the 
experience of displacement can transform the concept of citizenship itself for the 
people concerned. I address this gap in knowledge by re-conceptualising citizenship 
in displacement through the lens of the experiences and narratives of former refugees, 
seeking approaches that capture the complexity, temporality and uncertainty of 
citizenship in displacement.  
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3.8. Citizenship in displacement: De facto and de jure integration debate 
 
The literature on ‘acts of citizenship’ discussed in this chapter shifts the focus from 
citizenship as legal status to citizenship as participation and ability to integrate despite 
the lack of legal status. This is not to say that scholars of critical citizenship studies 
dismiss the value of legal recognition; rather, they accentuate the disruptions that 
claiming rights by non-citizens causes to the established understandings. Linked with 
the ‘acts of citizenship’ approach is the debate about the de facto and de jure 
citizenship. This literature focuses on people’s ability to integrate and claim rights 
despite access to formal documentation, and it examines the opportunities and 
limitations of these processes. This analytical lens has been widely applied by scholars 
researching the experiences of migrants and refugees who manage to claim rights 
despite the lack of legal and institutional recognition (see Gasarasi, 1990; Jacobsen, 
2001; Polzer, 2008). The lens of de facto and de jure citizenship has also been applied 
in the existing studies of the integration and naturalisation of Burundian refugees in 
Tanzania (Miletzki, 2014; Kweka, 2015; Hovil, 2016). In my research, however, I 
found that the distinction between de facto/de jure fails to account for the experiences 
of former Burundian refugees and that a more nuanced conceptual understanding of 
citizenship in displacement is needed. Before critiquing the shortcomings of this 
approach, I first define the concept of naturalisation and outline the central premise of 




Defining de facto or de jure integration  
 
This research revolves around the policy of naturalisation of Burundian refugees, and 
therefore it is important to explain what the term stands for. In a legal sense, 
naturalisation denotes a straightforward procedure: the admittance of a foreigner to the 
citizenship of a country. Research has shown that people can integrate without access 
to formal citizenship, and that documented citizenship often does not guarantee rights 
and privileges. It is helpful to think about naturalisation as an element on a spectrum 
of local integration (Hovil, 2014). Understood in terms of durable solutions, the 
definition of local integration combines three interrelated dimensions (Crisp, 2004): 
(i) a process of adaptation that enables the refugees to live without fear of 
discrimination, (ii) an economic process of establishing financially sustainable 
livelihoods, (iii) a legal process that allows refugees to establish access to employment, 
services, and rights in the host state. These dimensions can be attained with or without 
formal citizenship and they should never be seen as static. Rather, they may develop 
simultaneously, overlap, or could be reversed. In the literature on local integration, 
scholars distinguish between de facto and de jure local integration.   
 
De facto local integration is a process where refugee individuals or groups establish 
belonging at the local level. The success of this type of local integration is largely 
dependent on the relationship between refugees and the host population in the locality 
they inhabit (Bakewell, 2000; Jacobsen, 2001). De facto local integration takes place 
on a spectrum, and it can be easily destabilised by external circumstances (Hovil, 
2014). On the other hand, de jure integration is primarily about national belonging - it 
 93 
is achieved by renouncing refugee status and obtaining new citizenship in the host 
country. As such, it is an overtly political and formalised process. In some cases, 
however, formal citizenship does not translate into integration; especially if local 
communities do not accept the naturalised refugees and state authorities continue to 
discriminate against them (e.g. Nubians in Kenya: Balaton-Chrimes, 2014). The crux 
of these debates is that one can possess formal state membership and yet be excluded 
(in law or fact) from certain civil, political, or social rights; and one can also have 
access to an array of rights and remain excluded from formal, legal citizenship.  
 
The perils of ‘de facto’ citizenship  
 
Cases of mass naturalisation are infrequent, and therefore most of the available 
literature on citizenship in displacement focuses on de facto citizenship, documenting 
how refugees and migrants integrate despite government and international refugee 
policy, rather than because of it (Bakewell, 2000; Hovil, 2014). Scholars have been 
arguing that especially in Africa many refugees integrate without access to formal 
citizenship, which is secondary to integration at the locality they inhabit (Blitz 2011; 
Grace, 2013; Balaton-Chrimes, 2014; Whitehouse, 2012). Lucy Hovil (2016) shows 
how Sudanese refugees living in Uganda’s West Nile region were not legally citizens, 
and yet many were paying taxes and running for political office within the local 
government structures (p. 26). She argues that for as long as they were perceived to be 
legitimately Ugandan within the local spaces in which they operated, no one was going 
to ask for proof or evidence that they are Ugandan citizens. However, such forms of 
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local legitimacy can be easily destabilised by local, national and global 
transformations.  
 
One of the threats to de facto integration is posed by the growing implementation of 
biometric identification. The arguments about the de facto integration of migrants and 
refugees often stipulate that since the wider national population does not have access 
to ID documents or/and passports and ID documents are easily available on the black 
market, it is easier for migrants and refugees to cross borders, settle, and de facto 
integrate. However, with the increasing securitisation agenda and states’ investments 
in national ID card schemes on the continent (e.g. ECOWAS biometric passports; 
Smart ID in South Africa, NIDA in Tanzania)9, it becomes gradually more difficult to 
construct secure livelihoods without access to legal documentation. Manby (2016) 
speculates that these existing strategies and processes of de facto integration on the 
continent are now being undermined by the rapid roll-out of ID programs across 
Africa, which allow the authorities to differentiate more effectively between the 
‘members’ and ‘non-members’ of a community.  
 
Threats of biometric identification for ‘de facto’ citizenship 
 
Ambitious claims are made about the benefits of biometric identification, including 
increased national security and increased capability to deliver services. At the same 
time, however, there is almost no focus on the need to resolve underlying questions of 
who qualifies for the national ID (Manby, 2016). The danger is that in places where 
 
9 At least 23 National Identification (NID) programs or programs of similar type have been introduced 
in African since 2000 compared with only 15 in the four prior decades (Manby, 2016) 
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people have integrated without securing legal status, a roll-out of strict requirements 
for documentation (e.g. proving the nationality of one’s parents or grandparents) will 
simply remove access to all the coping strategies that have previously been deployed. 
This could, consequently, close the buffer zone in which those of undetermined 
citizenship have operated and create stateless populations (Manby, 2016). In other 
words, increased securitisation is not necessarily the answer to the lack of legal status. 
Having more documentation does not immediately translate into more inclusive 
societies. On the contrary, rapid roll-out of ID programs without clear and reflective 
criteria can lead to, or even be manipulated for purposes of, marginalisation and 
exclusion. Thus, the notion that access to de jure citizenship is not essential for 
integration in many African contexts is now being progressively undermined.10 
 
In Tanzania, the government launched its national identity card program on 7 February 
2013 (Appleman & Leiden, 2013). By March 2015, over 6.1 million people had been 
registered and 1.7 million people had been issued IDs (IRB, 2016). Major 
controversies emerged from the process, and in 2016 President Magafuli issued a 
statement that the existing cards are flawed because they lack a visible signature. 
Despite the controversies, ID cards entered the public sphere and became an 
increasingly desirable document. With millions of Tanzanians registering for 
biometric documentation, the ‘hiding’ strategies of refugees living in urban centres 
might be exposed. Burundian refugees are acutely aware of these processes, and 
 
10 This does not mean that black markets for documentation disappear. Rather, rapid implementation 
of sophisticated biometric certification leads to more criminalised and exclusive illegal citizenship 
markets, where prices for fake documents rise, fewer players control the trade, and the situation 
becomes more precarious. 
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following naturalisation, many of my respondents remarked that they intend to apply 
for ID cards.11  
 
Beyond de facto and de jure debates  
 
In her PhD thesis, Miletzki (2014) argues that Burundian refugees developed 
belonging to the host nation and acquired de facto citizenship within the confines of 
the settlements. In line with the ‘acts of citizenship’ literature, Miletzki shows how 
people in the settlements claim de facto citizenship rights on a day-to-day basis in the 
locality they inhabit. Through her analytical framework, Miletzki (2014) examines the 
interplay between exclusion from formal, legal citizenship and a sense of local 
belonging and integration that refugees developed despite the lack of access to formal 
citizenship. Likewise, Hovil (2016) demonstrates that Burundian refugees before 
naturalisation successfully integrated on the local level, but they remained isolated 
from nationally ascribed forms of belonging (p. 82). In contrast, Kweka (2015) 
maintains that even after naturalisation, Burundian refugees still struggle to negotiate 
recognition on the local level and are yet to be integrated. She argues that Burundian 
refugees are not fully accepted by the local population and that the extent of local 
integration has been exaggerated in the studies of Western researchers and donors. 
Thus, the existing studies which rely on the de facto and de jure framework to assess 




11 At the time of research, ID cards in Tabora region were only available to civil servants, and a major 
registry for the general population had not yet taken place. 
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All of the existing research projects about naturalisation of Burundian refugees were 
conducted prior to the distribution of citizenship certificates, focusing only on a certain 
point in time on a long timeline of naturalisation. As such, they overlook the aftermath 
of the distribution of citizenship certificates and the new challenges and consequences 
that followed. For that reason, the role of de jure citizenship for former refugees is 
ignored in the existing studies. My research addresses these shortcomings by providing 
a longitudinal perspective which captures the situation both before and after 
distribution of citizenship certificates; revealing the complex, non-linear and 
ambiguous process of naturalisation. In the light of my fieldwork, I suggest that the 
distinction between the de facto and de jure citizenship is not sufficiently nuanced to 
capture the complexity of evolving citizenship for those who are long-term displacees. 
As I discuss against the evidence in the subsequent empirical chapters, the experiences 
of former refugees in Tanzania blur the boundary between de facto and de jure 
citizenship, or in fact between citizenship and refugee status itself, demanding a 
different conceptual approach to citizenship in displacement.  
 
3.9. Beyond de facto and de jure dichotomy   
 
There is a growing body of literature which develops the conceptual work around the 
different experiences of people who fall between the categories of citizens and non-
citizens. Work in that field elaborates new concepts of ‘in-between citizenships’ which 
aim to capture the realities of people who defy the simplistic dichotomy between 
citizenship and non-citizenship (Menjívar, 2006; Bosniak, 2008, Nyers, 2006, 2019; 
McNevin, 2013; Rigo, 2011). Together, the authors expand the understanding of how 
migrants and refugees, through their experience of migration and exile, create other 
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categories of being political that fall between citizenship and non-citizenship; creating 
partial, contested and incomplete citizenships (ed. Squire, 2011).   
 
Aoileann Ní Mhurchú (2014) advances the discussion of exclusion and inclusion as 
the defining aspects of citizenship. She observes sharply that the politics of citizenship 
is defined as a clash between particularistic statist (‘restrictive’) and universal post-
statist (‘liberal’) models of citizenship. Mhurchú points out that these approaches do 
not capture transgenerational migrants who do not experience either being included or 
excluded from the state but are caught between citizenship and migration. She calls 
that state ‘ambiguous citizenship’. Her notion of ambiguous citizenship is set within a 
growing body of literature on different forms of citizenship that blur the boundaries 
between citizenship and non-citizenship. In his work, Nyers (2019) examines the 
transformation of ‘regular’ citizens into deportable ‘irregular’ citizens by presenting 
cases of people who get caught up in the deportation apparatus and must struggle to 
remain in or return to their country of citizenship. Drawing on a case study of 
Abdelrazik, a Canadian citizen who was falsely accused of terrorism and forced into 
exile, Nyers distinguishes between revoking someone’s citizenship and irregularising 
it. Rigo (2011) develops a similar argument and invites the reader to think through the 
paradox of ‘illegal citizenship’ by pointing out to informal citizenship practices of 
migrants and refugees which are targeted by restrictive policies. In the same line of 
analysis, McNevin (2007, 2011, 2012) puts forward a concept of ‘undocumented 
citizens’ to capture the experiences of long-term migrants who face threats of 
deportation. She argues that the demands of ‘undocumented citizens’ constitute the 
key contemporary sites of ‘the political’.  
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The conceptual work around ‘ambiguous’, ‘illegal’, ‘irregular’, ‘alien’, 
‘undocumented’ citizenships is relevant to the experiences of former Burundian 
refugees in Tanzania. I argue, however, that the existing conceptual developments do 
not adequately address the concerns of the people I worked with. Although a lot has 
been written about citizenship in the context of migration, it is usually grounded in the 
Western migratory contexts, responding primarily to the concerns to South-North 
migration. This ignores certain aspects of South-South migration, such as the specifics 
of political membership in African context and the importance of access to land. 
Moreover, the existing work on ‘in-between’ citizenships focuses primarily on context 
of migration. As argued before, displacement as a condition is a subset of migration 
with specific dimensions and characteristics (Bakewell, 2011). As such, the contexts 
of displacement and migration present many similar characteristics and they also carry 
some distinctive challenges and features. Therefore, thinking about citizenship in the 
specific context of displacement necessitating different conceptual approaches to 
citizenship which might or might not be adaptable in other contexts of migration, 
depending on the context.  
 
3.10. Probational citizenship - thinking about citizenship in displacement 
 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of evolving citizenship in displacement by 
bringing together cross-disciplinary insights from citizenship studies, migration 
studies and African studies. In doing so, it builds on Marshall’s (1983) normative ideal 
of citizenship, Sen’s (1999) Capabilities Approach, Arendt’s (1973) analysis of the 
causes and consequences of displacement, Bakewell’s (2011), Hammar’s (2014) 
conceptual work on migration and displacement, as well as many contemporary 
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scholars who explore the possibilities and obstacles of restoring meaningful 
citizenship for those in displacement, including Bradley (2008), Long (2013b), Omata 
(2013, 2017), Hovil and Lomo (2015), Hovil (2016), Brun (2015), Grabska (2015). In 
these efforts, the thesis emphasizes how temporality and uncertainty (inherent in the 
experience of displacement) become the crucial characteristics of citizenship in 
displacement.  
 
While working with people who acquired citizenship in displacement, I observed that 
they experienced an interplay of both safety and anxiety about their citizenship status, 
which dominated their lives and shaped their actions post-naturalisation. Former 
refugees I met insisted that benefits of citizenship, including mobility, safety and 
ability to plan for the future, cannot be attained without access to formal 
documentation. At the same time, their narratives revealed that citizenship they 
obtained remains only temporarily fixed - it is aspirational but not quite realised. To 
capture the temporality, uncertainty, and ongoing struggles for recognition in 
displacement, I put forward a concept of ‘probational citizenship’. The concept of 
‘probational citizenship’ emerged directly from observations, interviews and 
conversations conducted during fieldwork. Once I noticed the recurrence of this theme, 
I developed it further in focused interviews and conversations with primary informants 
and research assistants. Using narrative measures, I tested if the notion was meaningful 
and clear for the people concerned.  
 
The notion of ‘probation’ in probational citizenship, is metaphorical rather than 
legalistic. According to a dictionary definition, probation is as ‘a process of testing or 
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observing the character or abilities of a person with an objective of making an 
important decision subjective to their good behaviour under supervision’ (Probation, 
n.d). Former refugees in Tanzania, however, where not put on an official scheme of 
‘probationary citizenship’12 and they are not in an officially declared transition period. 
Nonetheless, the new citizens believe that citizenship can be arbitrarily withdrawn and 
that their status is ultimately uncertain. ‘Probational citizenship’, therefore, is not 
about the official, legalistic nature of their citizenship status. It is more about the 
practices of the state that induce anxiety regarding their status and consequently how 
those granted ‘probational’ citizenship perceive and act on their status.  
 
As such, the meaning of probation in the concept of ‘probational citizenship’ links to 
two interrelated discussions. On the one hand, probation links to practices of assessing, 
judging, valuing. Here, the question is who can be put on probation and how, by whom, 
and to what effect. The second, performative meaning of probation as a condition and 
as a state of mind, stands for uncertainty and insecurity. The condition of probation is 
characterised by radical temporality as the time on probation is uncertain, there is no 
evident end-date, it can be extended or might lead to unwanted or tragic consequences. 
The underlying conditions and boundaries of ‘probational citizenship’ are unclear. The 
recipients believe that it can be withdrawn, but it is unclear how long the probation 
period is meant to last and who is enforcing it. Although the people I worked with 
 
12 For example, in 2009, the UK government announced a new proposal advocating for a points-based 
system for UK citizenship and a system of ‘probationary citizenship’ before ‘full citizenship’. The 
change of government in 2010 has seen such proposals dropped with the Home Secretary dismissing 
them as too costly and difficult to implement. 
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received citizenship certificates, they remain anxious about their rights and the long-
term security of their status.  
 
The idea of ‘probational citizenship’ links back to the liberal and civic republican 
conceptions of citizenship, where, in a very crude, schematic sense, liberals see 
citizenship as a fundamental right and republicans think about citizenship more as a 
privilege. Political liberalism envisions a more limited political arena, with ‘greater 
focus on procedures that would ensure fair, inclusive deliberation about governance 
and policy’ (Abowitz & Harnish, 2006, p. 662). As such, from a liberal point of review, 
citizenship is a right of the individual and it must be prioritised. The civic republican 
discourse stresses instead an implicit social contract that demands loyalty to the state. 
When holding citizenship is construed as a privilege, not a right, it then becomes 
conditional on a certain standard of behaviour. The concept of ‘probational 
citizenship’ is grounded in the increasing prevalence of the view that citizenship of 
migrants and refugees is a privilege that must be earned and that can be withheld if 
certain requirements and standards of behaviour are not met. The republican discourse 
on citizenship, naturalisation and denaturalisation allows for the rise of uncertainty and 
temporality around citizenship status. As such, the right to citizenship becomes 
contingent and ‘probational’ rather than fundamental. Although the concept of 
‘probational citizenship’ is being developed in this thesis directly through the 
narratives of former Burundian refugees in Tanzania, the final chapter of this thesis 
argues that ‘probational citizenship’ it is not exceptional. Rather, it is becoming 
increasingly common and it resonates with the circumstances of migrants and citizens 




French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari note that ‘history is always 
written from the sedentary point of view’ (1987, p. 23). Not only history, but also 
political theory is shaped by the perspectives of sedentary people, privileging the 
experiences of belonging to a nation-state over experiences of exile and displacement. 
Movement, as an alternative approach to understanding the human condition, is side-
lined in dominant conceptual frameworks. In result, the existing theories of citizenship 
fall short of being able to encompass and interpret the experiences of former Burundian 
refugees in Tanzania as well as others who are seeking to secure citizenship in 
displacement. This chapter sought to develop a theoretical approach to capture the in-
between, uncertain, and ‘probational’ modes of experiencing citizenship in 
displacement.  
The chapter argues that the main tenets of citizenship theory were conceptualised to 
capture the boundaries of membership within a nation-state; not including or 
accounting for the experiences of transnational migrants and refugees. Despite the new 
understandings of citizenship in academia as notoriously polyvalent and multifarious, 
the conventional state-centred, sedentary understanding of citizenship dominates 
mainstream political discourses; shaping and structuring the politically feasible 
responses to displacement. As the social and political debates about belonging and 
membership of migrants and refugees continue to occupy a central stage across the 
world, more acumen is needed into how experiences of migration challenge the 
established tenets of citizenship theory; generating new modes of thinking about 
political membership and belonging.  
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In this chapter, I presented an analytical framework that argues that the disruptive 
experiences of exile and displacement affect how migrants and refugees conceptualise 
and narrate citizenship. Drawing on the existing literature and insight from my 
fieldwork, I begin outlining the contours of ‘probational citizenship’ in displacement 
as a complex, multi-spatial, multi-temporal process characterised by uncertainty and 
ongoing struggles for recognition. In the following chapters, I show how these 
complex and often paradoxical views on citizenship unfold in various spheres of 
former refugees’ lives, including political participation (Chapter 5), access to land 











Serendipity involves planned insight coupled with unplanned events, core to the 
philosophy of qualitative research (Fine & Deegan, 1996, p. 445). 
 
This thesis explores how the experience of naturalisation shaped Burundian refugees 
views of citizenship, and considers how this can help develop understanding of 
citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context. With this project I 
aimed to examine how Burundian refugees in Tanzania experienced and interpreted 
the implementation of TANCOSS policy and how it affected their day-to-day lives. 
As the project progressed, I also began to critically analyse how former refugees’ use 
and treat their citizenship documents, what is the role of mobility in displacement, in 
what ways do former refugees make claims to land and political representation, and 
finally how these processes are experienced differently by various individuals and 
groups.  
 
In order to seek answers to these questions, I chose to rely on extensive, multi-sited 
anthropological fieldwork with a focus on formal and informal interviewing. As 
Leitner and Ehrkamp (2005) remark, migrants’ and refugees’ perspectives on 
citizenship are rarely examined in either academic or public policy debates, which 
concentrate instead on broader legal and political aspects of citizenship changes in 
national citizenship laws and policies. In my research, I chose an approach that builds 
on people’s views and experiences. Instead of making claims about former refugees’ 
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attitudes towards citizenship from afar, I engaged in observations, conversations, and 
interviews with the people concerned in order to gain insights into the meaning and 
value they assign to citizenship. In this chapter, I synthesise questions of research 
methods and ethics pertinent to this project. Where relevant, I discuss the changes in 
my approach, decisions I had to make, and alteration to the initial research plans. I 
explore both the strength and pitfalls of the methods chosen with the awareness that 
serendipity played an important role in shaping this project, that my decisions were 
often partial and subjective, and that sometimes there is not a perfect choice to be 
made.  
 
4.1. Project overview  
 
This research project was conducted in 3 phases between 2014-2017 and took place 
predominantly in Ulyankulu settlement, Tabora region, and in the city of Dar es 
Salaam. The project relied on anthropological fieldwork with a focus on formal and 
informal interviewing. The qualitative methods included living with the community 
members, observation of key sites and events such as urban and rural markets, 
attendance at church services, visits and volunteering in schools, observation of local 
assemblies, attendance at court proceedings, visits to farming and building plots, 
attendance at important events such as graduations, weddings etc., as well as individual 
interviews and focus group discussions. During the three stages of fieldwork I lived in 
a boarding school in Ulyankulu, with a host family, and in a rented room on the 
premises of a Catholic church in Kaswa village. The interviews were enhanced by 
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learning Kiswahili language, periodic and extended visits to the research sites, and 
repeated meetings with primary informants.  
 
Over all three study periods, I conducted a total of 121 individual interviews and 34 
focus group discussions with 136 participants with people living and working in and 
near Ulyankulu settlements, Urambo town and Tabora city. I have also interviewed 23 
people from the Burundian community in Dar es Salaam. In the settlements as well as 
in Dar es Salaam, I interviewed many people multiple times and the conversations and 
interactions which inform this study were not limited to the semi-formal interviews. 
In Dar es Salaam, I also spoke with academics at the University of Dar es Salaam, 
local and international NGO staff, government officials, and UNHCR staff working 
both in Tanzania and Geneva. In total, I conducted 18 elite interviews in Dar es Salam. 
The interviews with senior government officials and international actors were 
conducted in English. The interviews in the settlement were conducted by myself in 
Kiswahili or Kirundi with support of a local research assistant. A few of my 
participants prefered to speak Kirundi and these interviews were directly translated by 
my research assistant. I interviewed some people once and others multiple times, 
building long-term relationships and discussions that continued both in person and 
online even after the completion of fieldwork in 2017. I had 6 key interlocutors in 
Ulyankulu settlement and 6 in Dar es Salaam with whom I spoke at length on multiple 
occasions between 2014-2017. 
 
The long-term duration of this research and repeated visits to Tanzania over time 
constituted one of the main strengths of this project. Ability to return to Ulyankulu 
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multiple times allowed me to see the results of mass naturalisation over time. Rather 
than analysing it at one fixed point in time, I had an opportunity to study the non-linear 
impacts of policy implementation: with all its’ promises, pitfalls, and unexpected 
consequences. Moreover, multiple visits to the settlements helped me to establish 
credibility and trust in the community, which is conventionally accustomed to 
researchers who come once, ask questions, and never return. The long-term scope of 
this research meant that not only the social and political conditions in the research 
location have changed over time, but also that my skills and capabilities as a researcher 
have developed. The repeated visits to the sites helped me to iterate and develop better 
questions, identify leading themes, establish trust and relationships and most 




I research stage: The first stage of fieldwork for this study was conducted over five 
weeks between March 2014 and April 2014 in Ulyankulu settlement in Tabora region 
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The first week of fieldwork was conducted in Dar es 
Salaam, and it focused on establishing connections with all significant actors involved 
in the process of naturalisation, including Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service 
(TCRS), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Asylum Access, the UNHCR and the 
Ministry of Home Affairs. In the following three weeks, I stayed at a Vocational 
Education and Training Authority (VETA) boarding school in Ulyankulu settlement. 
I began the research by interviewing students and staff at the school, meeting their 
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families, attending church gatherings, and from there snowballing and expanding my 
social network. This stage of the research was set predominantly in schools, churches 
and on tobacco farms. There, I met some of my primary informants and established a 
friendship with Mr Mtasha who later hosted me and became my research assistant. For 
the last week of the project, I returned to Dar es Salaam, where I conducted follow-up 
interviews with government officials and NGO’s employees, drawing on insights and 
questions collected during research in the settlement.  
 
II research stage: A year later I came back to Tanzania to conduct a second stage of 
my research. Before my arrival, I followed two semesters of an intensive Kiswahili 
course at the University of Edinburgh. This time I decided to live with Mr Mtasha’s 
family, whom I met on my previous visit and to volunteer in a secondary school where 
Mr Mtasha’s wife (Mama Blessi) worked as a teacher. I stayed in the settlement for 
five weeks from the end of April 2015 until the end of May 2015, living and working 
with the host family. I spent the first weeks getting to know the settlement better, 
cycling to various villages, making friends and focusing more on observations and 
informal conversations rather than structured interviews. In the latter part of my stay, 
I conducted unstructured interviews with host family’ friends and people I met at the 
school (from teachers to cleaners and guards). The dominant topics at that time 
included recent distribution of citizenship certificates, plans for establishing a district 
of Ulyankulu, population and business growth in the settlement, as well as the political 
situation in Burundi and the related challenges faced by the repatriates. This second 
stage of my research was crucial for building relationships and establishing trust.  
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III research stage: The last stage of the research was the most extensive one, lasting 
from May 2016 until March 2017. This stage constituted the main part of my 
fieldwork. It can be divided into three sub-sections:  
 
i) The first part included preparatory six weeks in Dar es Salaam (May-June 
2016), where I followed an advanced Kiswahili course for researchers, 
applied for a new research visa and research permit, and conducted 
multiple interviews with relevant government officials and NGOs. Next, I 
spent a month in Ulyankulu settlement, where I rented a room at the 
Catholic Parish of Ulyankulu. I began conducting more targeted and 
focused interviews in each village of the settlement, covering topics of 
access to land, political inclusion, psychosocial benefits of citizenship, and 
challenges related to naturalisation. Due to an illness, I had to leave the 
settlement and travel back to Europe for treatment.  
ii) I returned to Ulyankulu in late September 2016 and continued research 
there until December 2016. During these months, I was based at the 
Catholic Church in Kaswa village and I continued collecting data on the 
same set of questions across the settlement, developing understanding and 
knowledge of land tenure in Ulyankulu, political structure and conflicts, 
the history and significance of Tanzanians living in the refugee settlement, 
as well as family’s migration patters to and from the settlement. Stories and 
experiences of urban migration became a prominent theme in many 
interviews and conversations. Following this lead, I decided to conduct the 
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last months of my research project with Burundian refugees and former 
refugees in Dar es Salaam. 
iii) The Kariakoo market, where many Burundian refugees trade and do 
business, was the focal point of my research in the urban zone. I have also 
established close links with the biggest Burundian Pentecostal church in 
Dar es Salaam, where many refugees congregate and socialise. Relying on 
the network of friends and relatives of my research assistant, I have also 
visited several families from the Old Settlements in their homes in Dar es 
Salaam.   
This research approach resulted in four data sets each with a slightly different focus. 
My first stage of research (March-April 2014) coincided with the suspension of the 
naturalisation process and was dominated by profound confusion and uncertainty – 
both among the refugees and the other state and non-state actors. The interviews at the 
time were dominated by themes of fear, anxiety, distrust and disappointment. The data 
collected in 2015, following the implementation of naturalisation, is marked by a sense 
of hope, promises of development, themes of growth and planning. Other leading 
themes included political developments in Burundi as well as the related theme of 
struggles faced by the repatriates. The most detailed and extensive interviews were 
conducted in 2016, a year after distribution of citizenship certificates when new 
challenges about naturalisation became apparent. These interviews provide insights on 
land rights post-naturalisation, local politics and camp governance, and the various 
challenges and opportunities faced by inhabitants of Ulyankulu following 
naturalisation. The final part of my research in early 2017 focused on urban refugee 
livelihoods, the questions of mobility/ immobility, and the feelings of safety and 
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security attained through access to legal status. The long-term, multi-sited and cyclical 
nature of this research influenced the data collected, exposing non-linear and 
paradoxical effects of the implementation of naturalisation. In the following section, I 
introduce the two main field sites. 
 
4.2. Field sites 
 
Ulyankulu 
Between 1972 and 1975, 54,000 Hutu refugees were brought to Ulyankulu in several 
large groups, including thousands who had lived in the Tanzania-Burundi border area 
for several years (TCRS, 1984; cited in Malkki, 1995, p. 98). In the settlement, families 
were granted five and some up to ten hectares of land, as well as financial assistance 
by the UNHCR. Infrastructure such as roads, schools, water points and administrative 
centres were established with the help of humanitarian agencies. Refugees had to clear 
the land and build their own houses on assigned plots. The increased influx of 
Burundian refugees into Tanzania led to the construction of another settlement, 
Katumba, built in 1973 in what is now Katavi region (formerly Rukwa). A third 
settlement, Mishamo, was only built several years later, in 1978, in Katavi region due 
to deteriorating environmental conditions in Ulyankulu settlement. According to 
Malkki (1995, p. 39) half of Ulyankulu’s population, which had risen to 60,000, was 
moved to Mishamo after a survey of land and water resources in Ulyankulu in 1977. 
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All three settlements were located in underdeveloped and remote areas, which were 
susceptible to environmental challenges such as seasonal draught and floods.  
Figure 2. Ulyankulu location and distance from urban centres. Source: Sarkara, M. Rural Watermarks, KU 
Leuven (2018-2019). 
 
Ulyankulu settlement constituted the primary research site for this project. Ulyankulu 
covers an area of 2112 km2, consists of 11 villages and has a population of 53,180 
(SA3, 2007). When I first visited Ulyankulu, I was surprised by how vibrant, well-
connected, and thriving the place is. The settlement is located in Tabora region, 90km 
from Tabora town and connected by a dirt road, which is passable most of the year. 
The region of Tabora lies in the central-western part of the country and it is one of the 
largest regions by area. According to the 2012 Population and Housing Census (2013), 
the region had a population of 2,291,623 and the most prominent economic activity in 
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the region is agriculture. The area of Ulyankulu reflects the broader trends of the 
region.  
 
The main economic activity in Ulyankulu is farming, and tobacco is the primary cash 
crop. Prices of tobacco are relatively high, and many tobacco farmers in the settlements 
were reported to have accumulated substantial wealth. Other crops such as maize, 
beans, millet, and cassava are grown for subsistence and cash. A plethora of other 
economic activities, ranging from video and music studios, pharmacies, hairdresser 
and tailoring salons, restaurants and hostels, flourish in the settlement. With a large 
marketplace, 15 primary schools, three secondary schools, five dispensaries, one 
Health Centre, and 32 churches, Ulyankulu settlement has become the second largest 
urban centre in the district after the district headquarters in Urambo (SA3 2007). 
 
Figure 3. Main market in Ulyankulu, 2018. Credit: Biala, A. 
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Across the three settlements, 78% of refugees were born in Tanzania, and only 22% 
were born in Burundi (SA3, 2007, p. 17).13 In a livelihood analysis, it was found that 
the majority of the population (85%) engaged in farming activities, whereas 15% of 
the settlements’ population were pastoralists. The pastoralists were predominantly 
Sukuma and Nyamwezi origin. They lived in the villages neighbouring the settlements, 
and they came to Ulyankulu to acquire goods and to sell their meat and dairy products. 
A small number decided to remain and settle in Ulyankulu, attracted by business 
opportunities. Thus, Tanzanians from the neighbouring areas have been moving to 
Ulyankulu settlement for business and trade over the years, and their presence is an 
important element of integration (more in Chapter 7). At the time of research, the main 
languages spoken in Ulyankulu were Kiswahili, Kirundi, Sukuma, and Nyamwezi. 
 
Figure 4 Bakery in the centre of Ulyankulu which was opened by a Tanzanian owner, 2018. Credit: Biala, A. 
 
13 The last major survey in the settlement was conducted over a decade ago, in 2007, and therefore at 
the time of writing, in 2018, the figures will be significantly higher.  
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The settlement of Ulyankulu is characterised by large open spaces, permanent 
buildings, existing infrastructure and absence of enclosure. The villages within the 
settlement resemble other villages in Tanzania. What distinguishes Ulyankulu is the 
presence of the Settlement Officer and the different laws that govern mobility, land 
ownership and political engagement in the area. Initially, Ulyankulu was governed by 
the Refugees (Control) Act 1965 (GOT, 1966), which was replaced at a later stage by 
the Refugee Act 1998 (GOT, 1998). The 1998 Act stipulates that refugees are required 
to reside in the designated areas, which in effect puts restrictions on the freedom of 
movement and permits deportation in case an offence is made against the Act. The 
1998 Act also indicates that all the land and buildings within the settlement are under 
the custody of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Paragraph 16 of the 1998 Act). Although 
today former refugees do not require permission to exit the settlement, land ownership 
has not been reassigned and the Settlement Officer remains the highest political 
authority in the settlement.  
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Figure 5. A boy in front of new houses being built in the centre of Ulyankulu, 2018. Credit: Biala, A. 
 
Camp or settlement? 
 
From its inception, Ulyankulu has been referred to as a settlement. In the language of 
organisations administering refugees, a ‘camp denotes a temporary14 or emergency 
accommodation while a settlement refers to a more permanently settled group of 
refugees’ (Malkki, 1995, p. 304). In line with this definition, Ulyankulu, Mishamo and 
Katumba can be classified as settlements. Malkki, however, inspired by the critical 
point raised by her interlocutors, contests this definition and shows that refugees in 
Mishamo insist on using the term camp. My informants used the terms 
 
14 This terminology, however, does not reflect reality, as many refugee ‘camps’ are not a temporary 
emergency measure; rather, they remain open for decades and they grow over the years, turning into 
cities.   
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interchangeably, alternating between kambi ya wakimbizi (refugee camp) and makazi 
ya wakimbizi (refugee settlement). However, in some contexts, former refugees used 
and emphasised the word camp when they wanted to underline restrictions on freedom 
of movement and political representation in Ulyankulu. In the thesis, I consistently use 
the word settlement unless I am quoting or reiterating interviewees who used the term 
camp.  
 
Dar es Salaam  
 
All the existing studies on the naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania were 
conducted in the settlements of Ulyankulu, Katumba, and Mishamo (Hovil & Kweka, 
2008; Hovil & Kweka 2009; Kweka, 2015; Hovil, 2016; Miletzki, 2014; SA3, 2007). 
Both conceptually and methodologically, the studies focus on the rural context, with 
its specific livelihood challenges and aspirations. The question of what acquiring 
citizenship status means for the urban Burundian refugees has been largely 
overlooked. Yet as my research shows, to understand the effects of naturalisation fully 
it is necessary to think across the urban/rural divide.  
The aim of the naturalisation policy for the 1972 Burundian refugees was to provide a 
durable solution for the population of the three rural settlement: Mishamo, Katumba 
and Ulyankulu. Every person I interviewed, however, told me that they have relatives 
in urban centres. Therefore, the naturalisation policy has also (unintentionally and 
indirectly) reconfigured refugees’ urban lives. Not only some of the Burundians who 
already lived in Dar es Salaam (and other cities) got access to citizenship, but 
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naturalisation also facilitated an increased movement out from the settlements. 
Reflecting on these processes, I realised that in order to develop a complete 
understanding of the naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, an element of 
urban fieldwork is essential. The social worlds of my respondents were not limited to 
the settlements, and by expanding my fieldwork into the city I was able to understand 
the broader implications of naturalisation, such an the importance of freedom of 
movement (Chapter 7) and the differences in claim-making processes between urban 
and rural contexts (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).  
In Dar es Salaam, I initially relied on the network of my research assistant Benedict. I 
met his friends working in the Kariakoo market, visited his family and met his fellow 
worshippers from the Pentecostal community. Together, we went to various parts of 
Dar es Salaam (Buguruni, Temeke, Mwananyamala, Sinza) and visited people in their 
homes. After a few weeks, I established a good relationship with one of the Pentecostal 
preachers, and I continued to conduct interviews by myself in his parish. I interviewed 
people from across the urban refugee community, ranging from the very wealthy 
businessman, professors, activists, street vendors, musicians, to the poorest and most 
disadvantaged members of the refugee community. The interviews were conducted in 
formal and informal settings, including peoples’ homes, cafes, churches, and offices.  
It is not my intention to offer a comprehensive comparison between the experiences of 
naturalisation in the rural and urban setting. Rather, I want to show how the policy 
which on paper was meant to address the protracted displacement of refugees living in 
Katumba, Ulyankulu and Mishamo, ended up having a crucial urban component. 
Although my focus remained on the settlements, frequent references of the urban 
context are an integral part of the thesis. 
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Churches  
For the 1972 Burundian refugees, churches became vehicles that helped them to 
inhabit and make sense of their new lives in exile. Over the years, churches established 
and entrenched themselves as the most powerful institutions in the settlements and in 
2016, Ulyankulu settlement had 32 registered churches. Both in Ulyankulu settlement 
and in Dar es Salaam, churches have become crucial points of contact, where I was 
able to introduce my research, gain trust and meet many different people from the 1972 
refugee community. Although I did not plan to conduct my fieldwork in Dar es Salaam 
in Pentecostal churches, from one meeting to another I realised that many of my 
interlocutors were part of the same congregation, which happened to be located at a 
short distance from where I lived. My research assistant, Benedict, introduced me to 
Pastor Simoni at the Pentecostal Church in Mwananyamala. With time, the church 
became a place where I was able to meet new people and arrange interviews, which 
many people preferred to a visit in their house or a meeting in a public space.  
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Figure 6. A complex of buildings belongings to the Catholic Church in Kaswa village, Ulyankulu, 2018. 
 
In Ulyankulu, the premises of churches are utilised by the community for many 
purposes, including masses, prayers, Sunday schools, women’s groups meetings, 
microfinance groups meetings, entrepreneurship classes. As such, they created an 
opportunity for me to meet the same people on regular basis and to conduct focus 
group discussions. All of my interlocutors went to Pentecostal or Catholic churches15 
and my willingness to join them in mass and other religious celebrations was important 
for demonstrating my integrity. I initially visited 11 different churches across 
Ulyankulu, but I only established a relationship with two churches (Pentecostal Church 
 
15 Only three of all my interlocutors were Muslim and one of them invited me to a service in 
Ulyankulu’s only mosque, where I also had a chance to interview the leader of the Muslim 
community.  
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in Kaswa village and the Catholic Church in Kaswa village) where I was formally 
introduced to the congregation and spoke about my project on stage. Although there is 
a rivalry between the Catholic and Pentecostal Churches in Ulyankulu regarding who 
can attract more members and more funds for development projects, there are no 
hostilities or violence between the different denominations. I was always conscious of 
potential biases and I was deliberately trying to interview people from both 
denominations. Although I lived on the premises of a Catholic Church and many of 
my primary informants were members of that congregation, my research assistants 
were Pentecostal, and through them I was introduced to the Pentecostal leaders, 
congregation members and women’s groups.  
 
4.3. A note on terminology 
 
 
On the few occasions when I had an opportunity to speak about my research to a 
broader audience, I received feedback about the inconsistent use of terminology. ‘Why 
do you mix the terms refugees with new Tanzanian and naturalised refugees? Why do 
you still use the word refugees at all?’ The advice I received was straightforward – 
you should decide on one term and use it consistently. Unfortunately, I do not think 
consistency is possible or meaningful in the very peculiar context of my research, 
where everything, including terminology, is in flux. In this section I want to argue, 
instead, that context specific use of terminology is necessary.  
 
As the current debates around migration in the Western countries manifest, semantics 
is a powerful force that can play an important role in shaping migration policy. The 
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terminology we use can affect public attitudes towards migrants and refugees, it can 
have an impact on elections, and ultimately lead to implementation of new policies. It 
is no different in Tanzania, where the various stakeholders invested in TANCOSS 
struggle with the use of terminology in private and public conversations; anxious that 
a wrong use of words can have a negative impact on the future of this population.  
 
The confusion about the right use of terminology was perfectly illustrated at the 
validation workshop held by International Rescue Committee (IRC) in March 2017. 
IRC invited the government of Tanzania, UN Agencies, NGOs, donors and academics 
to discuss preliminary findings and recommendations on a new local integration 
report. At the event, every single speaker struggled with terminology and multiple 
terms were employed to describe the concerned population. The ones I noted included: 
Tanzanians, Burundians, Former refugees, Newly Naturalised Tanzanians, 
Naturalised refugees, New Tanzanians, New citizens, 1972 caseload, 1972 population, 
Residents of the Old Settlements. 
 
As the speeches’ of the participants at the workshop illustrated, there are many words 
that can be used to describe the concerned population, and there is no clear consensus 
on which is the most accurate and adequate. In fact, the question of terminology 
remains problematic because the 1972 caseload we are referring to is far from uniform. 
Within that population, there are people who obtained citizenship certificates, those 
who applied and were rejected, applied and never received their documents, repatriated 
to Burundi and now returned to Tanzania and live without any documentation, people 
who never opted for any option and continue to live with a refugee status, mix marriage 
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couples and their children who were never registered, as well as individuals who over 
the years fully integrated in urban centres and consider applying for naturalisation as 
a risk to their already established livelihoods. Being aware of how diverse the 1972 
population is, I propose to alternate the use of terminology in ways that reflect people’s 
status and do justice to the specific narratives I am presenting.  Moreover, my research 
incorporates historical narratives, in which I continue using the term refugee, because 
at the time when the described events occurred, people in the settlements still had a 
refugee status.   
 
The question of semantics occupies not only the people speaking and writing about the 
1972 population – it is also a contested point of debate among the people concerned 
themselves. In 2016, the leaders of 1972 association in Dar es Salaam initiated an 
online poll in which people could vote on their preference for a new tribal name they 
would like to use. For years, the urban refugees disguised themselves as Haa from 
Kigoma, Nyamwezi from Tabora, or Sukuma from Mwanza. These fake identities 
became an integral part of their integration strategies, as many learnt the respective 
local languages and associated themselves with other urban residents from the 
respective tribes. With the process of naturalisation and their new status as legal 
Tanzanian citizens, some urban refugees expressed a desire to claim back their original 
tribe - but what would that be? It is a discussion that sharply divides the community. 
People argue that Hutu has such negative connotations in Tanzania that they will never 
be able to use it without risking their own and their family’s safety. Continuing to use 
the names of other tribes that they do not belong to seems inappropriate for some.  
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Out of these discussions an initiative arose to introduce a new tribe name for all the 
naturalised refugees from Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu: Higwe. The proponents 
of this idea argue that in absolute terms, they are more numerous than many of the 
tribes in Tanzania. Moreover, considering that the country has over one hundred tribes 
and many people do not know the names of all of them, introducing a new tribe should 
not be a problem and people would not immediately associate them with Burundi. This 
proposal, in contrast to using the names of other tribes, has the benefit of retaining 
their identity as former refugees and it also allows to distinguish themselves from Hutu 
in Burundi that many of them do not wish to identify with. It is a compromise, a 
quintessential process of reinventing the tradition by introducing a new name that 
simultaneously contains the history of the group, but is also forward oriented and 
underlines people’s desire to permanently settle and integrate in Tanzania. Until today, 
however, the new name was not embraced, which leaves me with no other option but 
to navigate the fluid terrain of semantics to my best ability; with sensitivity and 
attention to context. In the following sections, I discuss and critically evaluate the 
research methods used in this study.  
 
4.4.  The learning curve of qualitative interviewing  
 
The objectives of this research were to understand how refugees living in the 
settlement and Dar es Salaam experienced and interpreted the implementation of 
TANCOSS policy, and what impact naturalisation had on their daily lives. The essence 
of the research revolved around the human experience of a social phenomenon, and 
therefore I decided to use semi-structured interviews and observations as the central 
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methods of this research project (see Brettell, 2002). In semi-structured interviews, the 
new information shared by the participants can be easily integrated into the interview 
guide and included in the ensuing questions, which significantly enhances the learning 
process. Longitudinal observations complemented the interviews and allowed for 
developing better and more relevant questions. In the following paragraphs, I discuss 
issues of sampling, working with research assistants, documenting, analysing and 
positionality.  
 
4.4.a. The uneasy: working with research assistants  
 
Although uncomfortable for some and historically omitted in ethnographic accounts, 
reflecting and writing about this project begins for me with the problematic and 
rewarding dimensions of working with research assistants. Critical insights from 
Molony& Hammett (2007), Turner (2010), and Borchegrevink (2003) prepare aspiring 
researchers for methodological and ethical challenges related to interviewing and 
working with research assistants. Sanjek (1993) and others expose the deeply 
problematic colonial legacy of anthropology and problematise the disregarded 
contributions of research assistants to the discipline of social sciences more broadly. 
Sanjek (1993, p. 13) argues that problems arise due to our failure to acknowledge and 
understand the meanings of the dependence of researchers on the people who help 
them. In this context, both ethnographers and their assistants lose something 
irreplaceable. Although in my research I did not rely on one key interpreter as some 
anthropologists in the past did, I still owe the scope and breadth of my analysis to the 
generosity, curiosity and networks shared with me by my research assistants. 
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Beyond translation and logistics  
 
Over the years of conducting research in Tanzania, I worked long-term with two 
research assistants: Issaya Mtasha and Benedict, who helped me with arranging 
interviews and translating from both Kiswahili and Kirundi. As my Kiswahili 
improved and I became more settled in Ulyankulu, I worked for two months with Deny 
Msonge, who did not support me with translation, but he used his network to introduce 
me to people in and around his village, and he facilitated arranging meetings and home 
visits. Although at the later stages of my PhD fieldwork my level of Kiswahili allowed 
me to conduct interviews on my own, I continued working with research assistants, 
both in Dar es Salaam and in Ulyankulu. I learnt that it was productive to conduct 
interviews with my assistants, as they understood both my research and the context we 
worked it and were able to criticise my assumptions and contribute their 
interpretations.  
After the interview, as we travelled back together, shared lunch or tea, went shopping, 
or simply waited for the next interview, we always did an informal debrief, discussing 
the interview that just happened. I would reiterate the relevant details of the 
conversation and share how I interpret them and what I found new, unclear or 
surprising. My research assistants responded to my questions and doubts with their 
interpretations, helping me to better contextualise and analyse the findings. Thus, their 
contribution went far beyond arranging and assisting with translation at interviews. 
They were the first point of contact I had for testing ideas and deepening my 
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understanding of the issues I was studying. Their contribution to this project was vital 
and cannot be emphasised enough. 
I paid my research assistants an agreed amount per day or per month which they 
suggested, and I compared with other local research salaries. In Dar es Salaam, I paid 
Benedict for a half or full day of work, also covering his travel and lunch expenses. 
He had many other commitments and was not able to work with me full-time. In 
Ulyankulu, where I sometimes worked with my assistants on a monthly basis and saw 
them every day, we agreed on a monthly salary, which, due to their request, was paid 
in installments. Some payments were made in cash whereas others were done by 




Throughout the project, I was acutely aware that in any circumstances a research 
assistant might be associated — by name, appearance, and accent — with a group the 
respondents either fears or despises (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 193). In Ulyankulu, 
my priority was to work with people who lived in the settlement and spoke fluent 
English, Kiswahili, and Kirundi. In Dar es Salaam, I prioritised working with a young 
person who was comfortable in diverse environments and did not seem threatening to 
the respondents. Both in Ulyankulu and Dar es Salaam I worked with male research 
assistants. Although I consciously made efforts to work with one female research 
assistant, I did not meet a woman who grew up in the settlement, spoke sufficient 
English, and was free of household and childcare duties to spend the whole days with 
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me. I am aware of the biases this brings into my study and at the later stages of my 
research, I made efforts to conduct some interviews and focus groups with women on 
my own.  
My primary research assistant at the early stages of my project in Ulyankulu was Mr 
Mtasha. Mr Mtasha was a teacher in a primary school and a respected preacher at the 
local Pentecostal church. He was 43 years old and came from a mixed Tanzanian and 
Burundian family from Kigoma region. He spoke fluent Kiswahili, English, Kirundi 
and can carry conversations in Kisukuma. He was posted to Ulyankulu to work as a 
teacher in the local primary school. Thus, his family did not have a direct experience 
of displacement. However, his position and the respect with which he was treated in 
the community facilitated conducting interviews with local village chairpersons, 
religious leaders, aspiring political candidates, and people in business. Moreover, his 
mixed background and fluency in various languages opened many doors. For a brief 
period, I also lived with his family and close association with them was crucial for 
developing trust with other members of the community. The biases produced by Mr 
Mtasha’s position, however, could not be escaped. I had no control over the 
intimidating effect he could sometimes have over some respondents due to his position 
of authority or the potential reservations people from non-Pentecostal churches might 
have had towards him. We had open conversations about these issues and attempted 
to mitigate them to our best abilities.  
In Dar es Salaam, I worked with Benedict, whom I met in 2014 when he was studying 
in Dar es Salaam on a UNHCR scholarship. Benedict was born and raised in Katumba, 
and he decided to establish his life in Dar es Salaam despite his family’s recent 
decision to repatriate. Over the years, I supported him in his study while he supported 
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me in my research. His networks among the Burundian urban community and his 
intrinsic knowledge of various parts of Dar es Salaam were invaluable. I met his 
family, relatives, many of his friends, and together we also travelled to the settlements 
to understand better the links between urban and rural experiences of naturalisation. 
Benedict was always very opinionated and critically pushed me to evaluate my 
assumptions. I was aware, however, that his young age limited our ability to conduct 
interviews with more senior members of the community. 
Moreover, due to his studies and other work, Benedict was often unable to join me 
during interviews. Despite these limitations, I was reluctant to work with someone 
else. That made me realise that the amount of trust built with years of knowing each 
other added value to the interviews in ways that could not be easily substituted by 
working with a more reliable but less familiar assistant. That person, I thought to 
myself, would never understand the scope and aims of my work in the same way, and 
therefore making changes was unproductive. Here, my dependence and attachment to 
my research assistants, which I always acknowledged and reflected on, was 






Following Rodgers (2004), I assert the relevance of data generated largely through 
intensive informal and interpersonal interactions. Rodgers standpoint challenges 
Jacobsen and Landau (2003) who urge researchers of forced migration to produce 
more representative data, publish larger data sets and collect data in ways that can be 
analysed more quantitatively. Rodgers argues that spaces of displacement do not 
exhibit laboratory-like conditions. Rather, they ‘are defined by social chaos and 
subversive economies where affected populations experience a profound sense of 
confusion and disorientation’ (Rodgers, 2004). Approaching these contexts with 
perfectly designed surveys not only takes away the opportunity from people in 
displacement to shape the research questions but also it risks missing the defining 
aspects of the issues we try to study. The informal and everyday nature of the 
interactions and processes allow us to generate information that in a more  
participatory way.  
At the initial stages of my research, my sampling technique was very much based on 
luck (see Fine & Deegan, 1996, on serendipity in ethnographic research) and the story 
of how I met Mama Alice illustrates this. On my first trip to Ulyankulu, I was getting 
breakfast of tea and mandazi at the bus station in Tabora before boarding the bus to 
Ulyankulu. Alice was sitting next to me, also eating mandazi and chatting with the 
ladies who were cooking. She was an energetic and jovial lady with contagious 
laughter, and she approached me with a series of questions: Do I like maandazi? What 
do I think about Tanzania? Am I married? We chatted for a few minutes and when she 
found out that I was on my way to Ulyankulu she was surprised and promised to come 
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to visit me there before I left. What I did not know at that point was that Alice was a 
Burundian refugee who married a Tanzanian man she loved, contradicting the will of 
her family. We exchanged numbers, and in the next weeks (and then years) I was to 
hear the details of her life and love story over many more cups of tea. We kept in touch, 
I met her family, visited her office in Urambo and shared meals. This encounter was 
typical of the first stages of my research, which were characterised by a collection of 
lucky coincidences. While I am not saying here that all ethnographic findings are 
random, I believe that chance is an important component in the collection and 
interpretation of data (Fine & Deegan, 1996). As Fine and Deegan (1996) observe, 
‘unplanned does not suggest that anything is possible, only that a range of things are’ 
(p. 445). In my data collection and analysis, I embraced the role of chance and 
throughout the process remained opened and attentive to serendipitous encounters.  
 
As my meeting with Mama Alice illustrated, at the first stages of my research, I was 
not selective or specific, and I spoke to anyone in and around the settlement who was 
keen to share their time and story. I spent much time simply ‘hanging out’ (Rodgers, 
2004) with people in private and public spaces. I used ‘snowball’ sampling approach 
to expand my connections (Bernard, 2006). As Jacobsen and Landau (2003, p. 189) 
point out, unless done very carefully, a snowball selection approach runs a high risk 
of producing a biased sample. Unlike a random sample, where everyone in the target 
population has an equal chance of being selected, ‘a snowball sample draws subjects 
from a particular segment of the community, and they are likely to be similar in certain 
ways — sharing a social network, for example, belonging to the same religious group 
or interacting with a particular NGO’ (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 196). In order to 
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tackle this issue, I developed multiple ‘snowballs’ by establishing connections with 
many unrelated families from different churches and making a conscious effort to meet 
new people and then snowball sample from these groups. I initially interviewed all 
Burundian teachers at VETA school, met their families, their neighbours, went to 
church with them. Next, I conducted interviews at the churches I visited and was also 
invited to come to nearby schools where I interviewed staff and teachers. My closest 
respondents became teachers, church leaders and choir members.  
At the latter stages of my research, I began to plan interviews with specific members 
of the community: I spoke to village leadership in all villages in Ulyankulu, I met the 
political candidates for district elections, I made conscious efforts to interview more 
women and young people from various social classes, I scheduled interviews with 
local judges arbitrating in land disputes, and I also conducted repeated interviews with 
families affected by long-lasting land disputes. Moreover, I got introduced to and 
spoke to many Tanzanians who moved into the settlements searching for business and 
livelihood opportunities. Although at this point I was more selective and specific 
regarding the profile of the people I wanted to meet and speak with, my research was 
never randomised, and I still relied on the connections I made in churches, schools, 
and markets. It is important to highlight that conducting a controlled randomised study 
was not a desirable approach for the purpose and aims of my research. The open-ended 
design and sampling and personal connections with people allowed me to keep open 
the channel for former refugees to shape my research and for critical human 
connections to be formed. 
In its final stages, my research incorporated both approaches. I remained open and 
attentive to the serendipity and the unexpected encounters and connections that were 
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the dominant characteristic at the first stages of my research. At the same time, I 
continued with the more structured and selective sampling, which allowed me to 
diversify my sample and consciously include people from across the community. At 
the table below shows, despite my efforts, my interviews remained extremely skewed 
towards middle-aged men. At the initial statges of my research, the higher percentage 
of men in my interviews was a result of the gender and positionality of my research 
assistants, who organised most of the interviews. In the latter part of my research, I 
organised and conducted many of the interviews on my own but the disproportionately 
higher amount of interviews with men was an effect of my interest in questions of local 
politics and land conflict. I decided to interview people in positions of leadership 
across the villages of Ulyankulu as well as the people involved in land disputes. Most 
of the individuals in these contexts were men, and this has resulted in having a 
disproportionately larger number of interviews with male rather than female members 
of the community. In order to collect sufficient amount of data on the topics 
governance and land I compromised attention to gender balance in my research. 
Citizenship, as I discovered, was a very gendered space. I am aware that this could 
have impacted my findings and I tried to ameliorate it by discussing all my final 
arguments with the key informants. The tables below illustrate the breakdown of the 
interviews by gender, age and location (for a full table with information about all the 
participants, see Appendix 1.). 
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Table 1. Individual interviews with refugees, former refugees and Tanzanians living 






      
18-30 9 0 
      
30-50 51 23 
      
50+ 33 6 
      
 
Table 2. Participants in focus group discussions and group interviews conducted in 







      
18-30 15 12 
      
30-50 40 42 
      
50+ 16 11 
      
 
 






      
18-30 9 1 
      
30-50 9 4 
      
50+ 2 1 




4.4.c. Mindful interviewing: attentive speaking and listening 
 
 
Many books have been written on the subject of qualitative interviewing that advise 
on structuring questions, preparing follow-ups, notetaking and coding (see Roulston, 
2010; Brinkmann, 2013). Regardless of the number of qualitative research courses and 
preparations, most researchers know that interviewing can only be mastered following 
a painful and often disheartening streak of mistakes. As I became more forgiving 
towards my own oversights in research, I improved, grew in confidence, and ultimately 
realised that interviewing is a form of art; and everyone develops their own style and 
their own pace. In the following, I discuss aspects of qualitative interviewing that help 
to illustrate how my approach and practice changed over time.   
The fieldwork for this project included interviews conducted in very diverse settings. 
I spoke with the director of the Refugee Department in his freezing air-conditioned 
office, with the Settlement Officer on a long car ride asking questions between the 
multiple phone calls he answered, to a parish priest in his church in the unplanned 
settlement in Dar es Salaam, to a young woman while she braided her daughters’ hair, 
to teachers during their lunch breaks between lessons, to sellers in cafes of the busy 
Kariakoo market, to farmers as we walked across the rice fields, to patients waiting in 
line at the clinic, to traders selling cows, to young men in bike shops and hair salons. 
In all the interviews, regardless of the context, I practised what I refer to as mindful 
interviewing, a practice focused on attentive speaking and listening. Interviews and 
conversations constituted the central part of my project and developing a conscious 
and effective way of interviewing was the most important learning process of this 
research.  
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The questions I asked centered around the history of the settlements, the initial land 
distribution and governance in the settlement, the changes in land access and 
governance over time, details of the process of naturalisation and repatriation, the 
reasons behind people’s decision to remain in Tanzania, the story of their relatives 
who returned, what they expected from naturalisation, how they experienced the 
process of naturalisation, what are their concerns regarding naturalisation, if they 
and/or their relatives migrated to urban centres, do they have Tanzanian neighbours 
and what are their relationships, do they intend to remain in the settlements, what, if 
anything, has changed for them following naturalisation. 
In interviews, I sought not only to gather information but to genuinely establish an 
understanding with the people I spoke to. I made efforts to ensure that interviews were 
scheduled at times and in spaces convenient for them and that the nature and aims of 
my project were clear. At the end of each interview an opportunity was made available 
for respondents to ask questions about me, my family, my life in Europe or say 
anything else they thought was not sufficiently covered in our conversation. I respected 
feedback and clues given by my research assistants and did everything not to repeat 
mistakes, such as scheduling an interview in a cafe where our respondent did not feel 
comfortable. Throughout the research process, the range of interview questions was 
frequently adjusted, and my interview guide was often revised to include findings that 
arose from previous conversations. The long-scope of this project and repeated visits 
to the field sites resulted in both changes in people’s circumstances as well as changes 
in my aptitude to conduct interviews. Thus, the data sets collected in the different years 
differ slightly both in content and quality; with subsequent interviews and notes 




I relied on note-taking during most of the interviews, and people often paused while 
sharing something they thought of special significance to ensure that I wrote it down 
accurately. I made an attempt at recording interviews and at the beginning of my 
research, however, all of my participants indicated a preference for note-taking. At the 
end of each day, I summarised and annotated each interview, adding thoughts and 
points for further investigation. I have eleven long conversations with primary 
informants which I recorded and transcribed. In most interviews, however, people I 
met and spoke to were suspicious and fearful of voice recording, and I relied on note-
taking. Although this method was considered more comfortable for my informants, 
especially at the beginning it was challenging for me to take notes, write down quotes 
accurately and pay attention to nuance in people’s voice and attitude at the same time. 
With time, I made improvements, and after conducting multiple interviews, I became 
more familiar with people’s narrative styles and more skilled at discerning which 
responses need a word by word recording and when I need to code relevant 
information.    
I quickly learnt how much one absorbs in a few days of field research and how 
overwhelming it is to figure out what data is important, what is not, and how to record 
them in the best possible way (Sanjek, 1990). Following advice from other researchers, 
I wrote down everything, and I avoided relying too much on my memory. Following 
Seligmann’s (2005, p. 247) guidelines, I organised my field notes into three sections. 
The first one was a daily entry specifying the individuals involved, the date, and the 
narrative text. The second section included transcription of the interviews and both 
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theoretical and practical questions that emerged on that day. The third section included 
files with photographs of events and places and scans of documents consulted. At the 
end of fieldwork, I also compiled a table including details of all interviews and focus 
group discussions conducted with dates and locations.  
 
4.5. Analysing qualitative data 
 
Scholars for a long time have been debating the problem of ‘distortion’ in research 
which affects both the act of interviewing itself as well as the process of transcribing 
and editing (Sanjek, 1990). The interview is not a neutral situation where we are given 
access to the truth about someone or something. Rather, it is always a result of an 
interaction between interviewer and interviewed. Similarly, while editing and 
transcribing, we make subjective decisions about narratives that we privilege, 
statements we use more often to prove our point, and interview quotes that perfectly 
illustrate our premise. Awareness of how knowledge is produced can lead to 
questioning the purpose of research altogether. From my perspective, however, the 
awareness that the discourse of the informant and the discourse of academia are 
transformed in the interface allows letting go of attempting to reach an authentic, 
privileged source of knowledge. Ethnographic fieldwork is worthwhile precisely 
because it allows for academic, theoretical understanding to be challenged and 




As Liisa Malkki wrote:  
Whenever the anthropologist wants to say that a collectivity holds X belief or 
Y value, it is necessary either to use statistical and survey methods (with their 
own well-known limitations) or to make ethnographic generalisations which 
convince by showing how particular or idiosyncratic observations exemplify 
wider patterns (1995, p. 56).  
Thus, it can be argued that the aim in testing the validity of qualitative research is to 
convince the reader of the arguments presented. This, however, cannot be done by 
generalising our data or proving their validity by replication. Rather, generating a 
strong argument from qualitative data is done by a clear presentation of the research 
process, consistent use of terms and methods, and demonstration of transparency and 
thorough understanding of the context. 
In my analysis, I read and re-read all interviews multiple times, looking for common 
themes, questions and puzzles. I critically analysed potential biases of my informants, 
my research assistant and my own. I highlighted recurring themes and clustered the 
interviews around them. I assessed the times and places where the recurring themes 
occured, comparing them across urban and rural context, education level and gender, 
thinking about what impact these specific context had on people’s answers and what 
can be learned from it. Next, I wrote summaries and preliminary analysis around the 
clusterres, incorporating relevant quotes and signpostig potential contribution. Finally, 
I organised and I placed former refugees’ narratives into text, complementing and 
juxtaposing it with the existing studies. Using former refugees’ narratives as guiding 
principles for my analysis, I examined how the experience of naturalisation shaped 
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Burundian refugees views of citizenship, and considered how this can help develop 
understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement context. 
 
 4.6. Ethics, positionality and advocacy 
 
My positionality as a white, female researcher cannot be completely separated from 
the data I collected. By positionality, I mean a concept articulated by Linda Alcoff 
(1992) and others, namely that gender, race, class, and other aspects of our identities 
are markers of relational positions rather than essential qualities (Maher & Tetreault, 
1994). Knowledge is valid when it includes an acknowledgement of the knower’s 
specific position in any context (Maher & Tetreault, 1994, p. 118). I have found the 
lens of positionality (my own and my informants’) to be particularly useful in 
developing a more critical perspective on my research findings. Doing the research, I 
kept reminding myself that the ideology and value system I inhabit in Europe (which 
is, to a large extent, feminist, secular, and liberal) has an impact on the questions I ask, 
perceptions I have, and arguments I develop. In the same vein, the perceptions the 
people in the settlements have about race, gender, and Western values, were crucial in 
influencing their attitudes towards me.  
Moreover, conducting work among refugees, who directly or indirectly experienced 
violence and trauma, and currently, live in a state of profound anxiety about their 
future, necessitated special considerations. Given the precarious situation of the 
Burundian refugees pre- and post-naturalisation, it was essential to me throughout this 
project to ensure that my confidentiality and research purpose were abundantly clear. 
Before every interview, I introduce myself, explained the nature of my work and 
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outlined the purpose of my research. It was always my priority to ensure that people 
made an informed decision to participate in the research. Ample time was given for 
addressing any questions or concerns. Following Malkki (1995), I believe that the 
success of fieldwork hinges not so much on a ‘determination to uncover “the facts” as 
on a willingness to leave some stones unturned and to listen to what informants deem 
important’ (p. 51).  
Although I ‘physically’ left Tanzania in June 2017 and I finished my data collection 
then, I remained in regular communication with my primary informants. I try to resist 
the language of ‘entering’ and ‘exiting’ fieldwork, creating boundaries between the 
worlds we live in and do research in, separating them; anxious of potential overlap. 
Following Taylor (1991), I believe that during research, reciprocal relationships and 
responsibilities develop that cannot be simply ‘discarded’ with an arbitrary ‘end date 
of fieldwork’. As ethnographers in the past continued correspondence with their 
informants via letters, today WhatsApp remains the medium of extending fieldwork 
and blurring the boundaries between the fieldwork/ post-fieldwork worlds. After 
leaving Tanzania in 2017, I remained in regular online communication with a few of 
my primary respondents, who share with me news about their families, health, and 
future plans. Maintaining relationships with the people I worked with, who trusted me 





Reserach and advocacy  
 
Graduate students and seasoned researchers alike are often left grappling with a wide 
range of ethical challenges raised by and throughout their research (see eds. Block, 
Riggs & Haslam, 2013; Ansoms, Murison, & Thomson, 2013). David Turton (1996) 
argues that research in contexts of human suffering could only be ethically justified if 
part of the objective of that research is to help alleviate that suffering. Likewise, 
Jacobsen and Landau (2003) insist that researchers should ensure that their work is 
relevant to those agencies and organisations working to improve conditions for 
refugees and asylum seekers. Various contributors to the edited volume Values and 
Vulnerabilities: The Ethics of Research with Refugees and Asylum Seekers (eds. Block, 
Riggs & Haslam, 2013) insist that research without advocacy amounts to exploitation. 
At the same time, however, there has been a strong push against policy-oriented 
research in refugee and migration studies. Already in 1992, Fuchs wrote about the 
importance of academic inquiry into migration and refugee matters beyond the 
immediate policy relevance: ‘Good research in the pursuit of important knowledge is 
intrinsically valuable. International Migration Review (IRM), while helpful to those 
of us involved in policy, is not justified only by its usefulness to policy-makers’ (p. 
1069). Bakewell (2008) makes the same observation, putting forward a case for ‘policy 
irrelevant research’ (p. 450). The argument behind this concept is that policy-driven 
research is limited by the existing policy categories and in result might obscure crucial 
questions or overlook certain groups and individuals in displacement. On the other 
hand, by breaking away from policy relevance and limiting categories, research can 
‘challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions that underpin much practice and in due 
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course bring much more significant changes to the lives of forced migrants’ (Bakewell, 
2008, p. 432).  
Although under all circumstances I was careful to explain that I was conducting 
research for a dissertation, my presence in the settlement raised hopes that my work 
could have a positive impact on the outcomes of naturalisation or at least on people’s 
living standards. The emotional burden that came with the meaning of the space I 
began to occupy in the settlement dominated my fieldwork experience and shaped my 
ensuing involvement in multiple development projects in the settlement. Driven by a 
sense of indebtedness and obligations towards the community, I engaged in writing 
advocacy pieces for academic and media outlets to expose the incomplete 
implementation of naturalisation and the vulnerabilities it created. Frustrated by the 
lack of impact that these engagements were generating, I helped to create Wayair 
Foundation, a small organisation which today financially support projects and ideas 
initiated by former refugees in Ulyankulu and offers life-long scholarships for selected 
students. 
Therefore, in my work I try to square the circle. Sharing resources and knowledge to 
support the initiatives undertaken by former refugees in Ulyankulu, I am giving back 
in the only way I know to the people whose generosity, openness and kindness helped 
me to obtain my degrees and build my career. At the same time, however, in the 
following chapters of this thesis and academic articles published, I try to maintain a 
belief in policy ‘irrelevant’ writing, focusing on how this particular case of 
naturalisation in displacement contributes new insights into theory and practice of 




The objective of my research was to understand how the experience of naturalisation 
shaped Burundian refugees views of citizenship and to consider how this can help 
develop understanding of citizenship more broadly, especially in a displacement 
context. The underlying aspiration was to conduct research grounded in the concerns 
of the people I worked with. Following this aspiration, I employed ethnographic 
methods which are the most suited for understanding and addressing the lived 
experience of individuals and communities. The long-term, ethnographic and periodic 
nature of this project created additional spaces for learning and a chance to witness the 
non-linear consequences of naturalisation. In contrast to survey-based work, 
qualitative interviews allow for establishing relationships, learning about what the 
informants find important, and adjusting the initial premises and assumptions. During 
my research, I worked with two research assistants, who became my primary 
informants. Their networks, positionality and knowledge had a significant impact on 
all stages of this research from sampling to documentation. I am conscious of the 
strenghts and biases of their contribution and I recognise it througout my analysis.  
The process of fieldwork was a challenging journey, which included mistakes, illness, 
reconsideration of approach, fine-tuning of interviewing techniques, and multiple 
compromises. A great degree of intuition and reflexivity went into the analysis of my 
findings. In the following chapters, I present and analyse the narratives and stories that 





5. From refugee settlements to settlements of citizens - 




Refugeehood is an experience of exclusion from politics and inability to find 
platforms where one’s political concerns can be listened to and addressed  
(Arendt, 1973, p. 296). 
 
 
In refugee camps, the administrative apparatus is meant to restrict and discourage 
refugees’ political organisation within the host country. Refugees in a camp are 
expected to be ‘non-political actors’ and are usually discouraged by institutions (the 
host state and humanitarian organisations) from engaging in any political activities 
(Hanafi, 2010). Despite the existing structural limitations, refugees have been 
organising themselves in political ways, and the growing literature on refugee camp 
politics brings attention to various forms of protests, resistance, and claim-making 
(Ilcan 2015, Agier, 2008; Holzer, 2012). Although there are many studies that discuss 
refugees’ political organisation in camps (Lecadet, 2016; Omata, 2017; Hanafi, 2010), 
not much attention has been given to a post-camp scenario, in which refugees access 
citizenship. The case of naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania allows for 
contributing to these debates, shedding light on evolving citizenship in displacement 
and bringing attention to the significance of active and participatory elements of 
citizenship for the long-term displacees. 
 
In 2018, a decade after the TANCOSS agreement was initiated, Ulyankulu settlement 
remains in a transitional governance phase. New citizens are permitted to vote in 
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national elections and join political parties, but the Settlement Officer continues to act 
as the highest authority in the settlement. Although following naturalisation former 
refugees do not anymore need a special permission to leave the settlement, the 
Settlement Officer, however, remains in power and for the former refugees his 
arbitrary presence signifies the incompleteness of the naturalisation process. This 
chapter demonstrates how the settlement’s governance was transformed incompletely; 
creating a hybrid system where former refugees continue to live under camp 
governance despite having citizenship. For the people concerned, this creates 
ambiguous lines of authority and incites uncertainty about the future, defining the 
experience of ‘probational citizenship’. The nature of ‘probatonal citizenship’, 
however, is in essence contradictory, and I show how the new citizens navigate the 
altered forms of governance and attempt to assert their new status by voting in national 
elections, joining political parties, and attempting to elect a local councillor. 
Furthermore, the chapter draws out the discrepancies between urban and rural 
contexts, pointing out to political invisibility of former refugees in urban centres.  
 
The conversations this chapter builds on center around the topic of governance and 
politics. Following Fukuyama (2013), I think about governance as ‘a government’s 
ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services’ (p. 350). As Fukuyama 
(2013, p. 350) explains, governance is about execution within the domain of public 
administration, as opposed to politics or public policy. Politics, on the other hand, as 
used in this thesis, stands for the process of making decisions that lead to achieving 
and exercising positions on governance, including the activities of the government, 
members of law-making organizations, or other people who try to influence the way a 
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country is governed (Cambridge Dictionary, 2008). Discussions with former refugees 
foregrounded the challenges and grievances relating to the governance of the area. 
People’s struggles to influence the governance of the area they inhabit, however, are 
very much about involvement in politics. This research reveals that the extent of 
political incorporation in Tanzania is key to former refugees’ conceptualisation of 
citizenship. 
 
Struggles for recognition go beyond electoral participation, and former refugees I met 
in Ulyankulu strove to gain political voice and representation within and outside the 
settlement, despite structural obstacles in place. Their efforts to assert political 
representation, however, were unsuccessful. In 2015, inhabitants of Ulyankulu were 
informed that they can select a councillor who will represent them at the district level. 
Although the election took place, the results were eventually nullified, and the 
councillor was not appointed. In this chapter, I take forward Arendt’s notion of 
refugeehood as ‘inability to find platforms where one’s political concerns can be 
listened to and addressed’ (Arendt, 1973, p. 296) and explore how refugees in 
displacement make claims to political inclusion and representation. The chapter 
concludes that the ongoing struggles for recognition become an inherent characteristic 
of ‘probational citizenship’, where people’s attempts to get a political voice are 
undermined by temporality and protracted uncertainty. This has broader implications, 
as exclusion from politics leads former refugees to question the validity of their new 
status. Before moving to a detailed discussion of the opportunities, frustrations and 
tensions entailed by the transition in settlement’s governance, I first discuss the 
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specific context of the Tanzanian governance system, in which Ulyankulu is 
embedded.   
 
5.1. Ulyankulu governance in the national context 
 
Contemporary studies of governance in Tanzania (Kelsall, 2003; Gray & Khan, 2010; 
Pedersen, 2012; Lange, 2008) highlight the difference between how governance in 
Tanzania is planned on paper and how it operates in practice. Scholars have been 
arguing that decentralisation in Tanzania is accompanied by increasing central 
government and line ministry control (re-centralisation), which simply hollows out 
local people’s participation and control (Lund, 2008; Bruce & Knox, 2008; Sikor & 
Müller, 2009). In the context of this research, it is key to highlight that the 
administrative organisation of the Old Settlements is embedded in national structures 
and it needs to be understood as a reflection (rather than an exception) of the broader 
trends in Tanzanian governance. 
 
Governance in Tanzania: multipartism and decentralisation  
 
The multiparty rule was re-introduced to Tanzania in 1992, after almost 30 years of 
one-party rule under Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) which has been in power since 
independence. In 1996, the government officially launched the local government 
reform, with a goal to ‘strengthen the local government authorities with the overall 
objective of improving the quality and access to public services provided through or 
facilitated by the local government authorities’ (Ngwilizi, 2002, as cited in Lange, 
2008, p. 1126). The implementation of the reform was largely donor-funded and 
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according to Lange (2008, p. 1126), there appeared to be considerable ambivalence at 
different levels of the Tanzanian state apparatus towards the reform. 
 
In contrast to other decentralisation models (e.g. Mozambique or Cameroon), the 
government of Tanzanian abolished chiefdoms and customary authorities, asserting 
that they have no place in the official governance system. Tanzania is divided into 
regions and districts, and each district is divided into administrative wards, which 
again are divided into villages (more than 10,000 altogether). Villages are divided into 
vitongoji (hamlets) into rural areas and mitaa (streets) in urban areas. Each 
hamlet/street elects a chairperson who becomes a member of the village council. The 
village government is led by an elected chairman and an appointed, salaried Village 
Executive Officer (VEO) (Lange, 2008). VEOs are nominated by the village 
government but appointed by the District Council which is also their employer 




Figure 7. Local government structure in Tanzania. Source: Brockington (2008). 
 
Councillors for the district council are elected at the ward level. Each party nominates 
a candidate for each ward, as well as candidates for the special ‘women seats’ (one-
quarter of all council seats). The councillors meet for the full council meeting four 
times a year, and for this occasion, the district’s Member of Parliament is also 
supposed to attend. Local Government Authorities in Tanzania rely on three major 
sources of funding: own revenues, central government transfers, and development aid 
(Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2000).  
 
Decentralisation makes it less clear where decisions are made, exposing the lack of 
clear hierarchical structure in bureaucracy. Pedersen (2012) observes that 
decentralisation challenges the ‘conceptual dichotomy between state and local-level 
institutions’ (p. 268). The decoupling of layers within the structure of administration 
leads to a discrepancy between reform promises and reform outcomes. Pedersen relies 
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on the conceptual framework of decoupling which indicates how strong ideals within 
a formal organisation may result in a lack of coherence between these ideas and daily 
practices. Building on a detailed study of land reform, Pedersen (2012) observes that 
in some cases the local-level village authorities are too weak to establish and maintain 
projects and institutions on their own, while districts, Ministries and donors seem 
unwilling to take on responsibility for implementation. In other cases, the latter takes 
responsibility for implementation, thus overlapping with the local authorities and 
creating parallel structures. The implication of this is that it becomes unclear who is 
actually responsible for implementation of projects and it weakens the mechanisms of 
accountability.  
 
The layered public bureaucracies are also evident in the fiscal dependence of Local 
Government Authorities (LGAs), which rely on central government’s transfers and 
development aid. LGAs receive directives by the central government on how to utilise 
funds for certain projects, which contradicts the policy of decentralisation. Pedersen 
(2012) argues that policy implementation in Tanzania is slow and uneven precisely 
due to an incoherent administrative structure at all levels. Thus, he concludes that 
governance in Tanzania should be understood as ‘polycentric rather than hierarchical’ 
(Pedersen, 2012, p. 271), involving actors at the local, national as well as the 
international levels. Other scholars have made similar observations, particularly from 
the perspective of land management but also in relation to the role of civil society 
organisations in Tanzania (Green, Mercer & Mesaki, 2013). These insights are key for 
understanding the administrative structure and governance practices in Ulyankulu 
settlement.  
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5.2. The administrative structure of Ulyankulu settlement  
 
 
In their narratives, the inhabitants of Ulyankulu divide the history of local governance 
in the settlement into three periods: (I) from 1973 until 1985 when the camp was 
administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) and Tanganyika Christian 
Refugee Services (TCRS), the implementing partners of UNHCR, which provided aid 
and basic infrastructure, (II) 1985-2007 when humanitarian organisations were absent, 
Ulyankulu was divided into wards and wards were represented at the district council 
by local Tanzanian councillors, (III) and then 2007 until now when the implementation 
of naturalisation began and the wards of Ulyankulu were cancelled. Below, I briefly 
outline the characteristics of each phase, setting the scene for a broader discussion of 




When the Old Settlements were established in the 1970s, the initial set-up and structure 
were influenced by Tanzania’s national policy of socialism and self-reliance, where 
both international donors and the national government wanted refugees to become self-
reliant quickly through the cultivation of subsistence crops for food needs, and 
fulfilment of tax requirements by planting cash crops (Daley, 1991, p. 189). In these 
early years, the settlements were overseen by TCRS (implementing partner of 
UNHCR) together with MOHA’s representative, an appointed Settlement Officer. 
Ministry of Home Affairs worked together with TCRS to build basic infrastructure, 
refugee village leaders were selected, and refugees were encouraged to cultivate food 
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crops and cash crops. According to a TCRS report (1985), the strategy of rural 
settlements turned out to be a success in terms of production and revenue, and after 
less than a decade the refugees were deemed self-sufficient.   
 
Daley’s research in the late 1980s and my own interviews with the elders in Ulyankulu 
settlement reveal, however, that humanitarian organisations and the government aimed 
to establish self-provisioning refugee households within the minimum possible time. 
Refugees were encouraged to cultivate on allocated plots or to work as casual wage 
labourers on nearby agricultural schemes, including tobacco-growing farms. The ‘self-
sufficiency’ of the settlements was exaggerated and was always dependent on the 
seasonal migrant labour of some (usually male) family members and an increased 




In 1985, UNHCR left the management of Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba to the 
Government of Tanzania. This decision was made based on the fact that, according to 
UNHCR, the settlements were self-sufficient and able to operate without international 
assistance. The settlements were then placed under the recently revived local 
government structure. Subsequently, Ulyankulu was administered as a division similar 
to other areas in Tanzania, with its own wards and representatives (see the diagram of 
local government structure on p. 137). As Martin, a leader of the market association in 
Ulyankulu and a prominent figure in the settlement, recalled: 
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To familiarise us with the process here, the government brought civil servants 
who spoke Kirundi (they were Ha, Hangaza people) and they explained to us 
that now we need to follow the Tanzanian political system of governance. They 
put the candidates in front and told people to queue behind the one whom they 
wanted to vote for (int. 2016). 
 
Initially, the newly selected village leaders were people who held positions of authority 
in Burundi before displacement. With time, as the structure of the settlement 
developed, people who wanted to contest were required to get support in their village 
and then propose their candidature in a letter to the Settlement Officer. If approved, 
the lists were sent back for voting to the village.  
 
This created a situation wherein Ulyankulu had its own administrative system with 
village governments, but these operated under the authority of the settlement’s office. 
The major difference regarding governance between Tanzanian villages and 
settlement villages constituted the existence of the settlement’s office headed by the 
Settlement Officer. As Daley (1991) shows on the example of Katumba settlement, 
although village council membership was exclusive to refugees, ‘there was no local 
autonomy in major decision-making, since the settlement commandant’s [Officer] 
office controlled production, education, commercial activities and law and order, 
including imposition of penalties’ (p. 256). The functions of the village administration, 
as empowered by the Villages Act of 1975, were never extended to the refugee 
villages. These were centrally-controlled and on hand-over were transferred from the 
external agency, TCRS, to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Daley, 1989, p. 246). It is 
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key to understand that despite the representation at most levels of the administrative 
hierarchy in the villages, the refugee population was unable to participate in the 
decision-making process of the settlement.  
 
Refugee leaders were appointed to rule at the village level, whereas three16 Tanzanian 
Ward Representatives (also referred to as Councillors, Kiswahili Diwani) were 
representing the people in the district council (Miletzki, 2014, p. 115). The presence 
of the diwani (councillor) was crucial. Although they were not selected from within 
the refugee community, they represented the needs of the wards (which included both 
refugees and native Tanzanians), and in people’s view, they facilitated the delivery of 
social services. From the perspective of the people interviewed, having a councillor 
gave them representation at the district level and prevented the invisibility of the 
settlements. As explained earlier, the districts allocate the budget through elected 
councillors, and although the councillor selected for Ulyankulu was a Tanzanian, he 
served as a representative for Ulyankulu’s wards. Interviews in Ulyankulu revealed 
that people were satisfied with the former councillor, Mzee Kagoma, who has lived in 
the settlement for decades and was well integrated with the community.   
 
My research assistant knew Mzee Kagoma and he introduced us in 2016. Mr Kagoma 
came from Kigoma region and initially worked as a tax collector in Ulyankulu before 
he became a councillor. Tanzanians elected him, but he acted as a representative also 
for the area that included the settlement, and he was the councillor for the ward of 
Mirambo from 1994 to 2005. In his own words: ‘I am Ha, we resemble Rundi 
 
16 For the wards of Kanindo, Igombemkulu and Mirambo. 
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[Burundians], I was bringing development here, maybe building a school or whatever, 
they came and suspected I am Burundian because I have been helping them here, I 
convinced the government to allow them to build strong houses’. Although he was not 
above the messy reality of politics and according to my research assistant he was 
accused of many instances of corruption, Mr Kagoma’s work and advocacy for 
refugees brought health and education services to the settlement. Former refugees I 
spoke to saw the removal of the councillor position (which coincided with the 
inception of naturalisation) as hugely detrimental to their livelihoods.  
 
2007 until 2018 
 
In 2007, following the implementation of TANCOSS, the UNHCR re-established its 
presence in Ulyankulu, and the ward representation at the district level was dismantled. 
This reversal in the government structure was caused by the initial plan that under 
TANCOSS refugees who opted for naturalisation would be resettled to other regions 
to Tanzania. UNHCR’s reinstated presence was supposed to be a temporary measure 
which was in line with the original plan of resettling former refugees to other parts of 
Tanzania. As the plans for resettlement were abandoned, and the process of 
naturalisation extended over the years, the area remained without a ward 
representative. Village leaders, however, have remained in place, and they continue to 
report directly to the Settlement Officer. According to the inhabitants of Ulyankulu, 
the abolition of the ward representatives had real consequences in terms of the delivery 
of social services, and it affects both the former refugees as well as the native 
Tanzanians living in the settlement. In the next section, I explore in more detail the 
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governance situation in Ulyankulu settlement post-naturalisation and people’s 
perception and interpretation of the current situation. 
 
5.3. Ulyankulu governance in transition 
 
 
Ulyankulu settlement remains in a transitionary phase between the established 
settlement governance and prospective incorporation of the settlement into the 
Tanzanian local governance structure. This process, however, has not been planned 
under the initial TANCOSS agreement and there is no clear designated period when it 
is supposed to be completed. In the following subsections, I show how former refugees 
experience and interpret this uncertain state and what effect does that have on how 
they experience and understand their new citizenship status.   
 
From ‘refugee law’ to ‘local law’: unfulfilled expectations  
 
The idea of refugee camps as exceptional spaces has been explored by many scholars 
of forced migration (Agamben, 2005; Agier, 2002; Turner, 2006). Turner (2006) 
defines the state of exception by the simultaneous inclusion and exclusion of camp 
spaces: ‘When a country decides that refugees are a threat to the nation-state, and 
places them in an exceptional space of a camp, which is at once inside and outside the 
law, the state of exception is realized (Turner, 2006, p. 760). This creates a paradoxical 
situation where the space of the camp is simultaneously in the grips of the state (which 
tries to control and contain the refugee population) and outside the very same state 
(which excludes and alienates the refugees). In the context of encampment, Agamben 
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(Agamben, 1998, pp. 37-49) has used the term ‘bare life’ to describe refugees existing 
outside the polis of national citizens. The notion of ‘bare life’ has been criticised and 
refuted because it implies lack of agency on the part of the refugees. This is contrary 
to the evidence which indicates that refugees have been organizing themselves 
politically within refugees’ camps and beyond (Hanafi, 2010; Ilcan, 2014; Lecadet, 
2016; Omata, 2017). What is helpful, however, in the theorisation of refugee camps as 
exceptional spaces is the idea of the simultaneous existence of camps inside and 
outside the law. The narratives of former Burundian refugees echo these assumptions 
and show how this dynamic between exclusion and inclusion is affected by 
naturalisation.  
 
In one conversation, Aloyze, an elderly former street leader, explained to me: 
‘Previously the settlement was governed under the refugee law. The village 
government existed, but it was under the supervision of the settlement commander. It 
constituted the chairman, secretary, cell leaders from every road’ (int. 2016). Asked 
about what will be the difference after naturalisation, he replied: ‘What will be the 
difference after the transition? Political representatives will be added to the structure’ 
(int. 2016). Asked to elaborate, he explained that although the village government 
existed, it was always in one way or another under the supervision of the settlement’s 
office. The major change, when the process of naturalisation is fully implemented, will 
be that the village governments will be operating under the Ministry of Regional 
Administration and Local Government (MRALG)17 rather than under the Ministry of 
Home Affairs (MOHA) and that members of their community will be representatives 
 
17 Although this is the full, official name of that Ministry people often refer to it as the Ministry of 
Local Governance. 
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at the district level. My research assistant engaged in the conversation and added that: 
‘Prior to naturalisation the settlement was governed by special laws applying to 
refugee areas but that should change after naturalisation’ (int. 2016). They both agreed 
that following naturalisation they are expecting a prospective transition from what they 
refer to as ‘refugee law’ to ‘local government law’. The same sentiment was expressed 
in a number of other interviews.  
 
This terminological distinction between ‘refugee law’ and ‘local government law’ is 
telling. It symbolises a shift from one kind of imagined juridical logic to another. This 
shift entails different kinds of recognition, representation and access to resources (in 
principle and in practice). The transition from ‘refugee law’ to ‘local government law’ 
in people’s narratives demands a different type of political representation, meaning the 
selection of representatives from the community who can then represent former 
refugees on the district level and ensure access to development funding coming from 
the district administration. Here, notions of recognition, representation and resources 
are intertwined. As Lund (2011) eloquently puts it, ‘struggles over citizenship and 
property are, therefore, as much about the scope and constitution of authority as about 
access to membership and resources’ (p. 72). This distinction highlights that former 
refugees following naturalisation are making claims to substantive citizenship that 
goes beyond the formal aspects of naturalisation; arguing for full recognition of their 
status and political representation from within the community. Frustration regarding 
the delay in the imagined transition from ‘refugee’ to ‘local government’ law 
concentrates on the figure and presence of the Settlement Officer, who is viewed as a 
symbolic and physical continuation of the ‘refugee jurisdiction’.  
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Settlement Officer: Continuation of the ‘refugee law’ personified  
 
The figure of the Settlement Officer18 has been described and analysed in the earlier 
studies of the Old Settlements in Tanzania. Both Malkki (1995) and Daley (1989) 
reiterate stories of the Settlement Officers in Mishamo and Katumba, listing the ample 
abuses of power. In the absence of other measures of control and lack of contact with 
other representatives of the ministry as well as the lack of humanitarian organisations 
on the ground, the role of the Settlement Officer was imbued with disproportional 
power and influence. Daley shows (1989) how because ‘requests for assistance from 
donors, travel permits, further education and trading licences have to be sanctioned by 
the Settlement Commandant’ (p. 239) it created ample opportunities for exploitation. 
Likewise, in Mishamo settlement, Malkki (1995, p. 118) observed how her informants 
used the figure of the Commandant to delineate the separation between themselves and 
the Tanzanians, underlying their isolation and being governed by ‘the other’. 
Following naturalisation, the Settlement Officer remained in place, despite former 
refugees’ access to citizenship. His continued presence in the settlement provides an 
easy and immediate target for former refugees’ frustrations.  
 
In focus group discussions with members of the village governments, even if not 
prompted, people always raised the issue of the presence of the Settlement Officer: 
‘Governance is a problem in the settlement - we still don’t follow the Ministry of Local 
 
18 The use of terminology has changed from Settlement Commandant to Settlement Officer in 1998 
Refugee Act. In Kiswahili, however, it remained the same, and people refer to the Settlement Officer 
as Mkuu wa Makazi or just Mkuu (literally ‘the head of the settlement’ or simply ‘head’). I use the 
1998 Act terminology of Officer, however I keep Commandant and Commander in quotes for pre- 
1998 sources and when it was used by the interviewees.  
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Governance, we are still under Home Affairs, and Officer is still in charge as a 
supervisor of village leaders’ (int. 2016). The discussion would often get heated, with 
people exclaiming: ‘Settlement Officer, what kind of work is he doing now?! We fail 
to understand. It is just like in the past, why is he still here?’ (int. 2016). My 
observations during months of living in Ulyankulu expose that the relationship 
between the Settlement Officer and the local population is non-transparent; 
characterised by lack of accountability, unclear rules and lack of predictability. 
Moreover, the continuity of the Settlement’s Office work post-naturalisation has an 
impact on former refugees’ confidence in their new citizenship. 
 
During my time in the settlement, I witnessed multiple instances of the Settlement 
Officer stepping up to prohibit, control and regulate activities in the settlement. As 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6., the Settlement Officer has imposed a temporary 
ban on construction of buildings in 2016 which directly hindered prospective 
developments in the settlement. The prohibition was based on a logic that the 
settlement land has not been de-gazetted and a full transition to local governance is yet 
to happen. As land use plans are not available for this area, people should not build at 
random risking that in the future their homes or shops might be demolished. Although 
people defy and renegotiate the ban, it significantly slowed down developments and 
investments in the settlement. Former refugees reported as well that the building ban 
has also led them to question the validity of their new citizenship status.  
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At a dinner of ugali and fish shared with a well-regarded street leader and a good friend 
of my host family, Mr. Jean discussed with my host and me the problems of lack of 
clarity and accountability in the settlement office. He exclaimed:  
 
Three days ago, the Commandant announced that if you build a house with an 
iron sheet, it won’t be demolished. He also said if it is built already, then there 
is no problem, but if you start building now, it can be demolished, you just 
need permission. You must ask for a permit to build a house now. But 
yesterday he said they would be demolished regardless, and now he says you 
need permission. Commandant says this one day, this another day, he is 
confusing people (int. 2016).  
This statement illustrates how the inconsistencies in the communication from the 
Settlement’s Office confuse people and prevent them for securely investing in their 
homes.  
 
Another domain in which the Settlement Officer exercises unquestioned authority is 
control of movement in the settlement (discussed in more detail in Chapter 7). 
Although today former Burundian refugees are allowed to exit and enter the 
settlements freely, visitors are still required to obtain a permit from the Ministry of 
Home Affairs which they need to present to the Settlement Officer upon arrival. The 
permission to enter the settlement is not enforced consistently and it is mostly applied 
to foreigners. The process of applying for the permit is expensive and misleading, and 
as a result, diplomats, potential investors and journalists are discouraged from visiting 
the three Old Settlements. In principle, Tanzanians entering Ulaynkulu are also 
 165 
required to apply for a special permit and register with the settlement office, however 
Tanzanians whom I met persistently defy this regulation. As one Tanzanian man living 
in the settlement told me: ‘This is my country. I do not have to ask his [settlement 
officer’s] permission to be here’ (int. 2016).  
 
I spoke with the Settlement Officer of Ulyankulu on many occasions, both in formal 
interviews in his office, as well as in less formal settings at meals at the parish where 
I lived. In one interview, he explained to me that his office will remain in operation 
until: ‘All people received citizenship, and all integration projects are implemented’ 
(int. 2016). He continued explaining that the area will remain restricted until local 
integration is over:  
 
It is estimated to take four to five years, but it is not 100%, it depends on the 
donors. A lot of programs need to be implemented in order for the Government 
of Tanzania to decide when they are ready to withdraw. The plan is to improve 
livelihoods, improve social services, health, water, roads, bus stand, and build 
a modern market (int. 2016).   
 
When I challenged him, saying that it seems that the donors pulled out from the 
agreement and the promised integration and development projects might never be 
funded, he responded: ‘If there is no funding for the integration program, we might 
need to stay here for the next 10 to 15 years’ (int. 2016). Until then, as he announced: 
‘My main task is to maintain peace, order, and security here. Security, law, and order’ 
(int. 2016).  
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This emphasis on security, law and order translates into decisions and activities that 
shape how former refugees experience their environment post-naturalisation. The 
unclear continued presence and authority of the Settlement Officer reinforces former 
refugees’ feelings of uncertainty surrounding their new status. I was puzzled by why 
the Settlement Officer can persist in his post with so much authority post-
naturalisation. To shed light on these processes, I reached out to other academics in 
Tanzania to understand better why the Ministry of Home Affairs maintains their 
presence in the settlements and what are the underpinning political reasons for such 
seemingly crude wielding of power. I had an opportunity to discuss the ambiguities of 
this governance arrangement with Opportuna Kweka, a well-known Tanzanian scholar 
and refugee studies expert. In conversations and the subsequent email correspondence, 
Kweka (2018) explained:  
 
My understanding is that the people belong to the Regional Commissioner, but 
the land still belongs to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). It is not a 
common situation. The way I understand it is that the MOHA is still holding 
the land and that is why they still have a representative [Settlement Officer] 
there (int. 2016).  
 
To paraphrase, the incomplete implementation of the stipulations of TANSPLI (which 
intended to change the designation of the area from designated settlement land to 
village land) justifies the continues presence of the Settlement Officer. In result, both 
Regional authorities and the Ministry of Home Affairs exercise power over Ulyankulu, 
leading to overlapping authority structure and stagnation, as it is unclear who is 
 167 
responsible for what regarding the settlement. This ambiguous governance system 
undermines people’s confidence in their newly acquired citizenship. At their core, 
however, these processes are inherently paradoxical, and in the next section I show 
how former refugees claim political voice despite the structural obstacles.  
 
5.4. Electoral politics post-naturalisation  
 
The contested presence of the Settlement Officer does not mean that nothing is 
changing regarding political incorporation of the Old Settlements. In the following 
subsections, I show how the distribution of citizenship certificates coincided with 
national elections, in which the new citizens were invited to cast their ballots. 
Simultaneously, inhabitants of the settlement were mobilised by the political parties 
and were encouraged to become members of the existing structures. Finally, I discuss 
how although the ward election was ultimately cancelled, it organised people in 
political ways and created platforms for claim-making. The following sections 
illustrate that participation and representation in local and national politics are the key 
markers of former refugees’ conceptualisation of citizenship despite the prevailing 




People I spoke to, marked the right to vote as one of the most important aspects of 
their newly acquired citizenship. It is difficult to convey the excitement that former 
refugees expressed about being able to go to the polls in the elections of October 2015. 
Most of these conversations took place in May 2015, during my second visit to 
 168 
Ulyankulu. At that time, the first round of distribution of citizenship certificates was 
just completed, and it was a time of joy, hope, and enthusiasm. In the words of a young 
carpenter: ‘The biggest change considering naturalisation is that people can vote now’ 
(int. 2015). Although some of the oldest inhabitants of Ulyankulu voted in the 1965 
elections in Burundi, for an overwhelming majority this was going to be the first time 
in their lives to participate in local and national elections legally: ‘It was our first time 
to vote and to run for political positions, we don’t know much about politics yet, we 
are new in the election’ (int. 2015). 
 
People told me openly that in the past they travelled outside of the settlements and 
voted before naturalisation. As a young woman in one focus group explained: ‘We 
voted before, but it was in secret, and it was dangerous. Now you can vote in peace’. 
The reason why people participated in elections before was to receive a voting card, 
which could be used as a form of identification. Following naturalisation, voting 
obtained another meaning. People I spoke to saw their right to vote as a formal 
recognition of their new status - a proof of their new citizenship. In that sense, voting 
has become an important marker of citizenship. 
 
Exercising the right to vote in the 2015 elections came up in many conversations 
during my research. As one teacher from Ulyankulu Secondary School said: ‘We are 
so happy to be naturalised, and we can also vote now. Yes, really!’ (int. 2015).  On my 
visit in 2016, I followed up on the topic of the 2015 elections, asking about people’s 
experiences. Mama Emina, a farmer, entrepreneur, and a founder of a small 
Pentecostal community, told me: ‘Yes, of course, I voted in the elections, I was the 
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first one in line in the morning when they opened the voting station! It was an 
important day’ (int. 2016). From her perspective, exercising the right to vote was a 
confirmation of the validity of the newly acquired citizenship status. This was a point 
of view expressed by many of the people I met. As an elderly couple told me: ‘We 
love Tanzania, we coming from Burundi, we who escaped war, here all are friends, 
there is no tribalism, we are very grateful to President Kikwete, he gave us a right to 
vote’ (int. 2016).  
 
It is clear from the literature on democracy in Africa as well as civic engagement 
around the world that electoral participation is neither the only nor necessarily the most 
important measure of the exercise of citizenship (Campbell, 2003; Logan & Bratton, 
2006; Verba et al., 1995). Citizenship is seen less as a container of rights and 
obligations and more as a relational concept, a set of practices (MacLean, 2011). This 
perspective emphasises that simply casting a ballot does not make a citizen. At the 
same time, however, as Bratton (2013) observes: 
 
The act of casting a ballot in a meaningful election signifies more than the 
chance to participate in choosing a head of state or a representative to 
parliament. The voting act conveys human dignity by symbolising that every 
participating individual is an equal and respected member of a political 
community. As such, voting is a meaningful step on the road to democratic 
citizenship (2013: viii). 
 
The underlying symbolic value of voting observed by Bratton (2013) resonates with 
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my research in Ulyankulu. The experience of former refugees shows that in the context 
of exile, the relevance of electoral participation has heightened significance as it stands 




Linked to voting in national elections was the process of party mobilisation in the 
settlement. As Bloemraad (2017) hypothesises, political mobilisation can be seen as 
an invitation to participate in national politics and in that sense, it is a marker of formal 
citizenship status. She asks: ‘To what extent does it matter when lots of immigrants 
become citizens for other societal actors, unions, political parties, interfaith coalitions 
to then go out and actively recruit them?’ (Bloemraad 2017). This indeed happened in 
Ulyankulu, where following naturalisation CCM (Chama Cha Mapinduzi, the ruling 
party) has been actively recruiting new citizens to become party members.  
 
Party membership cards became an important form of identification documents 
alongside the naturalisation papers, and people proudly told me countless times that 
they: ‘Have already registered to join CCM’ (int. 2015). One lady working at the 
voters’ registration point in Ulyankulu told me: ‘Only CCM has been campaigning 
here so far, other parties have not yet, and I do not think they stand a chance here’ (int. 
2015). Interviews with other people across the settlement confirmed that: ‘If we vote, 
we vote CCM. They were in power when our parents came here, thanks to them we 
are here; we were naturalised. We will vote CCM to show our gratitude, our 
appreciation’ (int. 2015). Bernard, a former employee of TCRS, remarked: ‘Most 
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people will vote CCM. It would not be right not to vote for the party that supported 
you for so long’ (int. 2015). 
 
I had an opportunity on many occasions to speak to Tobi, a Tanzanian woman who in 
the past worked as a secretary for a tobacco company based in Tabora. She befriended 
a Burundian man, who repatriated a few years ago and left her his house in the 
settlement. Tobi moved to the settlement and was recruited in June 2015 by CCM to 
get support for CCM from women in Kaliua district. She admits that in her work, she 
focuses on Ulyankulu: ‘Now we put all of our efforts here because they are important 
voters. We teach them about the party’ (int. 2015). She was proud of the work she has 
done, and a year later told me that although ‘CCM has been struggling to maintain 
support in the district, Jimbo ya Ulyankulu [Ward of Ulyankulu] is their stronghold 
(int. 2016)’.   
 
This importance of party mobilisation needs to be seen in a broader context of 
Tanzania. Emma Hunter writes how following independence, tensions emerged 
between conceptions of political subjecthood defined by the state and alternative forms 
of membership offered by churches or Islamic brotherhoods or tarikas, or by political 
organisations such as the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union (Hunter, 2015, p. 208). 
She shows how in early postcolonial Tanzania, there was a tension between a 
definition of citizenship which was open and one which said that being a good citizen 
meant being a member of the Tanganyika African National Union19 (TANU). 
 
 
19 The principal political party in the struggle for sovereignty in Tanganyika, formed by Julius 
Nyerere. 
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This, as Hunter argues, was ‘solved’ in the system of one-party democracy which 
gradually evolved after independence and was realised in the first elections under the 
new system in 1965 (Hunter, 2015, p. 200). She writes extensively on the significance 
of membership cards and argues that ‘buying a TANU membership card and becoming 
a member of TANU was an act of registration and incorporation’ (Hunter, 2015, p. 
194). This legacy remains strong in Tanzania today, and it is reflected in former 
refugees’ narratives about their party membership and gratitude towards CCM, which 
people sometimes interchangeably refer to as ‘Nyerere’s party’, ‘the party that 
welcomed us’, ‘the party that gave us citizenship’. Considering the historical role of 
TANU in fostering national membership (Hunter, 2015), the developments in the 
settlements today can be seen as an extension of that system. 
 
The active mobilisation of former refugees by the party shows that political claim-
making is relational – not only former refugees seek recognition by participating in 
national elections, but also the government strives to win their votes and loyalty under 
the umbrella of CCM by linking the provision of citizenship with the rule of the party. 
Although not an even relationship, citizenship represents a relationship between 
different interest groups. In the current political context of Tanzania, the votes of the 
newly naturalised refugees are valuable to the ruling party (CCM). As the opposition 
party (CHADEMA) has strengthened its position in the regions surrounding the 
settlements (Kigoma, Mwanza), CCM prioritised establishing a stronghold among the 
naturalised Burundians. Former refugees are aware of this happening, and, as Bernard, 
a former employee of TCRS and successful tobacco farmer remarked: ‘We are many, 
we can make a difference, and they know it’ (int. 2015). 
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To sum up, voting in national elections matters for former refugees because of its 
symbolic meaning of admittance to the national community and official recognition of 
their new status. Simultaneously, the electoral support of the new citizens was 
important for the current government, and therefore granting voting rights to former 
refugees and incorporating them in existing parties was politically feasible. In contrast 
to voting, electing representatives became a much more contested and challenging 
issue, which continues to stir debates in the settlements and beyond.  
 
5.5. Electing representatives: the councillor controversy 
 
Among the former refugees, enthusiasm about political participation is demonstrated 
on two levels: it refers both to the ability to select representatives and to run for 
elections. Pascal, an employee of a vocational school, when asked about the 
consequences of naturalisation, responded: ‘Certificates change a lot. They give us the 
freedom to move, freedom to vote and to run for political positions (int. 2015). The 
view that citizenship means not only the ability to vote, but also to hold office is 
widespread in the settlement, especially among educated men. As one of the priests at 
the parish I lived at explained: ‘Still some work needs to be done here, we need to get 
leaders; when we get into politics and local governance, we will feel fully Tanzanian’ 
(int. 2016). The gender divide is very clear in terms of who is considered an 
appropriate candidate for the elections. However, women and men put equal emphasis 
on the general importance of having representatives selected from the community. 
During fieldwork, I held focus group discussions with women groups and two groups 
listed electing representatives from the community as their top priority.  
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Emphasizing and idealising active political participation  
 
From the perspective of the people of Ulyankulu, having a councillor is crucial, 
because the district government allocates the budget through elected councillors, and 
it cannot allocate a budget for Ulyankulu’s wards if they have no representatives. In a 
focus group discussion, people explained to me: ‘If we do not have a councillor, we 
do not have anyone to speak for our needs at the district council’, ‘A big problem that 
we still have is lack of councillors which means lack of development - there is nowhere 
where you can take your ideas, no one to listen’ (int. 2016). These are really important 
statements which highlight the significance that meaningful representation has for 
claiming citizenship in displacement.  
 
In rural areas in Tanzania, the most important decisions, such as planning and 
budgeting, are theoretically carried out at the district level20 (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 
2010). In theory, districts are empowered to enact by-laws, raise revenues, and prepare 
development plans and budgets (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2010). In practice, however, in 
the planning and budgeting process, the council’s role is to accept the plans and 
budgets prepared by sector heads. A REPOA21 report shows that councillors have to 
follow the central government’s directives because they finance most of the public 
services provided by their council (Chaligha et al., 2007, p. 6). Thus, district councils 
in Tanzania are ridden by financial problems and are highly centralised. The emphasis 
that former refugees place on having a councillor at the district level reveals that to 
 
20 At the district level, the council consists of the elected ward councilors, members of the parliament 
(MPs) representing constituencies within the council, woman representatives, and other MPs whose 
nomination originated from organs of political parties within the district council jurisdiction. 
21 Policy and research organisation based in Tanzania. 
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some extent, they exaggerate the actual impact and participatory nature of this 
position. As such, the discussion here is more about political inclusion rather than 
about the actual performance of the local government.  
 
These reflections highlight that, to some degree, former refugees idealise the extent of 
political participation that Tanzanians have in local governance. As discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, the governance structure in Tanzania is multi-layered, with 
many overlapping authorities and power structures. Research shows that Tanzanians 
across the country report various degrees of marginalisation and disfranchisement 
(Kelsall, 2003; Makulilo, 2012; Kabyemela, 2017). However, I argue that even though 
the participatory nature of local Tanzanian politics is sometimes limited, it is still a 
rather positive comparison to what refugees experienced in terms of political silencing 
in the settlements for decades. Thus, although former refugees idealise the extent of 
political participation and power of regular citizens in Tanzania, it needs to be 
understood in the specific context of their experience of displacement.  
 
Councillor’s election and controversy  
 
After the 2015 elections, inhabitants of the villages in Ulyankulu were called to 
nominate candidates for the position of the ward22 councillors. An election across the 
villages took place, and candidates were selected. Ultimately, however, the election 
was cancelled, and a clear explanation for the cancellation was not given to the 
community. What exacerbated the situation was the news that in Mishamo (one of the 
 
22 A village is the lowest government administrative structure at the community level and rural wards 
are composed of several villages. The councillor represents the ward at the district level.  
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three Old Settlement) the election went ahead, and councillors were selected. The lack 
of transparent communication about the issue sparked fierce debates in the settlement. 
 
When I met Martin, he was just recently appointed as a market leader in Kaswa village. 
We spoke on a few occasions and discussed and compared practices of local 
governance in Ulyankulu and beyond. Martin started his career in politics as a street 
leader, then was appointed by the district council to collect revenue, and afterwards 
the Ulyankulu business community selected him to be their representative in the 
business cooperative called ‘Umoja wafanya biashara Ulyankulu’. On top of that, he 
was appointed to be an advisor to a tax collector in Urambo and Kaliua. In 2015, he 
competed in the ward elections: 
 
They told us we are allowed to be in politics. I was chosen to contest for CCM 
in the campaign. Then, however, we were told that our wards were not 
registered. Now, again, they tell us the wards are registered. But we don’t know 
if they will repeat the elections, or what will happen (int. 2016).  
 
One year later, when I returned to continue my fieldwork, the councillor controversy 
and its aftermath still occupied an important space in public and private debates. In 
focus group discussions, former refugees alluded to it every time they wanted to 
illustrate their struggles for incorporation into the Tanzanian government structures. 
Besides the very pragmatic concerns of limited access to funding for social services, 
people’s frustration with the cancellation of the election was also linked with a sense 
of rejection from the government structures, undermining their newly acquired 
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citizenship. As an inhabitant of Kanindo ward explained: ‘We were told by the 
government that our rights would be respected, and we will be treated like other people 
in the country. But the election was cancelled, and we don’t know why. We don’t 
know when it will be repeated’ (int. 2016). Refugee contexts are fertile ground for 
rumours (Turner 2004), and people in Ulyankulu keep asking themselves what the 
meaning behind the cancellation of the ward councilor elections is. 
 
The councillor controversy raises the question of the multidimensionality of 
citizenship. Although former refugees were mobilised and recruited to vote and join 
political parties, at the same time, they are not given the rights to establish self-
representation. The cancellation of the election generated questions about what rights 
former refugees have acquired with naturalisation, what rights remain withheld from 
them, and through what avenues can they claim these rights. Analysing the different 
dimensions of political inclusion and exclusion faced by former refugees reveals the 
ambiguity of their status and sheds light on the ‘probational’ nature of their citizenship 
post-naturalisation. Through the framework of ‘probational citizenship’, I try to 
capture the inherent temporality and uncertainty of these rights. The boundaries of 
political participation for former refugees are unclear - no one has explicitly 
announced that they would not be afforded political representation. Yet, the election 
was cancelled without an explanation. There is no timeline, no deadline and no defined 
point in the future when this might change. These arbitrary practices affect how former 
refugees conceptualise the value of their citizenship, making them increasingly 
doubtful of their ability to influence decisions which directly affect their lives. In the 
last section, I discuss the discrepancies in political engagement between urban and 
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camp settings, drawing out the differences and similarities between the different 
contexts.   
 
5.6. Refugee politics in urban zones  
 
The 1972 refugee community in Dar es Salaam has an established structure, with 
existing leaders and operating channels of communication. During the design of 
TANCOSS, the Ministry of Home Affairs consulted some of the prominent leaders 
and members of the 1972 association. They did not have an active role in formulating 
the policy itself, but they were approached to share their opinions and represent the 
perspective of the community on possibilities of repatriation and naturalisation. 
Although one could argue that they function as political representatives of the 1972 
community, in reality, they affiliate only the more affluent urban refugees, who have 
the social networks and safety nets that allow them to come together without fearing 
for their security. I acknowledge that this association has traces of a political 
organisation. However, it never developed a strong presence or an agenda, and there 
are no plans to take it in that direction post-naturalisation. At the moment, the primary 
function of the 1972 association is to stay in contact with the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and inform urban refugees about the dates for the forthcoming rounds of citizenship 
registration in respective settlements and villages (I discuss these processes in more 
detail in Chapter 7).   
 
My research in Dar es Salaam shows that besides the 1972 association, refugees and 
former refugees from the Old Settlements do not engage in local and national politics 
in Dar es Salaam and they prefer to keep a low-profile. Their complete isolation and 
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separation from local governance issues stands in stark contrast to people’s 
engagement in and an outspoken contestation of political issues in the settlements. The 
main reason behind this isolation is that in urban areas, people fear that their identity 
might be revealed, which could compromise their safety, businesses, or even personal 
relationships; highlighting the contradictory and multidimensional nature of lived 
citizenship in displacement.  
 
This perspective must be understood through the lens of urban refugees’ strategies of 
integration and protection. Urban refugees and former refugees established urban 
livelihoods under the guise of other group identities (Sukuma, Haa, Nyamwezi). 
Learning the vernacular languages and socialising with these groups have served as a 
protection mechanism. Engagement in politics can destabilise these arrangements. 
During the months of living in Dar es Salaam and socialising in the Burundi refugee 
community, I only met one person who held a position of a street leader and one (very 
successful businessman) who was encouraged by his friends and neighbours to run for 
office, but in the last moment decided against it because even to him the risk was too 
high. The man who secured a position of a street leader in his neighbourhood in Dar 
es Salaam, told me: ‘Right now, I am a street leader at the place where I live! But other 
people, they don’t know. We live by hiding. I am a street leader, and I was a 10-cell 
leader before. But no one knows where I come from’ (int. 2017).  
 
A successful career in politics, as Imani, a refugee from Katumba, explained: ‘Can 
generate envy and competition, and people might seek to uncover compromising 
information about one’s past’ (int. 2017). People explained to me in multiple 
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interviews that when one engages in politics, the risks of attracting attention and 
creating enemies increase, and these risks offset the potential benefits. Therefore, 
despite naturalisation, Burundian refugees and former refugees in Dar es Salaam agree 
that exposing oneself in a political context can potentially put one’s family in danger. 
This view is held across gender and class divides, and as a young, educated woman 
told me: ‘Local politics? No, not in Dar es Salaam. Those who I know, they don’t 
participate in political issues at all. People are scared, it’s a way of exposing yourself, 
and it might become known where you come from’ (int. 2017). 
 
The recent process of naturalisation has not reconfigured the established mechanisms 
of protection, and according to my informants, this will only happen for the next 
generation. ‘Our children’, as one lady from Katumba said, ‘they can do anything they 
want. They can go to the army. Be policemen. Work for the government. Or even 
become a President!’ (int. 2017). Future oriented thinking about citizenship became 
an important thread in many conversations I had in Dar es Salaam, which underlines 
the temporal quality of evolving citizenship in displacement. Many urbanites admitted 
that they applied for citizenship because it might prove invaluable in the future. 
Although they do not act upon their rights on daily basis, they see the prospective value 
of citizenship as an enabling device for their offspring. For themselves, citizenship is 
only an additional protection mechanism against harassment or deportation.  
 
Here, citizenship is not about access to services or electoral rights. Rather, it is a 
protection mechanism with potential future and collective benefits for the next 
generation. Therefore, from the urban refugee perspective, the political function of 
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citizenship status in terms of voting and representation matters – but it does not matter 
today. Today, urban refugees and former refugees find active engagement in politics 
too dangerous, and they prefer to keep a low profile and believe that the situation will 
be different in the future.   
 
5.7. Cycles of suspicion: other obstacles to political inclusion 
 
In this section, I address other obstacles to political inclusion in rural and urban areas, 
namley the direct hostility and suspicion expressed by Tanzanians. My research shows 
that on top of political and structural obstacles to political integration, former refugees 
also face discrimination due to their Burundian heritage. The Tanzanian state is not a 
‘separate and autonomous entity that is really there and is really powerful’ (Abrams, 
1988, p. 63). Rather, states are comprised of myriad social relations, practices, and 
discourses, as well as individuals with their personal commitments, assumptions, and 
emotions. Although the Tanzanian government (represented here by the Department 
of Refugees within the Ministry of Home Affairs) has indeed granted citizenship to 
refugees, this fact has not been fully accepted by the local authorities. The process of 
naturalisation was centrally driven by the negotiations between the Director of the 
Refugee Department and the head of the UNHCR mission. Local authorities from the 
districts hosting the settlements were not consulted at the initial stages of drafting the 
naturalisation proposal. Moreover, at the implementation stage of the strategy, local 
authorities opposed the resettlement of former refugees to other regions of Tanzania. 
They maintained that resettled former refugees will be a burden on education and 
health services, that there isn’t available land to host them, and that their presence 
might lead to insecurity and conflict with the local population. My interviews with low 
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level civil servants and other government employees in Tabora and Ulyankulu reveal 
that there is still a pervasive sense of distrust and suspicion towards the new citizens. 
These various factors are intertwined and reveal important barriers to political 
integration of naturalised citizens.  
 
The fears of ‘Burundian enclave’  
 
The event of cancellation of councillor elections sparked many debates in the 
settlement among both former refugees and Tanzanians. During my research, rather 
than focusing only on the ‘real’ reasons behind the cancellation, I also documented 
people’s ideas and perceptions of these events, as well as the perspective of the 
Tanzanian stakeholders. Using the event of cancellation of the councillor election as a 
topic for opening conversations and interviews, I was able to gain new insight into the 
existing prejudices and doubts. In one conversation about the cancellation of ward 
elections, one of my primary interlocutors told me that maybe Ministry of Home 
Affairs heard that people here ‘are causing too much trouble and so they should be 
dispersed. Maybe they are planning to resettle us after all’ (int. 2016). Other 
interlocutors speculated that maybe elections were cancelled because only Hutu 
candidates (and not native Tanzanians) were nominated for the elections, and therefore 
the government decided to cancel the whole process. This argument is supported by 
the fact that Mishamo settlement elected native Tanzanians living in the settlements, 
and their elections were not cancelled. As the former councillor in Ulyankulu ward 
proclaimed: ‘The new Tanzanians [former refugees] got the tribal spirit and wanted to 
select one of their own. But our government saw that the winning candidate is 
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immature in the politics civics of Tanzania, and so in result, they cancelled the 
elections’ (int. 2016).  
 
This was a very popular explanation among the people I spoke to, and it stirred many 
debates about the new Tanzanians’ right to representation. In one interview, a 
participant in a focus group discussion said very openly that he thinks the election was 
cancelled because ‘we elected a Hutu candidate and that is why we were blocked from 
participating’ (int. 2016). This perspective is widespread in Ulyankulu, and it touches 
on crucial questions about the extent to which the government is willing to integrate 
the new citizens in the administrative and political structures. At the same time, 
however, some older adults in the settlement believed that young people should show 
gratitude for receiving citizenship and that political incorporation should not be 
demanded that quickly. As one elderly lady in a focus group discussion summed up: 
‘Citizenship was given to us like grace, so we don’t ask what’s left to be done. 
Naturalisation came like grace from God; we cannot ask for follow up. If someone 
gives you ugali with beans, you don’t ask for meat’ (int. 2016).  
 
The underlying argument for excluding former refugees from political representation, 
as put forward by Tanzanian stakeholders I spoke to, is built on the comparison with 
North Kivu and Banyamulenge23 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The narrative 
I heard repeatedly is that the former refugees in the settlements should not be given 
 
23 In more recent decades the term ‘Banyamulenge’ has been used as an ‘omnibus’ label to denote all 
Tutsi in the pre-colonial territories composing post-colonial North and South Kivu, those who 
migrated during the colonial period, and the political refugees from the Rwanda revolution during the 
early 1960s (Court, 2013). In my research, people made the comparison with Banyamulenge due to 
the role these groups have played in tensions during the run-up to the First Congo War in 1996–7 and 
Second Congo War of 1998–2003. 
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too much autonomy at once, because: ‘Tanzanians might one day wake up with a 
powerful minority in the centre of their own country’ (int. 2016). This analogy 
resonated with many Tanzanian stakeholders, and one of the people who reiterated this 
narrative to me was Ken, a manager at a large tobacco company in Tabora.  
 
He has worked for the tobacco company for eight years and prior to arriving in 
Ulyankulu he lived in Singida. As he said himself, he has ‘a good life, drives a big 
company car, and has a house in Tabora’ (int. 2016). For work, Ken supervised 
tobacco farmers, distributed fertilisers, seedlings, and provided technical expertise 
around Tabora region (including Ulyankulu). Ken was quite vocal about his 
perspective on naturalisation and he shared it with anyone who wanted to listen: 
 
Regarding naturalisation, I think that it was a good idea to give them 
citizenship. But not a good idea to let them stay here. They will create their 
own government, have their own councillor, then district representative, and 
then before we Tanzanians know, they will have a President. And then 
Tanzanians will wake up. And we will fight them, and it will seem like its 
Tanzanians fighting Tanzanians, but really it is us fighting foreigners. That 
won’t happen now; it will be in 100 years or so. Exactly like what we see in 
Eastern Congo (int. 2016).  
 
Ken’s point of view was expressed frequently by Tanzanians I spoke to, and the 
comparison with Eastern Congo, in various alterations, was a recurring theme in many 
conversations and interviews. These interviews included, among others, a local 
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UNHCR employee, a civil servant from the Ministry of Home Affairs, a council 
employee from Tabora, and a wealthy cattle trader from Shinyanga. What is crucial 
here is that the less personal connection people have with the naturalised Tanzanians, 
the more antagonistic and adverse views they express about their political integration.   
 
Although a concern about the consequences of naturalising a concentrated and isolated 
minority has been expressed widely among government officials, there is no existing 
strategy to address it. On the one hand, the government recognises that inward 
migration of Tanzanians into the settlements is good for integration, and probably 
should be supported to counter the fear of a ‘refugee island in the middle of the 
country’. On the other hand, they are displeased with the clandestine movement of 
Tanzanians into the settlement and have never issued a statement that would facilitate 
migration into the area. These conversations give insight into the ambivalence 
associated with political integrations of former refugees and lack of existing coherent 
strategy to address this issue. This perpetuates a vicious cycle, where the government 
is suspicious of the former refugees and it continues to keep them under supervision, 
and the former refugees cannot completely integrate and trust their citizenship because 
they are not given autonomy.  
 
5.8. Politics post-naturalisation: recognition, political representation and living 
in ‘open’ environments 
 
The councillor controversy and the continuing cycles of suspicion shed light on 
important questions of what is at stake when we speak about former refugees’ political 
participation and how far the Tanzanian Government is prepared to go in terms of their 
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political inclusion. The provision of voting rights was a level of inclusion meaningful 
for the population concerned, and in this case, it was also beneficial from the 
perspective of the ruling party. However, giving full rights to select representatives to 
a large and concentrated population of former refugees became a contested issue. As 
such, the case of Ulyankulu speaks to the broader debates about gradation of 
citizenship. Migdal (2004) has shown that citizenship is not homogeneous and fixed 
for all members of the community, rather, it is a ‘graduated entity’. This entails the 
presence of variously situated groups with different legal rights and obligations within 
a state (Bezabeh, 2011, p. 588). In the context of Ulyankulu, former refugees are 
considered eligible to vote. However, they are not seen as suited for full political 
participation alongside native citizens – they are voters, but not yet citizens.  
 
For the former refugees, the essential characteristics of the experience of displacement 
and encampment were restricted freedom of movement and exclusion from self-
governance. Although people in the settlements could appoint village leaders, even 
that had to every time be approved by the settlement’s office. As Malkki (1995) 
pointed out, it perpetuated a perspective that Hutus are always governed by outsiders 
– Tutsi in Burundi, Tanzanians in exile. Today, the comparison of the Officer’s 
authority with Tutsi domination in Burundi is less pervasive, but the experience of the 
acute absence of self-governance remains relevant. As such, the exclusion from 
engagement in politics (understood as selecting representatives who participate in 
decision-making about community’s concerns) dominated the experience of 
displacement, and it continues to be an important element of people’s world post-
naturalisation. What I observed, however, was that due to the experience of political 
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silencing for decades, former refugees prioritise and emphasise an active and 
participatory side of citizenship. By trying to assert ‘active’ versus ‘passive’ 
citizenship, former refugees make claims to politics, understood as having a say in the 
decisions that affect their lives.  
What is at the core of the debates about the political inclusion of former refugees is 
the question of recognition. The practices of ‘active’ citizenship always occur in 
relation to some form of validating authority, primarily but not only a formalised 
central or local state authority (Hammar, 2018, p. 2). Therefore, recognition becomes 
crucial in validating the processes of claim-making. A lot has been written and 
theorised about recognition, and a broad Hegelian tradition takes recognition as a 
fundamental human expression of acknowledgement of the ‘other’ (Fraser, 2001; 
Taylor, 1994). In this thesis, however, following Lund (2016) and Honneth (1995) I 
use the term recognition to denote ‘simple legal recognition’ (Honneth, 1995, cited in 
Lund 2016, p. 1206). Legal here does not mean legalistic, rather, it stands for the 
recognition of rights by an institution and a reciprocal recognition of its authority by 
their subjects that can effectively define and enforce the claims as rights (Lund, 2016, 
p. 1206). In this conceptualisation, recognition refers to recognition of rights to 
property, rights to belonging and political subjectivity. As Lund (2016) shows, 
recognition is, in essence, reciprocal, meaning that in exchange for recognised rights 
(to property, land and other entitlements), people recognise and thus legitimise the 
political power of the institution (p.1206).  
 
The reciprocal processes of recognition are not stable or fixed, rather, they are 
relational and negotiated. As the former councillor of Ulyankulu ward, Mzee Shahe 
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Jumanne Abdulah Kagoma, told me and my research assistant in a long conversation 
at his shop: ‘This will be a new place when the Mkuu [settlement officer] leaves. We 
will have Utawala [governance] like other places. Tutatambikiwa! [we will be 
recognised]’ (int 2016). The continued presence of the Settlement Officer as the 
highest authority in the settlement perpetuates a sense of non-recognition or rather 
partial recognition of the former refugees’ right to citizenship. Lund critically points 
out that ‘rights entailed through recognition as a political subject may be limited or 
extensive […] or recognition may entail no rights at all, as the capacity to recognise 
rights is also the capacity to deny and expunge them’ (Lund 2016: 1206). The mutually 
constitutive but uneven character of recognition is crucial in this context. Although the 
majority of former refugees received statutory, formal citizenship, they are still 
struggling to assert their right to self-representation.  
 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the former settlements, political participation in 
terms of voting and party membership is actively encouraged by the ruling party. 
However, at the same time, former refugees struggle to advance their interests through 
the assertion of representation at the district level, which continues to be seen as ‘out 
of place’. As Omata (2017) observes, in refugee camps, humanitarian organisations 
advocate for refugees’ ‘agency’ and ‘participation’ but at the same time discourage 
refugees’ political activity. The challenges former refugees face in entering the 
government and gaining recognition mirror the paradoxes captured in Omata’s (2017) 
analysis. Despite naturalisation, former refugees remain constrained by the same 
existing biases – voting and party membership are supported because they are seen as 
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orderly expressions of political participation, whereas claim-making and contestation 
are actively blocked and equated with ‘troublemaking’ and ‘lack of gratitude’.  
 
One of the leaders of a Pentecostal church eloquently put into words something that 
recurred in many conversations and captured the importance of active and 
participatory citizenship: ‘Naturalisation certificates are important because they allow 
us to move but the opening of this space is crucial and still needs to happen. As long 
as we still have Mkuu [Settlement Officer] and closed space, the process is not 
complete’ (int. 2015). The phrase ‘opening of this space’ was repeated in many 
conversations, and it shows how people link the notions of mobility, citizenship and 
political representation. On the surface, ‘opening of this space’ means only allowing 
migration to and from the settlements. Hearing this expression in multiple contexts, 
however, I came to realise that it also conveys a notion that a mobile, open space 
indicates a space where one’s concerns can be ‘listened to and addressed’ (Arendt 
1973: 296). ‘Open space’, as imagined by the people I worked with, stands for a space 
that is not controlled by an arbitrary settlement office but is governed by people elected 




In this chapter, I outlined the transition in governance from refugee settlements to 
settlements of citizens, and the kinds of opportunities, frustrations and tensions that 
such a process entails. My research reveals three major obstacles that the new citizens 
face in attaining the type of political incorporation they desire. Firstly, the settlement 
is stuck in a transitional space, where despite naturalisation, the Settlement Officer 
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remains the appointing authority in the settlement, and there is no clear timeline of 
when this might change. Secondly, former refugees face discrimination due to their 
Burundian heritage, which remains a key obstacle for political integration. Finally, 
former refugees tend to idealise the extent of participation and local representation that 
regular Tanzanian citizens have. Their emphasis on political participation, however, 
needs to be understood through the prism of displacement and the experience of the 
decades of political silencing. Thus, the struggles for recognition and representation 
are not so much about the efficiency of local governance. Rather, what matters at this 
point is political inclusion and recognition of their new citizenship status by the 
government and fellow Tanzanians. 
 
For the former Burundian refugees in Tanzania, the experience of displacement was 
characterised by systematic exclusion from political participation and representation. 
The people concerned expected that their exclusion from politics would end with 
naturalisation and they assign outstanding significance to voting and selecting 
representatives. People I spoke to see voting as a formal recognition of their new 
status, a proof of their new citizenship. In that sense, voting has become an important 
marker of citizenship. Selecting representatives occupies a similarly symbolic status, 
and therefore the cancellation of ward elections reverberated strongly and caused 
uncertainty in the community. People’s frustration should be understood through the 
prism of the protracted experience of exile. Excluded from the nation-state politics for 
decades, former refugees equate their newly acquired citizenship with active political 
participation and representation. From their perspective, the recent insecurities 
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surrounding councillor elections undermine the validity of their new status, exposing 
the ‘probational’ character of their citizenship.  
 
Conversations with Tanzanian authorities provided insight into the ambivalence 
associated with political integrations of former refugees and lack of existing coherent 
strategy to address this issue. People’s opinions and narratives uncovered a vicious 
cycle, where the government is suspicious of the former refugees and it continues to 
keep them under supervision, and the people concerned cannot completely integrate 
and trust their citizenship because they are not given autonomy. The cycle of suspicion 
amplifies the narratives of ‘probational citizenship’, highlighting that recognition and 
acceptance by Tanzanian authorities plays a crucial role in former refugees’ perception 
of their new status. Former refugees highlight the contrast between the constrained, 
‘probational citizenship’ they were granted and the normative ideal of citizenship by 
using a notion of ‘open space’. ‘Open space’, as understood by my interlocutors, 
means transition to governance that is not controlled by an arbitrary settlement office 
but is governed by people elected from the community. 
 
Finally, critical analysis of political participation in urban areas shows a discrepancy 
between the settlement and the city. In Dar es Salaam, former refugees isolate 
themselves from political activities. They justify this decision by fear of being 
discovered, which might compromise one’s safety, business, and relationships. The 
perspective that develops in these contexts is a future-oriented conceptualisation of 
citizenship. Former refugees, I spoke to believe that their children will be able to be 
more vocal and involved in urban politics in the future, but for themselves, the risks 
 192 
are still too high. The experiences and narratives of former refugees both in and outside 
the settlements emphasise an active and participatory side of citizenship with 
additional collective and future-oriented elements. This future-oriented, temporal, 
promising but not quite realised citizenship is what ‘probational citizenship’ 
forecloses. In the next chapter, I turn to a discussion of land rights post-naturalisation, 
conceptually linking citizenship and land in displacement.   
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6. Making claims to land and to a future in displacement 
 
 
Land rights are always about the expectations of the future  
(Gray, personal communication, 2018). 
 
 
The controversies and debates regarding political inclusion of the former Burundian 
refugees are intimately tied with an equally essential and challenging question, namely 
the new citizen’s rights to land. Recognition of land rights is a crucial marker of 
citizenship for former refugees and it is intertwined with expectations of the future. In 
this chapter I examine how naturalisation both undermined the existing land tenure24 
system and strengthened former refugees’ claims to land - reinforcing and 
reinterpreting the relationship between land and political membership.  
 
Land and citizenship are intertwined, both in Western thought, as well as in the more 
specific African context. According to Mahmood Mamdani (2001), in contemporary 
Africa, access to rights and ability to exercise political agency are informed by the 
notion of ‘indigeneity’, which directly links belonging to land. Following Mamdani, 
Patricia Daley (2013) argues that ‘indigeneity’ has become the de facto basis for access 
to citizenship rights in Africa. Migrants’ and refugees’ access to land had become a 
contentious issue across the continent, leading to violent clashes between the ‘native’ 
and ‘incoming’ populations (Boas & Dunn, 2013). Many of these conflicts are 
 
24 Land tenure is the relationship, whether legally or customarily defined, among people, as 
individuals or groups, with respect to land (FAO, 2002).  
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grounded in the logic of autochthony, which holds that people can only claim 
belonging and ownership in places where they can demonstrate some ancestral 
affiliation. Scholars have highlighted the prominence of discourses of autochthony in 
the ways that both citizenship and land rights have come to be defined and asserted in 
contexts of migration and displacement (Jackson, 2006; Geschiere, 2009; Comaroff & 
Comaroff, 2001; Lentz, 2013; Boas & Dunn, 2013). I suggest that there is a risk that 
this emphasis hides other instances and quiet cases of integration, in which 
autochthony is not the dominant trope through which citizenship or land rights are 
claimed, as this chapter demonstrates in the case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. 
It is not my intention to challenge the autochthony and land paradigm directly in itself; 
rather, I simply observe that the paradigm does not capture the concerns of accessing25 
land in this particular context of displacement, which exhibits different characteristics.   
 
In Ulyankulu, while seeking recognition of their land rights, former refugees rely on 
claim making strategies that do not derive their power from the discourse of 
autochthony and do not encounter opposing claims grounded in the logic of 
autochthony. Instead, they seek recognition of their rights based on the long-term 
productive use of the land, land transactions with local Tanzanians, and engagement 
in land disputes. It is important to note that claims to land are also often insecure for 
Tanzanians in other parts of the country (Askew et al., 2013). Where former refugees’ 
situation differs is that their land is not recognised under the Village Land Act (GOT, 
1999) and they do not even have customary village land ownership. In this chapter, I 
 
25 I use the word access as denoting all possible means by which a person is able to benefit from land 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
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argue that the strategies employed by former refugees indicate that people are trying 
to convert land access, which they have enjoyed for decades, into land rights. The main 
finding of this chapter is that access to citizenship increased people’s sense of 
entitlement to the land in Tanzania, and it generated new opportunities and new 
avenues for claim-making. At the same time, however, the state’s engagement in the 
area following naturalisation has destabilised the previous tenure system, creating new 
uncertainties. In this chapter, I critically examine former refugees’ claim-making 
practices, linking the recognition of land rights with citizenship and the expectations 
of the future.  
 
6.1. Land access in Ulyankulu settlement 
 
When examining how people establish land access and claim land rights, it is helpful 
to ask what land is. As Tania Li (2014) persuasively writes, land as a resource does 
not have essential or intrinsic quality. Land is assembled and constructed; it always 
includes a discursive element, and it can ‘wax and wane, or morph as technologies are 
added, values change, and material qualities shift’ (Li, 2014, p. 589). Acknowledging 
the elements assembled in ‘making up’ land and the processes that stabilise the 
assemblage gives us tools for approaching the question of land rights more 
systematically. Inspired by Li’s typology and following the data collected, I 
understand land and its value for the displacees as changeable over time and defined 
both in material and symbolic terms. In the section below, I outline the initial 
distribution of land in Ulyankulu and explain why in the 1970s, establishing rural 
refugee settlements with access to large plots of land was politically feasible. I identify 
the three main reasons in: (i) the distinctive features of the land tenure regime in 
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Tanzania, (ii) the earlier history of evictions and displacement in the area, (iii) and the 
subsequent absence of indigenous land claims.   
 
Initial land distribution 
 
When Ulyankulu settlement was established in 1972/1973, it was built around a grid 










Upon their arrival, refugees were registered and allocated plots of 5 hectares per 
household on average (int. 2016).26 They were expected to clear the land, construct 
their homes and begin cultivating. For these purposes, simple building and farming 
tools were provided (TCRS, 1985). The village governments were given custody over 
additional plots of land, which were distributed over the years as the families 
expanded. During my time in Ulyankulu, I spoke to many elderly members of the 
community about their memories of arrival to Ulyankulu and the first years in the 
settlement. One elderly man recollected:  
 
 
26 The settlement office in Ulyankulu holds a registry that lists all the plots distributed in 1970s. The 
registry, however, was never updated, and it does not include any of the later land transfers. 
 
Figure 8. Map of Ulyankulu villages. Source: Sarkara, M. Rural Watermarks, KU Leuven (2018-2019). 
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When people came here first, agronomists were here. They measured plots, 
meter by meter, and like that they went around the area, all the plots were the 
same. As the families increased, the village government added land - you 
would go to the village chairman, tell them that the family has increased and 
land is not enough, and you would get an additional plot (int. 2016).   
 
As this quote illustrates, families were given allocated plots of land, and over the years 
they were able to approach the village government and request additional plots for 
their children. Therefore, the cultivated area of land in the settlement grew with time 
and began to expand beyond the initial, neatly planned grid structure. 
 
The year 1978 marked a crucial point in initial land distribution in Ulyankulu. The 
settlement continued to grow and quickly became overpopulated - at the end of 1976, 
it housed over 59,000 people, almost 200 per cent beyond its estimated carrying 
capacity (Daley, 1989). As a consequence, a new settlement was designated, and 
30,000 people were resettled to the new site of Mishamo in Mpanda district (Daley, 
1989). In people’s stories, an additional reason for the resettlement was the extensive 
flooding which occurred in Ulyankulu, making parts of it inhabitable. According to 
the Settlement Officer, following floods and refugees’ resettlement to Mishamo, the 
vacant plots were returned to the village government and then distributed equally to 
the inhabitants of the village. People’s narratives, however, reveal that frequently, 
neighbours of those who were resettled received their plots for a minor payment. As 
Richard, an inhabitant of Mbeta village explained: ‘The floods took long… After 
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people left, you would give money or a gift to someone who lived nearby the flooded 
plot. In that way, you got land in these places; I did that myself’ (int. 2016).   
 
The ‘Mishamo move’ marks the beginning of land transactions in the settlement and 
it accounts for many of the differences in plot sizes between the families. According 
to people’s stories, at that point, there was no competition for the land. The village 
government was still in custody of vacant plots, which were distributed to refugees as 
families grew. Today, families that own larger fields for cultivation usually highlight 
that they obtained them in 1978 when people were relocated to Mishamo or in 2008 
when people repatriated to Burundi (discussed in more detail in the latter part of the 
chapter).  
 
Thus, over the years, refugees gained access to additional plots of land beyond the 
planned villages both within and beyond the area of the settlement. These newly 
acquired plots were often located at a distance from the households and today are 
predominantly used for rice cultivation. Therefore, in Ulyankulu land has multiple uses 
and functions and many households own two plots of land – one on which they live 
and cultivate vegetables and keep animals, and another one, further away from their 
house, where they cultivate rice and other cash crops. Moreover, owners of more 
centrally located plots sell and rent their land for commercial activities, such as bars, 
cafés, hostels, and shops. As such, land provides direct commercial and subsistence 
benefits that people rely on for their livelihoods. With access to citizenship, however, 
the importance of secured access to land in Tanzania became imbued with another 
layer of significance. Before moving to a discussion of these processes, I explain why 
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the establishment and maintenance of rural settlements in which refugees were granted 
land access was politically feasible in the first place.  
 
Land governance in post-colonial Tanzania  
 
To an outside observer, it seems quite striking and surprising that Tanzanians 
neighbouring Ulyankulu have not come forward to claim rights to the land on which 
the settlement was established. In other contexts, such as for example northern 
Uganda, the settlement of Sudanese and Congolese refugees has provoked deep 
concerns about land being alienated from its ‘rightful’ Ugandan owners (Leonardi & 
Santschi, 2016). In Ulyankulu, however, customary claims to the land preceding the 
refugee settlement are not dominant. Below, I explain why allocating and securing 
land for the refugee settlement was possible. 
 
Firstly, in postcolonial Tanzania, the new government decided to nationalise all land, 
making the state the ultimate trustee (Hyden, 1980, p. 70). As Boone (2015) argues, 
Tanzania provides a unique example of a sub-Saharan country in which postcolonial 
rulers have dismantled neo-customary land tenure institutions (p. 176). Boone (2015) 
makes an analytical distinction between neo-customary and statist types of land 
regimes27 and argues that Tanzania is a unique example of a statist regime on the 
continent. Since the 1970s, the Tanzanian state has not offered juridical recognition to 
ethnicity-based customary land claims, and it has not institutionalised the land powers 
 
27 Boone (2015) acknowledges that this analytic framework is crude and schematic, as local land 
regimes often mix or combine these different sorts of rules, or display other ambiguities or hybridities. 
Nevertheless, she argues that this schematic model of variation in land regimes captures critical 
differences in the forms of authority and political identities that structure smallholders’ access to land. 
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of neo-customary authorities in administrative practice (Boone, 2015, p. 182). Land 
administration in Tanzania is largely secularised, meaning administrative non-
recognition of ‘ancestral (and ethnic) land rights and non-recognition of neo-
traditional local leaders with land powers’ (Boone, 2015, p. 182). The statist land 
tenure regime works to define the land user as a subject or citizen of the state, ‘rather 
than a member of an ethnic collectivity’ (Boone, 2015, p. 177).  
 
Although this typography is useful for understanding the overarching differences and 
leading characteristics of various land tenure regimes, the reality on the ground is far 
more complicated. In fact, land institutions in Tanzania are far from monolithic, and 
customary land tenure practices and informal markets continue to operate within the 
overarching institutional framework (Gray, 2018, p. 133), leading to more overlapping 
systems than Boone’s typography suggests. There are multiple and overlapping ways 
of making claims to land in Tanzania, and although the land regime is inherently 
statist, that does not necessarily mean that the legal claims are more respected over 
other types of claims (Askew et al., 2013). The statist element of land tenure regime 
in Tanzania, under which the state can confer ownership of land, is, however, precisely 
what made the establishment of rural refugee settlements possible in the first place. At 
the same time, the parallel existence of customary land tenure practices and informal 
markets in Tanzania created a space where refugees could access and make claims to 




Absence of indigenous land claims 
 
According to Abrahams (1981), the Nyamwezi people who had inhabited the area of 
Ulyankulu until 1958 were evicted due to colonial interventions to fight the spread of 
tsetse flies as sleeping-sickness vectors. In the 1970s, the area of Ulyankulu was still 
sparsely populated and overgrown with bush. As a remote and uninhabited area, it was 
designated to be a refugee settlement. The logic behind this designation was that 
settling refugees in the area would attract international development funding, develop 
the periphery, and raise the economic productivity of the region (Daley, 1989). In their 
narratives, former refugees, as well as local Tanzanians, often emphasised how wild 
and untamed the environment was before the refugees arrived. An elderly woman from 
southern Burundi told me: ‘There was nothing when we came here, it was bush, there 
were wild animals, we were scared’ (int. 2016). A Tanzanian fisherman from the area 
added: ‘When they [refugees] came here, our living standards increased. We were 
included in the new services provided. This place would not have been developed if 
not for the refugees. It was a different place’ (int 2016). 
 
This narrative and many other similar stories I collected from both former refugees 
and Tanzanians illustrate that the area of the settlement was sparsely populated due to 
the prior eviction of people living there. Moreover, it was infected with disease and 
marginalised prior to the refugees’ arrival. The elderly Tanzanians from Ulyankulu 
and the villages nearby emphasized that the settlements brought social services and 
business opportunities to this remote and neglected region. Due to this very specific 
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political and historical context, assertions of autochthony have not emerged here in 
opposition to the refugees on a large scale.  
 
Recently, however, contestations over alienation of land for refugee camps have 
emerged around the expanding Nyaragusu camp in Western Tanzania, Kigoma region. 
There, land has been alienated from farming communities to construct the camps, and 
they were never appropriately compensated. Moreover, in contrast to Ulyankulu, the 
communities neighbouring Nyraragusu do no benefit from the services provided to the 
refugees, and today the hostilities are on the rise (Zhou, personal communication, 
2017). Thus, the specific characteristics of the Old Settlements, where land was not 
alienated directly from the neighbouring farming communities and where the 
indigenous population was directly benefiting from the services provided to refugees, 
facilitated refugees’ land access.  
 
6.2. Naturalisation and its effects on land access 
 
 
When the first round of citizenship documents was being distributed, Tanzania’s 
Home Affairs Minister, Mathias Chikawe, proclaimed that: ‘The new citizens are 
meant to enjoy all citizenship rights including land ownership’ (IRIN, 2014). 
According to a few of my interlocutors, a similar statement regarding land ownership 
came from President Kikwete when he was campaigning in the area before 2015 
elections. In reality, the implementation of the naturalisation process has destabilised 
some of the existing practices of land tenure, and it has not (as of yet) replaced them 
with the national framework of land governance. What I mean here is that before 
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naturalisation, refugees enjoyed secured access to land within the settlement due to 
international recognition of their status and the protection of the area as a designated 
refugee settlement. With naturalisation, the designation of the area as a settlement will 
be removed but it remains uncertain when it will be replaced by incorporation of the 
area into Tanzanian local government structures.  
 
The change of the legal status of the land in Ulyankulu is planned under the TANSPLI 
(Tanzania Strategy for Local Integration Programme for the New Citizens) scheme. 
According to the stipulations of TANSPLI (2016), two actions will be undertaken 
regarding changing the status of the settlement area. The first is the removal by the 
Minister for Home Affairs of the refugee-designated status over the settlement areas. 
The second action will be the removal of the forest reserve status in accordance with 
the Forest Act 2002 (GOT, 2002). Furthermore, the plans stipulate the creation of a 
master land use plan for the settlement and the surrounding areas, followed by the 
registration of villages in each settlement, provision of preliminary documentation for 
land rights, and, finally, issuance of Certificates of Village Lands (CVLs) and 
Certificates of Customary Rights of Occupancy (CCROs) (GOT, 2016). Therefore, in 
addition to changing the status of the land (de-gazetting of lands), a key aspect of the 
local integration programme will be to secure land rights for the new citizens (GOT, 
2016, Par 3.2). The timeline and funding for these activities, however, remain 
unknown.  
 
During fieldwork, I visited the University of Dar es Salaam, where I met Professor  
Rutinwa. He was the mastermind behind the design of TANCOSS policy, and he has 
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extensive knowledge about the current situation in the settlements. I went to speak to 
him about the challenges of changing the designation of land in the settlements. He 
explained, building on section 16 from the 1998 Refugees Act, that: ‘If we abolish the 
institution of the Settlement Commandant and dissolve the settlement, the land will 
revert to its original status, i.e. the status it had before establishment of the settlement 
in the 1972. It won’t belong to the refugees’ (int. 2014). Professor Rutinwa concluded 
that the land and property rights for the refugees must be secured before abolishing the 
settlement. However, there is no established precedent for this type of transition in 
land governance. In a context marked by a lack of political will as well as lack of 
financial resources for changing the designation of land, the situation remains 
unresolved.   
 
Despite the administrative delays and limitations, the political challenges, and anxiety 
surrounding land ownership, former refugees have developed a strong sense of 
entitlement to the land, and today, Ulyankulu settlement is abundant in land transfers, 
land transactions, and land disputes. What is crucial is that access to land in Tanzania 
was essential to many people’s decision to remain in Tanzania and apply for Tanzanian 
citizenship. As such, for the people I met, the validity and security of their citizenship 
status hinges on recognised and secured access to land. In the following sections, I 
discuss the various actions and processes that illuminate how inhabitants of Ulyankulu 
developed and strengthened their access to land in exile and how they attempt to claim 
land rights in the changing circumstances post-naturalisation. The following sections 
focus on (i) the changing perspective on land in displacement, (ii) the significance of 
land transactions and documentation, (iii) conflicts and disputes as the new 
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mechanisms of claim-making, (iv) contestation of the building ban, (v) gender and 
claims to land in Ulyankulu.  
 
6.3. Thinking about land in displacement  
 
Evidence from my research indicates that people’s perspective on land in the 
settlement has developed in comparative relation to the political and economic 
situation in Burundi. In this section, I show how over time refugees began developing 
a different approach to their land in Tanzania; transitioning from a temporary to a more 
permanent and future-oriented perspective. This is important because the change in 
people’s perspective on land in Tanzania was intertwined with the changing 
perspective on the possibility of naturalisation.  
 
Changing perspective  
 
The year 1993 marks the most important turning point in former refugees’ narratives 
about how they began to perceive their place in Tanzania as something other than 
temporary. In a conversation with Mzee Godfrey and Eliza, an elderly teacher and his 
wife whom I visited multiple times over the years, they recalled that: ‘The hope to go 
back to Burundi was out of our mind after 1993 when the first Hutu President was 
assassinated. When Ndadaye was killed. Since then we started to hope for citizenship 
here’ (int. 2016). This sentiment was shared by most of the people with whom I spoke. 
Adam, a teacher at a vocational school confirmed that people’s attitudes towards the 
idea of permanently staying in Tanzania began to change at that time: ‘People started 
to lose their hope of going back to Burundi…the imagination of repatriation 
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progressively declined’ (int. 2016). He explained that since the assassination and the 
return of civil war in Burundi, people became more cautious about their plots and 
competition for securing farming land intensified. The perceived increasing 
importance of land in the settlement became directly proportional to the increased 
insecurity in Burundi.  
 
This link became even more pronounced in 2015, when the distribution of citizenship 
certificates coincided with the eruption of election violence in Burundi, followed by 
months of insecurity, economic decline, and food shortages across the country (Hovil, 
2016, p. 1). The people I met in the settlement frequently discussed the issue of land-
related violence that repatriates faced upon their return to Burundi. Burundian law 
acknowledges a person as a rightful owner after cultivating a plot for more than 30 
years, implying that many occupants now became legal owners (van Leeuven, 2010, 
p. 756). When the government felt that it served useful political purposes, it expelled 
those who occupied land and granted it to the repatriates. In other contexts, land 
sharing agreements were enforced.  
 
When the repatriates from the Old Settlements returned to Burundi, many of them 
became involved in land conflicts and became both victims and perpetrators of 
violence. The way in which former refugees think about land in the settlement in 
Tanzania was influenced by the struggles that their relatives and friends faced while 
making claims to land in Burundi. In other words, inhabitants of Ulyankulu 
conceptualise the value of their land and citizenship in exile in comparative relation to 
Burundi. Thus, insecurity, violence, and lack of land access are associated with 
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Burundi, whereas lack of violent conflicts and the perceived abundance of land in the 
country are attributed to Tanzania. 
 
Scholarly research on access to land in Burundi accentuates the intimate connection 
between a specific piece of land and people’s understanding of identity (van Leeuwen 
& Haartsen, 2005; van Leeuwen, 2010; Fransen & Kuschminder, 2012).28 Hovil 
(2009) underlines that for many in Burundi identities are quite literally rooted in the 
soil (see also Whyte et al., 2013 on Uganda). The extensive International Refugee 
Rights Initiative (2009) study of the repatriates brings attention to people’s desire to 
recover the land they fled from and where their ancestors were buried:  
 
Land connects the current generation to their ancestors… Land, and especially 
family land, is priceless; it is a gift you get from the ancestors, and it is a gift 
you have for your descendants. Land keeps the extended family together and 
as such it is like a clan umbilical cord (IRRI, 2009, p. 37).  
 
Apparently, when the researchers asked people if they would accept an alternative 
piece of land, their responses were negative. These findings become more complex 
and less one-dimensional if we consider that the repatriates in this study were part of 
the same families that opted for Tanzanian citizenship and today try to secure rights to 
land in Tanzania. It is vital to understand that people can have a strong sense of 
 
28 It is important to highlight that these studies were written recently and are framed by the discourse of 
post-conflict reconstruction. For 40 years now no significant research has been done on customary land 
law, tenure security and local land management outside conflict situations in the Burundian context 
(Kohlhagen 2011) 
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attachment to their land in Burundi and at the same time choose to remain in Tanzania. 
Under conditions of displacement, with very limited options and the impossibility of 
return, people make adjustments over time and under given circumstances, and 
through these circumstances, new/different relationships to land necessarily evolve. 
Due to the continuous instability in their country of origin and the lack of prospects 
for sustainable livelihood opportunities, the majority of Burundian refugees decided 
to remain in Tanzania. There, they strive to establish secure access to land within and 
beyond the designated area of the settlement. In the next section, I look at the strategies 
they employ to achieve these goals in the constrained circumstances of the settlement.  
 
6.4. Land transactions and documentation  
 
 
In the following paragraphs, I show how former refugees engage in land transactions 
and how through these processes, they make claims to land. Moreover, I argue that the 
documentation and agreements produced in the process of land transactions become 
an important way of legitimising their land access and claiming rights to land 
following naturalisation.  
 
Repatriation and expansion of land transactions 
 
As discussed, TANCOSS offered Burundian refugees a choice between naturalisation 
and repatriation. From 2008 onwards, more than 5,000 people repatriated from 
Ulyankulu to Burundi. This major migration juncture set in motion many overlapping 
land sales and transactions. Initially, the TANCOSS agreement stipulated that upon 
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naturalisation, refugees would be resettled from the settlements to other regions of 
Tanzania. According to Godfrey, a teacher at the secondary school in Ulyankulu:  
 
The sales of land were happening before, but they significantly increased when 
the process of naturalisation started. We were told we would be moved away 
from here and so people started selling. Also, people repatriated then, and that 
opened possibilities for land sales (int. 2016).  
 
As Godfrey’s story suggests, repatriation of refugees to Burundi was a key force 
behind the surge of land transactions in Ulyankulu following naturalisation. With 
many families leaving the settlement, new and often centrally located plots of land 
became available. Simultaneously, refugees who decided to opt for naturalisation and 
remained in Tanzania became motivated to own more land and therefore competition 
for land increased.  
 
It is crucial to highlight that none of the sales were permitted by the settlement’s 
administration (although many officials were benefitting and continue to benefit from 
these transactions). The refugees never obtained formal titles to the land they occupy, 
and as an employee of TCRS who worked in Ulyankulu for over 15 years remarked: 
‘In Tanzania, the President has a right to distribute land. He leased it to the refugees. 
But they are not permitted to administer it freely’ (int. 2014). These stipulations, 
however, have been widely disregarded by the inhabitants of the settlement. Since 
naturalisation, land transactions increased between the refugees themselves and they 
also expanded to include Tanzanians from the neighbouring areas and beyond.   
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Inward migration of Tanzanians: ‘finding’ land  
 
Following the implementation of TANCOSS, thousands of Tanzanians began to move 
into the area, and today their number is estimated at around 12,000. This is only an 
estimate, as Tanzanians do not register with the settlement administration or the village 
government, and they usually settle clandestinely (although legally they are required 
to report to the settlement office). Many come in search of business opportunities. 
However, the key pull factor that motivated Tanzanians I met to move to Ulyankulu 
was the availability of ‘cheap’ land. 
 
In the process of ‘finding’ land, the incoming Tanzanians first approach the seller and 
then inform the authorities at the lowest level – ten-cell leaders or street leaders. An 
agreement is usually formulated and signed. The documentation of land sales follows 
various patterns depending on the relationship between the buyer and the seller. Within 
families and among close friends or neighbours, usually no agreements are signed, and 
payments are symbolic. When the two parties are less familiar with each other, a 
standard procedure is followed. The buyer approaches the seller, they agree on a 
certain amount of compensation, and afterwards they bring in witnesses and include 
the street leader (sometimes the village leader is informed as well, but usually the sales 
happen without informing him or her).29 Next, an agreement is formulated, which is 
then copied and signed by all the parties involved. As one of the street leaders 
explained to me:  
 
29 Ten cell (ten household) and street leaders are the lowest authority in the Tanzanian local 
government structures  
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Tanzanians, they come first to the ten-cell leader, then to the street leader, then 
to the chairperson. But first, they go straight to people from whom they access 
land; someone has more, they divide, negotiate, make an agreement. In my 
street, we have people from Ngara, Bukoba; I assisted them, they have land 
now, houses. We live together (int. 2016).  
 
Despite the underlying legal regime that actively discourages people from developing 
a sense of land ownership in the settlement, refugees continue to engage in land 
transactions between themselves as well as with the incoming Tanzanians. When I 
asked Elija, a bicycle fundi (repairman), about the details of the transactions, he 
explained: ‘How do we do transactions? We give them cash. We have some sort of 
documentation, but that’s not important, what is important is that the neighbours 
know’ (int. 2015). Apart from the direct benefits of acquiring and selling land, these 
land transactions also have another function: they operate as recognition by 
Tanzanians of former refugees’ rights to land. In other words, the willingness of 
Tanzanians to engage in land transactions in the settlements and purchase land from 
the former refugees, functions as an indication of their recognition of former refugees’ 
customary rights to land based on shared cultural notions of the importance of long-
term occupation and productive use of land.  
 
Engagement in these transactions produces a document trail fortified by spoken 
agreements which are both crucial for the former refugees. The documents people 
showed me included signatures and names of multiple witnesses and family members, 
they were signed and stamped by street leaders and/ or village chairpersons, and all 
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parties involved held multiple copies. Documenting the transactions and sales of a 
portion of their land allows people to delineate and document the boundaries of what 
they consider is their land. In the context of the settlement, these are the only 
documents people have to certify the land access they have established over the years. 
 
Mutual benefits  
 
Tanzanians’ willingness to engage in land transactions with refugees should also be 
seen in the broader, national context, where migration to other rural areas and 
accessing land in new localities is often extremely challenging (Askew et al., 2013). 
Anatol, a friend of my host family from an area north of Kahama told me one day that: 
 
It is good for agriculture here, I was poor before, and I am better now. I had 
many friends and family here. I had one friend who told me to come here; he 
said come, there is land. So I came to settle here. I brought a letter of intention 
from my village. My friend repatriated. For the land I have a document, it is 
signed by the village chairman. In the place where I am from, all land is 
occupied, but here, there is still space (int. 2016). 
 
I discussed this issue in a focus group discussion with Tanzanians who settled in 
Ulyankulu. We laughed and joked a lot about how Tanzanians who move to Ulyankulu 
complain about the lack of social services, restricted access, insecure land ownership, 
but end up building houses in the area and insist that they want to stay here. A sentence 
that recurred in many conversations with Tanzanians whom I asked why they decided 
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to move and stay in Ulyankulu was: ‘Ninapenda mazingira hapa’, which literally 
means ‘I like the environment here’. In the focus group, the Tanzanians I spoke to 
agreed that ultimately, the business opportunities in Ulyankulu are better than where 
they come from, and they can quite easily access and expand land holdings in the 
settlement which they could not afford in their place of origin. 
 
Moving into the area of the settlement provides easy and cheap access to land for the 
Tanzanians. From the perspectives of former refugees, migration of Tanzanians into 
the area facilitates integration, and their willingness to purchase land in the settlement 
functions as a mechanism of recognition of former refugees’ rights to that land. By 
engaging in these land transactions, Tanzanians from the neighbouring areas 
strengthen refugees’ claims to land and validate their newly acquired citizenship. 
Instead of reliance on autochthonous claims, what we are witnessing in this context is 
an establishment of a shared and functioning (though enclosed) land tenure system 
between Tanzanians and former refugees within the boundaries of the settlement.  
 
As observed by Hammar (2014), Elliott (2014), Hansen (2014), while displacement 
often dismantles people’s pre-existing capital, networks, and expertise, it also 
generates a range of new relationships, creative strategies, and socio-economic spaces. 
Thus, displacement produces paradoxical simultaneities - both destruction and 
creation, loss and gain, despair and hope, and confinement and mobility. The new 
business opportunities emerging in Ulyankulu settlement and the rise of land tenure 
relationships between refugees and Tanzanians are indicative of what Hammar (2014) 
calls the ‘displacement economies’. Although I agree that displacement has produced 
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both loss and economic opportunity in Ulyankulu, I observe that these are unstable 
and unevenly distributed. The surge in land transactions and business prospects linked 
to land sales created new inequalities and vulnerabilities in term of land access in 
Ulyankulu. In the following paragraphs, I turn to the problem of illegitimate land sales.  
 
Illegitimate sales   
 
The legitimising power of land sales and transactions in Ulyankulu has its flipside in 
the form of illegitimate land sales. I am aware that the concept of ‘illegitimate’ land 
sales in the context where all sales are prohibited might seem peculiar. However, in 
this terminology, I follow the point of view of former refugees, who have a very clear 
and established idea of which sales are and aren’t legitimate. In two different villages 
in the settlement, I had a chance to witness two contested cases where village chairmen 
sold people’s land to incoming Tanzanians. As Aisha, a middle-aged woman who was 
a victim of an illegitimate sale told me:  
 
There are many land conflicts here. Mostly because village chairmen sell land 
to Tanzanians and others. You think you own land and someday you find it 
given to someone else without any information, you just find it occupied. So 
how do you solve that? What can you do? (int. 2016).  
 
In the same village of Mbeta, a young farmer and a father of four faced a similar 
situation. He told me that he went to cut some trees from the plot he owns which is 
located at a distance from his house. His family only uses it for seasonal agriculture 
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and does not visit the plot every day. When he arrived, he saw that someone built a 
shed on his plot. A man emerged from the grass shed and claimed that he bought the 
land. The young farmer asked him to show the documents and to bring him to the 
person who sold the land to him. The man never produced the documents and never 
showed up for the meeting arranged at the settlement’s office to resolve the case.  
 
When I was finishing my fieldwork, these two cases remained unresolved, and both 
victims insisted that their land was sold without their knowledge by the former village 
chairman. The man was since then removed from his position, but the conflicts 
remained without a resolution. As these cases indicate, land sales and transactions are 
in some cases manipulated by the more powerful and influential members of the 
community; jeopardising rather than securing people’s claims to land. In the next 
section, I look in more depth into the role and meaning of land conflicts in the 
settlement.  
 
6.5. Conflicts and disputes: new mechanisms of claim-making  
 
 
It might seem counterintuitive to speak about land conflicts in the context of a case 
that is challenging the usual scholarly emphasis on discourses of conflict and 
autochthony. I suggest, however, that in Ulyankulu, people’s engagement in land 
disputes is a conscious way of gaining official recognition of access to land. As it is 
firmly established in the literature (Berry, 1993; Moore, 1978; Lund & Sikor, 2009), 
struggles over land are as much about recognition of rights and institutional authority 
as they are about control of property per se (Lund & Boone, 2013, p. 1). Following 
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naturalisation, former refugees are making efforts to gain recognition of their rights to 
land by the authorities. Rather than a sign of trouble, land conflicts and new conflict 
resolution dynamics in Ulyankulu are a way of making claims to land. Moreover, I 
suggest that people’s active engagement in land disputes is evidence of an increasing 
sense of entitlement that they feel towards the land in the settlement. As one elderly 
lady in a focus groups discussion in the village of Keza remarked: ‘Before citizenship, 
there was less conflict over land. Now there is more conflict because people are sure 
that they are staying here’ (int. 2016). In the following sub-sections, I outline the 
existing strategies that refugees employ to establish stronger claims to land and the 
challenges they encounter in the process.  
 
Resolution mechanisms: Taba case  
 
Currently, despite naturalisation, when land conflicts occur in Ulyankulu, the 
Settlement Officer remains in charge of adjudicating all cases. In line with the 
established chain of authority, first, a case in question is mediated on the local level 
through the ten cell and street leaders. If the local authorities fail to resolve it, the case 
is brought to the village government and presented to the Land Committee. When the 
parties involved are unable to reach a compromise, the case is brought to the 
Settlement Officer. Next, he schedules a visit to survey the plots and makes the final 
judgment. In Taba, one of the villages in Ulyankulu, I had an opportunity to witness a 
land case being resolved by the Settlement Officer.  
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The conflict in question was related to encroachment and building on plots that are 
seemingly ‘empty’ but belong to the settlement’s office. The Officer was instructed to 
visit the village by the District Commissioner, who received a land conflict complaint 
at his office. He told the Settlement Officer to ‘take better care of the issues in his area’ 
and ‘to make sure these types of issues do not reach the district office again’. The 
Settlement Officer first met with the village chairman of Taba and reminded him 
multiple times that conflicts in the village, if unresolved, need to be brought to his 
office. Then, the case in question was brought by a farmer who allegedly expanded his 
fields for cultivation into the land which belonged to a dispensary (and therefore to the 
settlement’s officer). He insisted that it is his land, and when he was told to leave the 
area, he wrote a letter to the District Commissioner to ask for legal assistance. The 
man was very outspoken and complained that since he is a citizen now, he has a right 
to do that. In response, he was told that although it might seem to him that he owns the 
land, it still belongs to the Ministry of Home Affairs. In a later conversation, the 
Settlement Officer explained: ‘People here believe they have land rights here, but they 
don’t. They only have rights to use the land but not rights to own’ (int. 2016). 
Ultimately, the man was told to leave the land he was cultivating and claimed as his 
property.  
 
His case was not an isolated incident and it is representative of many similar disputes 
that frequently occur across the settlement. Since naturalisation, many inhabitants of 
the settlement bypass the authority of the Settlement Officer and bring their cases 
directly to the Land and Housing Tribunal in Tabora town and the relevant district 
authorities in Kaliua. Their cases, however, are dismissed, and people are repeatedly 
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told that the land in the settlement is still governed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
and thus they should seek resolution at the office of the Settlement Officer. There is a 
continuous disjunction between having obtained Tanzanian citizenship and remaining 
excluded from the national channels of land governance. At the core of these debates 
is the question who is responsible for solving land disputes following naturalisation 
and what are the mechanisms for seeking justice that are available to the new citizens.  
 
The nature of property rights in Ulyankulu 
 
Colin Marx (2015) differentiates between land conflict related to distributional 
inequalities and conflict emerging from the inherent nature of property rights. His 
focus is on the difference between conflict understood as a (re)distributional struggle 
over (already) defined property rights and conflict that occurs because of the 
inherent, contested nature of property rights themselves (Marx, 2015, p. 2779). The 
idea that the nature of property rights can be a source of conflict is derived from a 
recognition that property rights are relational, constructed, contingent on social 
context and must be continually ‘produced’ (Marx, 2015, p. 2780). These insights 
illuminate the situation in Ulyankulu, where the inherent insecurity of property rights 
remains at the core of many conflicts. As one a member of a Land Committee in 
Makonge village explained it pointedly: ‘We don’t have land rights yet […] our 
neighbours [from villages outside] have land rights, but we don’t, we are told to keep 
waiting. Lack of ownership increases the number of conflicts; there are more 
problems’ (int. 2016).  
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According to the records provided by the local magistrate, the number of land disputes 
brought to the local court has increased by over 20 percent since naturalisation.30 The 
most numerous conflicts in Ulyankulu are around rice fields. As my research assistant 
explained:  
 
The most contradictions are over rice fields. When people got here, they got 
land distributed along the roads but what is now used as rice fields was only 
divided later by the people themselves. So they just use testimony to know who 
owns which plot. For example, Sukuma pastoralists can come here to buy land 
from a refugee family. But then the father dies, and the children rise to claim 
the land back (int. 2016).  
 
The conflicts over rice fields are on the rise in the rainy season when people start 
cultivating and cross boundaries. Other leading conflicts relate to illegitimate sales of 
land in the absence of the owner, encroachment on seemingly ‘empty’ plots of land 
that belong to the settlement office, and dispossession of widows and their children.  
 
As one participant in a focus groups discussion in Keza village told me: ‘Sometimes 
if Mkuu [Settlement Officer] fails to solve a conflict, he would just take the land and 
give it to whomever he wanted or freeze the land for a few years and not let anyone 
access it so all the sides of the conflict would lose and learn’ (int. 2016). These 
arbitrary decisions and lack of accountability in solving land conflicts motivates 
former refugees to seek resolution in other spaces of authority. As the case of Taba 
 
30 I could not verify the figure as the records for all the years were not available. I use this number 
here figuratively to indicate the perceive increase in conflicts.  
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illustrated, people try to bring their land cases to the District office, which in turn 
refuses to deal with them and sends people back to the Settlement Officer. Although 
former refugees are aware of these patterns, they continue seeking resolution for land 
disputes with authorities at the district level. These processes expose the absence of 
clear judiciary mechanisms for dealing with land disputes in the settlement. 
 
Ambiguities on the judiciary level 
 
The extent of the confusion regarding how land in Ulyankulu should be governed has 
been exposed to me by the local magistrate who told me:  
 
There are so many land conflicts, and there is no court for land. People fail to 
know where to take their cases! It would be really good to have a land court. 
People come to me, and I don’t know what to tell them. People want to bring 
their cases to the Land and Housing Tribunal but they can’t. They have no 
occupancy rights, don’t pay taxes for land. This area was not officialised to 
give people possession of land. And so people are afraid to really invest here 
(int. 2016). 
 
I had an opportunity to discuss this problem at length with the land committee 
members in Makonge village. Every village in Ulyankulu has a land committee which 
consists of people who are part of the village government and are selected for this 
position. Land committee is the first point of contact for land conflicts before they are 
brought to the settlement’s office. One of the members of the land committee in 
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Makonge village, reflecting on the issue of people’s inability to seek a resolution to 
their land disputes in court, said:  
 
We got citizenship, yes, but we are told we are still under probation for five 
years […] It’s confusing […] We are receiving Sukuma visitors, we are selling 
the land, but when will we get land ownership ourselves? We got citizenship, 
but what about land? (int. 2016).  
 
These conversations highlight that former refugees see secure access to land as a 
necessary condition of citizenship in its fullest, substantive sense. They express this 
perspective by challenging the decisions of the Settlement’s Office and bringing their 
cases to courts outside of the settlement. The aim of these actions is to seek and gain 
recognition of the land access they established over the decades and to convert their 
locally recognised land access into land rights recognized vis-à-vis the state. These 
actions expose how ongoing struggles for recognition become an inherent 
characteristic of citizenship in displacement. 
 
Although the statist land tenure regime existing in Tanzania is not monolithic, it is 
widely accepted and understood in Tanzania that the state can confer ownership of 
land. This characteristic of land tenure in Tanzania is what made it possible to 
designate land for refugee settlements in the first place. At the same time, however, 
today the same characteristics of the land regime in Tanzania are the cause of 
uncertainty and anxiety surrounding land rights in Ulyankulu because following 
naturalisation, land rights need to be secured vis-a-vis the state and not only in the 
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concerned locality. In that context, achieving recognition of relevant authorities has 
heightened significance. In the next section, I show how former refugees contest ‘a 
building ban’ and through that productive disobedience attempt to claim rights to a 
more substantive version of citizenship.  
 
6.6. Building a ban and active contestation 
 
In November 2016, the inhabitants of the settlement (both former refugees and 
Tanzanians) were told that they are not supposed to build permanent structures or make 
any improvements to their houses unless they obtain permission. The building ban was 
based on a logic that the settlement land has not been de-gazetted and a full transition 
to local governance still needs to happen. Because land use plans for the area are not 
available, people should not build at random risking that in the future their homes or 
shops might be demolished. Former refugees, however, perceive the ban as a strategy 
aimed directly to obstruct development in the settlement. The new citizens, as well as 
Tanzanians living in the settlement, fiercely contest this ban, and land transactions and 
construction of houses continue to flourish. 
 
Building a ban  
 
Discussion about the building ban dominated public and private conversations during 
my last months of fieldwork in Ulyankulu in November 2016. As the former village 
chairman of Mbeta told me over a meal we were sharing:   
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The big thing now in the settlement is that people were prohibited to build. 
They are confused; there is no information on why and for how long. People 
are asking “What is this citizenship if we are obstructed from the right to 
build”. Also, now electricity was delivered. But people are not allowed to 
build! So they are asking, where is the electricity supposed to be put on, on 
trees?! (int. 2016).  
 
The most important thread in this, and many other conversations regarding the building 
ban, is the issue of misinformation and/or lack of information. As one woman in a 
focus group remarked: ‘People are not allowed to build, they say there will be a city 
plan, but no one understands, and we are not informed about anything’ (int. 2016). 
Another woman from Mapigano village added: ‘Last year people were allowed to 
build, yes, but now it changed for some reason and we don’t know why’ (int. 2016). 
As Stepputat (2004) points out, ‘information and in particular the quality of, and trust 
in, information’ is crucial in the process of decision making in displacement (p. 8). 
Providing contradictory and confusing information can be seen as a strategy of 
managing and controlling refugees post-naturalisation, hindering development in the 
settlements.  
 
Despite these challenges, both former refugees and Tanzanians living in the settlement 
disobey the building ban by continuing building and construction. Around the 
settlement, following naturalisation people began laying the building foundations on 
their land and improving the existing structures. These activities are meaningful in 
themselves, as they are a material expression of former refugees’ intention to plan and 
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invest in their future in Tanzanian (as discussed more in Chapter 8). However, laying 
the foundations for houses needs also to be seen in the broader, national context, where 
Tanzanians tend to lay the foundations for houses on the land they own or purchased 
to show that the land is being used and that it is occupied. Therefore, laying the 
foundations for buildings and improving the existing structures is as much about the 
houses themselves as it is about securing land access. By constructing buildings on the 
land they occupy, former refugees also make claims to land in ways that reflect broader 
trends and practices of the country. Both improving houses and making claims to land, 
however, support the same argument that access to formal citizenship documentation 
allows people to make constructive decisions about their future, which in turn manifest 
themselves in more active engagement with the present. Thus, expressing discontent 
and openly disobeying the building ban has productive consequences.  
 
These practices of former refugees echo the kind of ‘active’ or ‘substantive’ 
citizenship that James Holston (2008) and others (Appadurai & Holston, 1996; Diouf 
& Fredericks 2014; Sassen, 2002) discuss in their work. Although these studies are 
primary set within urban settings, the conceptual frameworks that they develop are 
useful in approaching the urbanising centre of Ulyankulu and the rural villages around. 
Appadurai and Holston (1996) show how mobilisations for rights are organised in 
relation to new conditions of work and residence, and concern the people previously 
excluded from the resources of the state (p. 198). Taking the example of housing, 
Appadurai and Holston (1996) argue that claims of urban poor relativise thinking 
about property by claiming that property must fulfil a social function (p. 198). They 
show that effective claim making in many cases succeeds in producing new legal 
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regimes in the form of new constitutional principles. Substantive citizenship is 
different form formal/ statutory citizenship, but they are interlinked. In the context of 
former refugees in Tanzania, access to formal citizenship has empowered people to 
make claims to more substantive and participatory rights than what they were granted 
under the initial policy of naturalisation. In other words, access to formal documents 
functions here as an actualising tool for people to feel confident to make claims to 
other, more expansive rights, such as political representation and recognition of rights 
to land. In the next section, I show that these processes of claim-making and struggles 
for recognition are mediated differently in relation to gender.  
 
6.7. Gender and claims to land in Ulyankulu  
 
As the previous sections indicated, people who engaged in the various practices 
regarding claims to land against the authorities were predominantly men. During the 
initial distribution of land in the settlement, plots were allocated per household and 
registered in the Settlement’s Office under the name of the male head of the household. 
Women who lost their husbands during the genocide stayed with their relatives until 
they remarried, and I did not come across cases of women who receiving land in 
Ulyankulu under the initial distribution. Both Malkki (1995) and Sommers (2010) 
expressed disappointment at talking with Burundian women, and Malkki claimed even 
that: ‘Efforts to work with women were frustrated’ (Malkki, 1995, p. 50). Perhaps 
because of my age, gender or personality, I did not share similar experiences. 
Nonetheless, during my research in the settlement, I experienced the overtly 
patriarchal character of Ulyankulu’s social world, and my sample is biased towards 
men (as explained in more details in Chapter 4).  
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Questions of political representation and land access were key to the all the people I 
interviewed, regardless of their positionality. However, these markers of citizenship 
were always experienced and narrated differently by the various groups and 
individuals depending on their wealth, gender, education and age. In terms of gender, 
the divergence in concerns and experiences regarding naturalisation was the most 
significant in relation to land access and the processes of claiming land rights. Women 
were not directly involved in any of the land disputes I investigated, and they rarely 
brought their cases to the village government. I learnt that when women attempted to 
bring their cases to the attention of the village government, they were always 
dismissed, and therefore they usually came accompanied and represented by their 
relatives or sons.  
 
One of the women who defied this established practice was Mama Fau. When I met 
Mama Fau, she was 40 years old, had nine children and was heavily pregnant. She was 
Tanzanian but born in Kigoma to a Burundian mother. When her father died, they 
moved to Ulyankulu where her mother still had relatives. Faustina met her husband, a 
soft-spoken Catechist from Mbata village and they married and stayed in Ulyankulu. 
In 2007, Mama Fau went to a seminar led by the local UNHCR representative where 
she learned that women: ‘Wana haki sawa’ [Have the same rights]. She told me that it 
changed her perspective to learn that that is the law and that ‘Here there is no place for 
Hutu habit that only boys inherit, this is the law that women have rights. Sheria sio 
mila [law and not tradition]’ (int. 2016). After the training she attended, she committed 
to support widows in fighting dispossession from their land. Her fierce intellect and 
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ceaseless energy gained her a reputation and women began coming to her for advice 
and assistance.  
 
In Ulyankulu, after husband’s death, it is common that his brothers claim the land and 
displace the widow and her children. This is not unusual, and Young (2006), Chen 
(2000) and others show dispossession of widows is a common practice in India and 
many African countries. When I met Mama Fau in 2016, she was on her way to assist 
a woman in a land dispute against her brother. The woman was from a family of one 
brother and four sisters. The father divided the land in half, gave half to the son and 
the other half to the four girls. All of the girls got married and left the village, and the 
brother remained on the land and was using their plots. However, one of the sisters 
came back to the village after her husband left her, and she decided to reclaim the land 
that the father left for her. Her brother refused and chased her away. Together with 
Mama Fau, the woman took her case to the village chairman, but when he refused to 
listen, they brought the case to the UN office and then to the police. 
 
Finally, in early 2016, the police confirmed that she is allowed to own the plot left for 
her by her father. When I met Mama Fau, she was insisting that the brother should sign 
an agreement that he accepts this verdict. He refused and according to Mama Fau said 
that: ‘Since they are from one stomach, he doesn’t see a need to go to the Settlement 
Officer to sign any documents, he said he is satisfied with the agreement, there is no 
more conflict, but he still doesn’t want to sign anything’ (int. 2016).  
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As this story illustrates, women in Ulyankulu are fighting parallel battles for 
recognition. Most of the struggles that women are engaged in are against their relatives 
and many cases are never registered or receive any attention from the authorities. With 
the help of women like Mama Fau, however, more and more woman, and especially 
widows, demand recognition of their rights to land. Although women are not 
represented in the formal structures of authority and are invisible in most of the cases 
brought to the attention of the Settlement Officer, they are taking part in reshaping 
land ownership and land rights in other spheres. Instead of relying on the existing 
authorities of the settlement office and village leadership, Mama Fau helps women to 
bring their cases to the UNHCR office and the police, seeking support and resolution 
with institutions not directly involved in land governance. 
  
By doing this, women try to create new spaces of authority in relation to land, and they 
seek to legitimise their claims to land in novel ways; outside of the village government 
structure that disregards their concerns. Many of these struggles were prompted by 
naturalisation and former refugees’ awareness that they are now allowed to remain in 
the settlement. In other words, access to citizenship status affects both men and 
women’s engagement in land disputes and it motivates them to assert their rights to 
land in Ulyankulu for themselves and their children. Therefore, my observations 
suggest that following naturalisation, both men and women are engaging in ongoing 
struggles for recognition of their land rights in the settlement and that these processes 
become an essential characteristic of citizenship in displacement. In their struggles, 
they resort to the avenues available to them, and parallel processes of claim-making 
and recognition are happening on different scales in the settlement.   
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6.8. Citizenship and land in displacement 
 
The processes of asserting land rights are riddled with ambiguities and paradoxes. The 
inhabitants of the Old Settlements were initially granted land access for cultivation 
under the umbrella of the settlement structure, and they have established recognition 
of their rights among the local Tanzanians. Following naturalisation, the existing 
protection structure is being dismantled, and former refugees’ rights to land access has 
become more vulnerable than ever before. In consequence, people are simultaneously 
developing a stronger sense of entitlement to land in Tanzania and a stronger sense of 
insecurity regarding their access. As one woman from Kaswa village remarked: 
‘Without ownership rights, we are not completely settled, we can’t invest securely, we 
don’t know completely what will happen to us’ (int. 2016). 
 
In the last months of my research, I visited a family in Tabora that moved out of the 
settlement, bought land in Tabora and built a house, but kept their plot in Ulyankulu. 
David, the father of the family, was a retired businessman, and two of his sons were 
employed in NGO and education sectors. During the conversation, which extended 
into a late afternoon, the father told me that he kept the original plot the family received 
in Ulyankulu, but he is uncertain how to assert his rights to that plot: 
 
Our plot, it is so expensive now, it is in the center of Ulyankulu, has a very 
good location. What if my kids want to return there and build? Or if I want to 
give it to them [the children] as an inheritance. How can we permanently 
possess land in the settlement so no one would take it from us? (int. 2016).   
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He directed this question at me, and waited, hopeful, for reassurance that I could not 
give. The profound sense of anxiety regarding insecurity of tenure expressed by my 
interlocutors is not unique to Ulyankulu settlement, and many scholars have been 
examining insecurity of land tenure in Tanzania (Maganga et al. 2016; Askew et al., 
2013). In the context of the settlement, however, recognition of land access and 
obtaining secure tenure has a different meaning, as from the perspective of the former 
refugees, recognition of their rights to land is a necessary to validate their new 
citizenship status.  
 
The various examples and stories presented in this chapter centre around the notion of 
recognition, which remains at the core of evolving citizenship in displacement. Land 
transactions, engagement in land disputes, challenging the building ban, as well as 
bringing land cases to the authorities beyond the settlement are all strategies that rely 
on recognition of their rights to land by the different levels of Tanzanian authority 
structure, including the local magistrate, Land and Housing Tribunal, District 
Government. As Lund and Sikor (2009) show, property rights and citizen rights in 
their broadest form exist only to the extent that they are produced, recognised and 
sanctioned by some form of legitimate authority (p. 8). What distinguishes property 
rights from possession or access is precisely recognition, which can be established 
through enforcement by society or government, custom, convention, law, or a 
combination of the above (Rose, 1994; Lund & Sikor, 2009). Likewise, in the context 
of Ulyankulu, seeking recognition from different sources (local, regional, national) is 
an essential part of the process through which former refugees attempt to convert their 
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land access into recognised land rights and by that ensure the validity and security of 




Evaluating the process of naturalisation from the perspective of land rights brings out 
the analytical contrasts and paradoxes between the supposed security that is gained 
through access to citizenship and the actual uncertain and unstable rights of citizenship 
that came with citizenship. On the one hand, former Burundian refugees view land in 
Ulyankulu as an essential source of livelihood to which they feel they have a right due 
to their long-term occupancy, productive cultivation, and the recent process of 
naturalisation. On the other hand, however, they are aware of the adverse de jure 
regulations that still govern the area, and a strong sense of insecurity continues to 
dominate daily conversations about land rights in the settlement. Their rights to land 
access are ‘probational' – they are temporal, uncertain, and it is unclear when or how 
that might change.  
 
However, despite the major structural challenges and the subsequent inherent 
insecurity of their rights, former refugees continue to engage in land disputes, 
challenge the Settlement Officer’s authority, and seek conflict resolution at the district 
and regional level. Although it might seem counterintuitive, I suggest that people’s 
engagement in land disputes is a conscious way of gaining official recognition of one’s 
access to land. These are all disruptive actions through which the new citizens assert 
their rights to land against the state. Their engagement in these practices implies that 
people are developing a strong sense of entitlement to the land in the settlement. This 
 233 
sense of entitlement is further supported by the willingness of incoming Tanzanians to 
engage in land transactions with the former refugees. I observed that these productive 
practices where prompted by naturalisation and therefore I argue that access to 
citizenship documents strengthened former refugees’ sense of entitlement to land in 
Tanzania and it motivates them to take action to convert their land access into secure 
rights.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter examined the evolving process, where following 
naturalisation former refugees are trying to convert land access, which they have 
enjoyed for decades and asserted in the locality they inhabit, into land rights 
recognised vis-à-vis state institutions. I show how the inhabitants of Ulyankulu 
conceptualise the importance of their land in exile in comparative relation to land in 
Burundi. In other words, the way in which former refugees think about the importance 
of land in the settlement is influenced by the struggles that their relatives and friends 
are facing in making claims to land in Burundi. Thus, insecurity and lack of land access 
are associated with Burundi, whereas lack of violent conflicts over land and the 
perceived abundance of land in the country are attributed to Tanzania. By asserting 
rights to land, inhabitants of Ulyankulu are seeking recognition of their new citizenship 
in the fullest sense, ultimately seeking a new and more permanent sense of belonging 














In this chapter, I move from the discussion of land, the most tangible marker of 
citizenship, to the less tangible and more elusive marker of citizenship, namely 
freedom of movement. In the context of displacement and encampment, the right to 
freedom of movement becomes imbued with special significance. Although the right 
to freedom of movement for refugees is granted under the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights as well as the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (art. 12. Article 26), in many countries, including Tanzania, refugees’ 
freedom of movement is restricted both by national laws and the humanitarian 
encampment practices. The restrictions on freedom of movement have wider 
consequences on refugees’ autonomy, their access to education and their ability to 
establish sustainable livelihoods. 
 
Former Burundian refugees I met in Tanzania repeatedly told me that freedom of 
movement is one of the most important advantages of the newly acquired citizenship 
status, despite evidence that people have been moving extensively to and from the 
settlements since the 1970s with minimal official sanction. Moreover, people who 
have never left the settlement and do not intend to do so, believe firmly that freedom 
of movement is a crucial benefit of naturalisation. This chapter explores the 
significance of these narratives, asking what has changed in people’s experience of 
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movement following naturalisation and what does that reveal about the importance of 
mobility in the process of affirming citizenship in displacement.  
 
The main argument of this chapter is that access to citizenship documents allows for 
beginning the transition from movement to mobility which is key in former refugees’ 
conceptualisation of citizenship in displacement. Following de Haas (2009) and Long 
(2010), I think about mobility more broadly as having intrinsic meaning beyond the 
mere act of moving or as a means of achieving socio-economic goals. Using Sen’s 
(1999) terminology, I see mobility as a fundamental capabilities-enhancing freedom 
itself. As I came to understand the distinction between movement and mobility through 
the narratives of former Burundian refugees, movement signifies migration from point 
A to B. Mobility, on the other hand, means the capacity to move freely without fear 
and anxiety, to have one’s movement recognised by the state and other citizens, and 
to have the right and the choice to live in multiple places. 
 
In Sen’s (1994) conceptualisation, a person’s capability represents the effective 
freedom of an individual to choose between different functioning combinations – 
between different kinds of life – that a person has reason to value. In the narratives of 
former refugees, kusafiri [literally, to travel in Kiswahili] as the practice of freedom 
of movement, as the ability to travel, the capacity to be mobile, is a crucial marker of 
how they conceptualise citizenship. In line with Sen’s (1994) framework, movement 
can be understood as a functioning and mobility can be seen as a capability. The 
benefits of mobility as a capability, however, are not always evenly, equally or 
predictably distributed. In the latter part of the chapter, I discuss how class 
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differentiation impacts refugees’ ability to take advantage of the opportunities created 
by naturalisation. Moreover, I examine how my interlocutors narrate the benefits of 
freedom of movement in future-oriented terms, revealing that mobility as a capability 
is still a ‘probational’ rather than a fundamental right, which is expected to only 
materialise for the next generation. The chapter pays close attention to spatiality and 
temporality of displacement and examines how the transition from movement to 
mobility plays an important role in the process of evolving citizenship for former 
refugees in Tanzania.     
 
7.1. Restrictions on refugees’ freedom of movement 
 
‘I am not sure if I am going to move out of the settlement now, but what is important 
is that I can if I want to’ said Daniel once when we were sitting in his house, drinking 
soda and sharing a watermelon with his kids. He went silent for a while, looked around 
the room, and said again: ‘Yes, what matters is that now I can and my children can’. 
Daniel is a primary school teacher and a farmer, and together with his family he lives 
in one of the most remote villages of Ulyankulu: Kanindo. As many ambitious male 
students from the settlement, when he was young he entered a Catholic seminary in 
Tabora town to access better education. This decision was riddled with many 
obstacles, starting from obtaining fake school certificates, illegally leaving the 
settlement, and then over the years hiding his identity from his teachers and friends. 
He eventually dropped out of the seminary and returned to the settlement where he 
secured a teaching post. Daniel’s migration story is not exceptional. In every 
household I visited, some family members have migrated out of Ulyankulu for 
education, employment, healthcare, business, adventure, or love. Being familiar with 
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these migration stories and patterns, I was initially surprised at how inhabitants of 
Ulyankulu would repeatedly tell me that freedom of movement is a key benefit of 
naturalisation.  
 
As time passed, I got to know Daniel better and began to understand the burden he 
carried. Years of trying to establish a life and a career out of the settlement and at the 
same time hiding his identity and actively avoiding threatening encounters with the 
police or immigration authorities led him to anxiety. His return to the settlement meant 
giving up plans and dreams he had, but he told me that he ‘could not manage the life 
in hiding anymore’. Daniel’s story foregrounds the psychosocial toll that many 
refugees who live beyond the camps and settlements with no permits or protection 
endure on daily basis. In the following, I discuss the global and national context of 
restrictions on freedom of movement of migrants and refugees and then move to a 
more detailed discussion of the differences in refugees’ experiences of movement pre- 
and post-naturalisation, focusing on the significance of safety and recognition.  
  
Spatial practices of the encampment  
 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (art. 12 Article 26) both provide that 
States shall afford refugees the right to move freely within the host State. As written 
in the 1951 Convention: ‘States shall afford refugees the right to choose their place of 
residence within the territory and to move freely within the State’. However, many 
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countries31, including Tanzania, specify in their national laws that refugees should live 
in designated refugee camps and that their movement must be restricted. Ultimately, 
these laws not only limit refugees’ mobility, but also restrict their access to other rights 
such as employment, healthcare, and education. The widespread practice of placing 
restrictions on Article 26 of the 1951 Convention shows that freedom of movement is 
far from being a core norm within the refugee regime (Maple, 2016).  
 
The topic of why refugees are regularly subjected to policies of camps and restrictions 
on freedom of movement in Africa has received a great deal of attention in academia 
since the 1990s (Crisp, 2000; Hyndman, 2011; Loescher & Milner, 2006; Shacknove, 
1993; Milner, 2011). A state’s emphasis on controlling refugees’ mobility stems from 
the perception (or rather a wish) that refugees’ presence is temporary and a view that 
their movement is a potential threat32. The strong resistance to secondary movement 
of refugees from camps has its roots in overlapping interests of states and humanitarian 
organisations. 
 
African (and other) governments fear the impact that refugees’ freedom to move 
around and search for employment can have on popular support, especially in countries 
that struggle with high rates of unemployment (Misago, 2017). As Misago (2017) 
notes in the context of South Africa, unregulated human mobility is still seen as a threat 
to the physical and economic well-being of citizens. Moreover, in the specific case of 
post-colonial Tanzania, containing refugees in camps provided development in the 
 
31 Ethiopia: National Refugee Proclamation, No. 409/2004, art. 21(1); Kenya: The Refugees Act, No. 
13, Legislative Supplement No. 7 (2009); Tanzania: Refugee Act 1998, Section 17. 
32 Threat takes on various meanings here: threat to the established national order of things, a threat to 
the strained labor market, a threat to voters’ support, a terrorist threat.  
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periphery and various economic benefits (Chaulia, 2003). Establishing rural 
settlements in Western Tanzania helped to clear and cultivate the land, brought new 
contribution to the economy in terms of taxes, provided more people to work on the 
nearby plantations, and populated the remote and peripheral regions. Moreover, the 
policy of rural settlements attracted donors and provided additional benefits for the 
country in terms of aid. From the humanitarian perspective, on the other hand, keeping 
refugees in organised and remote settlements makes it easier to deliver aid and to 
attract funding. Agier (2011) explores this interdependence between the need to 
control and govern the refugees in order to provide humanitarian assistance. He 
highlights the ambiguity of what he calls the ‘Humanitarian Government’ which 
consists of ‘[the] humanitarian world (the hand that cares) and the police and military 
ordering (the hand that strikes)’ (p. 5).  
 
Thus, the insistence on keeping refugees in camps is reinforced both by humanitarian 
and national interests, and encampment continues to dominate the discourse and 
practice of the responses to displacement. These practices of encampment, however, 
contradict the existing evidence, which indicates that secondary movement from 
refugee camps allows refugees to improve their livelihoods, access education and 
assert their autonomy (Long, 2010; de Haas, 2009; Stepputat, 2004). In recent years, 
UNHCR began to reassert that ‘freedom of movement is a fundamental human right 
and that mobility should be included in durable solution frameworks’ (UNHCR 2014). 
However, a significant paradigm shift away from operational work within camps is yet 
to be seen. 
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In a recent special issue on refugee camps, Simon Turner (2016) reflects on how one 
of the essential characteristics of camps is the distinction between outside and inside 
that is created and maintained by spatial markers and by control of movement. Turner 
(2016) insists that it is important to understand encampment as a spatial practice. 
Spatiality, as Hammar (2014) observes is a necessary, but not isolated, element of 
displacement, as movement in any direction as well as inability to move is always 
necessarily spatial. Space in itself always matters and it is always relational. As Turner 
(2016) demonstrates: 
 
Living inside a refugee camp—however invisible the line between the camp 
and its surroundings and despite ongoing contact between the inside and the 
outside—marks one’s life and defines one’s position: a position that is 
simultaneously excluded from and included into host society, excluded 
spatially and legally while simultaneously being defined and contained by the 
surrounding society (p. 142). 
 
The right to freedom of movement has been most rigorously restricted for refugees in 
long-term encampments, where leaving the camp for even a few hours can require 
specific permits and where the decision to migrate out of the camp without the permit 
comes with risks of detention and imprisonment. In the Old Settlements, these intrinsic 
characteristics of camps were maintained spatially by the mechanism of movement 
control. This is not to say that refugees do not leave the settlements. Rather, their 
movement is always controlled and considered illegal, and therefore anxiety 
surrounding movement became inherent to the experience of displacement. In the 
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following section, I outline the specific mechanisms of movement control in 
Ulyankulu settlement.   
 
Movement control in Ulyankulu 
 
By 1985, UNHCR decided that Ulyankulu was producing sufficient amounts of food, 
and the organisation began preparing to hand over the management of the settlement 
to the Tanzanian government. With the international organisations and their 
implementing partners absent, the Settlement Officer, appointed by the Director of the 
Refugee Department at the Ministry of Home Affairs, became the highest legal 
authority in the settlement. As a legal representative of the Ministry of Home Affairs, 
the Settlement Officer does not answer to the Regional Commissioners but is a direct 
subordinate of the Ministry of Home Affairs. This is not in line with the established 
Tanzanian authority structure, where local authorities within the regions report directly 
to the Regional Commissioners. Effectively, the appointment of the Settlement Officer 
by the Ministry placed the camp outside of the normal jurisdiction of the Tanzanian 
state (Turner, 2010).  
 
In the Old Settlements, humanitarian organisations were absent since the 1980s, and 
refugees achieved a degree of self-reliance in terms food and income.33 Thus, authority 
over refugees could not be exercised through aid distribution; instead, it has been 
primarily exercised by regulating the space, i.e. by controlling the borders and 
restricting people’s mobility. As Malkki (1995, p. 137) observes, in the Old 
 
33 As Daley (1989) notes, the extent of self-reliance was exaggerated by the UNHCR.  
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Settlements, the regulation of space came to have heightened practical and political 
significance. She shows that although the camp was not surrounded by fences or walls, 
the ‘overabundance of undomesticated and forbidding space’ (p.138) acted as a barrier 
to travel to and from the camp. All three Old Settlements were located in remote 
regions and were surrounded by kilometres of bush. The refugees, as Malkki notices, 
experienced their isolation as repressive and the spatial closure of the settlement 
generated a particular kind of power that allowed the government to control the 
movement of the people living in the settlement. These geographical characteristics of 
the settlements produced an invisible boundary which was reinforced by the repressive 
sense of isolation. In the absence of fences and walls, the power over refugees’ 
movement was exercised through documentation. 
 
In this specific context, where the borders of the settlements (Mishamo, Katumba and 
Ulyankulu) were open and there was no fence circumnavigating the area, lack of 
documentation operated as a measure of control. The Tanzanian authorities 
(Settlement Officer, Immigration officers, police officers) controlled refugees’ 
mobility and defined the limits of the camp space by determining who and when can 
enter and exit the settlements and to what effect. In other words, the Settlement Officer 
was in charge of enforcing Tanzania's refugee policy on the ground, overseeing 
refugees’ mobility and creating the sense of the boundary between the inside and the 
outside of the camp. As an elderly neighbour of my host family remarked: 
 
Before [naturalisation], our feet were like tied by rope, we could not go 
anywhere, but now, now we are free. Once a soldier came here, and he saw the 
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settlement. Is this a camp? Really? Where is the fence?! There is no fence, but 
they didn't need one to keep us imprisoned, lack of documentation was our 
prison (int. 2015). 
 
Narratives like this suggest that the lack of documents operated as a symbolic 
boundary but with real disciplining effects. Despite the absence of a fence 
circumnavigating the area, people could not leave the settlement. In order to leave the 
settlement, they had to obtain a permit (kibali) from the Settlement’s Office.34 The 
pass was valid for fourteen days. To obtain it, one had to first apply in the office of the 
Village Chairman, who then wrote a letter explaining the destination, the purpose and 
the duration of the travel. The application was then forwarded to the settlement’s 
office. Each refugee was interviewed, and if their permit was approved, the Settlement 
Officer would stamp the letter, and the secretary would enter the details in a log book. 
The process was lengthy and stressful, and applications were often arbitrarily declined. 
As one businessman who used to travel a lot out of the settlements in the 1980s told 
me: ‘It was very difficult to get permits, the only people who qualified were sick 
people, business people that aimed to bring goods here or people visiting relatives in 
Mishamo or Katumba’ (int. 2016). 
 
The inhabitants of the settlements lived under this restrictive movement control regime 
for over four decades, meaning that the second generation of Burundian refugees was 
born into a context where freedom of movement was a privilege not afforded to them. 
 
34 According to the Refugee (Control) Act 1965, section 12, refugees in Tanzania are required to 
apply for a permit in order to leave the settlements. Those who leave or attempt to leave a refugee 
settlement without fulfilling that obligation, are deemed to have committed a disciplinary offence 
(Section 13 (3a)). 
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This protracted experience of displacement led to a situation where people began to 
equate restrictions on freedom of movement with refugee status. While overall the 
policy of rural settlements improved refugees’ income-generating opportunities, from 
the perspective of the refugees, movement control defined how they experienced their 
living environment. Although a failure to obtain a permit could result in a maximum 
of six months’ imprisonment, people defied the rules, exiting and entering the 
settlement without documents. This created a contradictory space, where although 
refugees managed to exit and re-enter the settlement, their movement was always 
uncertain and potentially dangerous.  
 
Movement against all odds: migrating from Ulyankulu  
 
As the existing evidence from the literature on encampment, migration and livelihoods 
illustrates, mobility allows refugees in camps to meet their livelihood needs (de Haas, 
2009; Géraldine, 2010; Long, 2014; Stepputat, 2004). Both local governments and 
United Nations agencies have long been aware that most of the African refugees live 
outside of the planned settlements (Kuhlman, 1994; Jansen, 2016). Nonetheless, the 
magnitude of refugees’ migration from camps to cities is generally unknown, in large 
part because their flight is often illegal and undocumented. It is estimated that 59 per 
cent of the total global population of refugees is now settled in urban areas (Crawford 
et al., 2015). Evidence of out of camp migration is extensively documented in the 
existing literature on encampment and livelihoods (Sommers, 2001; Campbell, 2006; 
Jacobsen, 2006).  
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Burundian refugees are not an exception to that trend, and they have been exiting the 
settlements despite the strict restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement. 
Refugees leave the settlements and migrate to other urban and rural areas for various 
reasons, including farming, business, further education, employment, marriage, artistic 
careers, love and adventure. Despite the existing regulations in place meant to control 
people’s mobility, Burundian refugees from the Old Settlements migrated in large 
numbers, mostly to urban centres of Tabora, Kigoma, Mwanza, Morogoro, and Dar es 
Salaam.  
 
Before naturalisation, to leave the settlement each person needed not only to obtain 
the special pass but also had to be prepared to pay the police officers who patrolled the 
trains and buses leaving from the area of the settlements (regardless of whether they 
had the official permit to travel or not). Thus, the control of refugees’ movement and 
the disciplining effects of lack of citizenship documentation extended beyond the 
boundaries of the camp. Police officers on buses and trains departing near the 
settlements targeted refugees. As Simoni, an elderly leader from Ulyankulu settlement 
told me: ‘Freedom of movement is the most important outcome of naturalisation. Yes, 
we travelled before, but there were always problems with migration police’. During 
my research, I noted that although people migrated extensively out of the settlements, 
these migratory decisions were linked with a strong sense of anxiety and uncertainty.  
 
One of these people was David, whom I met during the last stage of my fieldwork. I 
was introduced to David in Tabora, where he bought land just after naturalisation and 
built a new house for his family with the support of his sons. He is a retired 
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businessman, and before naturalisation he was buying and selling used clothes as well 
as also buying crops and selling them outside of the settlement. He belongs to a 
dynamic group of businessmen and entrepreneurs from Ulyankulu, who breached the 
movement control rules in the settlement and over the years travelled to urban centres 
in search for opportunities. In his young years, David travelled extensively to nearby 
towns of Tabora, Kahama, Shinyanga, however, he never permanently settled outside 
of Ulyankulu. He was eager and proud sharing his experiences of years of exiting and 
re-entering the settlement, and explained that at first, he used to go to the village 
chairman, who would then write a letter to the Settlement Officer, and only then he 
would get a permit to leave (which was sometimes valid only for a few days). Due to 
the inconveniences and stress inflicted by the process, he often skipped it and travelled 
without the permit. Despite doing so for many years, he never got caught. ‘It was 
always stressful’, he remembered, ‘always in the back of your mind that they can catch 
you. It has not happened to me, but I always anticipated it’ (int. 2016). Despite 
infrequent contact with the authorities and rare cases of detention, fear permeated the 
experiences and narratives of migration out of the settlements. 
 
The biggest advantage of Burundians in Tanzania, in comparison with other refugee 
groups (e.g. Somalis in Kenya: Lochery, 2012), is that they can easily blend in with 
the Tanzanian population: they have similar appearance, speak fluent Kiswahili, and 
can pass as native Ha (one of the Tanzanian ethnic groups living in Kigoma region). 
Moreover, the Tanzanian government only recently began issuing national identity 
cards (NIDA), and the majority of Tanzanian citizens do not carry any form of 
identification (I return to this subject in Chapter 8). A combination of those factors 
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enabled Burundian refugees to travel outside of the settlement before naturalisation. 
As the existing evidence illustrates, the limits of the camp are porous, allowing goods, 
people and ideas to move in and out of the camp (Lecadet, 2016). However, as Turner 
(2016) observes, ‘despite these transgressions of the limits of the camp, the perimeter 
remains an important defining characteristic and shapes the lives of those who remain 
inside’ (p. 141).  
 
This observation is a good starting point for unpacking why, considering the extent of 
outward migration from the settlements, so many of my interviewees insisted that the 
right to freedom of movement was the most important benefit of naturalisation. What 
exactly has changed in people’s experiences of migration from the settlements 
following naturalisation? And what does this perspective tell us about the relationship 
between citizenship and mobility? In seeking answers to these questions, I turn to the 
narratives and experiences of the people concerned.  
 
 7.2. Movement with and without citizenship: unpacking the difference 
 
 
In this section, I look at how former refugees narrate their experiences of secondary 
movement from the settlements and what has changed for them following 
naturalisation. People’s narratives point towards notions of recognition, safety and 
autonomy, and the following paragraphs are organised around these themes. When 
brought together, these elements are helpful in defining how the experience of 
movement changes with access to citizenship and subsequently what role does 
mobility play in conceptualisations of citizenship in displacement.  
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The burden of secrecy  
 
John was twelve years old when he fled Burundi with his family. For secondary 
education, his parents sent him to attend a school outside the settlement. He recalls 
that during that time he did not tell anyone that he was a refugee. He said that he did 
not experience any difficulties only because he was always skilfully hiding his identity, 
always on guard, careful about what he was sharing with his peers and teachers: ‘It is 
important never to let anything slip about your refugee background, you need to keep 
all your family stories coherent’ (int. 2014). 
 
John admits that it was extremely difficult to find opportunities for schooling for his 
own children. Regular Tanzanian schools often require students to show their birth 
certificates, which children that were born in Ulyankulu do not have. Therefore, most 
families end up sending their children to private or religious school, which are more 
lenient and willing to accept students who do not have the necessary documents, but 
they are also more expensive. When attending a school outside of the settlement, 
students need to hide their identity not only because of direct discrimination at the 
schools. What is also at stake is the future of their employment – if their identity is 
discovered at the school, they might never find work. As John explained: ‘If at the end 
they discover you are a refugee they won’t employ you, someone might find out further 
down the road, and then your options are closed’ (int. 2014).  
 
Meeting John and speaking to him about his past and his family helped me to begin 
understanding why former refugees prioritise freedom of movement as a benefit of 
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citizenship, despite their extensive history of secondary migration out of the 
settlements. John explained to me that mobility does not mean only being able to 
physically move to attend a school. Real freedom stands for a capacity, where one’s 
movement is accepted and recognised by the state and other citizens. Only then, he 
argued, freedom of movement is the most important benefit of naturalisation. John’s 
perspective advances a broad understanding of mobility very much in line with de 
Haas (2009) notion of mobility as ‘a fundamental capabilities-enhancing freedom 
itself’ (p. 53).  
 
The importance of recognition 
 
John was acutely aware that his family’s circumstances are not going to change 
overnight. However, when confronted with stories of the continued discrimination of 
students from the settlements in Tanzanian schools and their relatives in urban centres 
post-naturalisation, he just shook his head with impatience. What matters, he 
explained, is the legal recognition of their new citizenship status, which with time will 
change the experiences of freedom of movement for the next generation. At the core 
of this perspective on the benefits of naturalisation is a notion of recognition.  
 
Recognition can take a number of forms but broadly speaking it refers to people feeling 
their own sense of identity is affirmed (Renault, 2007). In turn, ‘non‐recognition can 
entail people feeling positioned or constrained to act in ways that compromise their 
self‐definition’ (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011, p. 27). As the political theorist Charles 
Taylor (1992) argues, the recognition of identity ‘is not just a courtesy we owe other 
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people. It is a vital human need’ (cited in Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011, p. 216). Here, 
it is crucial to be cautious and not to use recognition to classify and preserve people’s 
identity. Instead, the focus needs to remain on recognising self-identification or self-
understanding (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000), which foregrounds that people do not have 
a single coherent identity and that they can express themselves differently across 
various contexts. 
In understanding the importance of recognition for the former refugees, I turn to 
definitions that emphasize everyday interactions, seeing recognition as ‘the ability of 
individuals to occupy public spaces in a manner that does not compromise their self‐
identity, let alone obstruct, threaten or even harm them more materially’ (Painter & 
Philo, 1995, p. 115). Obtaining recognition comes from multiple places, and it is not a 
one-off event or a linear process (Lund, 2016). In this particular context, recognition 
comes from locally settled Tanzanians, local government officials, national 
government, and Tanzanians in other parts of the country. Moreover, recognition is 
not always stable, and it needs to be continuously asserted and maintained. From the 
perspective of the former refugees, the most important layer of recognition acquired 
with naturalisation is the formal, state recognition which allows them to remain in 
Tanzania and to move out of the settlements. John’s story, however, suggests that 
recognition of former refugees’ rights to access education and employment beyond the 
refugee settlements is ongoing and not yet realised. It is seen as a long-term process, 
which might take another generation.  
This perspective on the benefits of citizenship illustrates an in-between, ‘probational’ 
state where former refugees received citizenship and have the right to freedom of 
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movement but are not yet able to exercise that right in a broad, substantive sense. 
Despite naturalisation and permission to remain in Tanzania, former refugees continue 
to hide their identity even from their friends and partners. At the same time, however, 
the same people insist that the experience of freedom of movement will change for the 
next generation and therefore it will become a key benefit of naturalisation. This 
future-oriented thinking about citizenship is integral to the concept of ‘probational 
citizenship’. This brings me to another distinction between freedom of movement pre- 
and post-naturalisation, namely the question of safety.  
 
Naturalisation and safety  
 
Mama Sophia, a wife of a well-known Pentecostal pastor in Dar es Salaam, told me 
that the first thing she did after obtaining the citizenship certificate was to apply for a 
passport. ‘A real passport’, she underlined, referring to the forged documents many 
refugees relied on previously. ‘I was so happy, and it was the first thing to do. They 
did not question me or anything. Then, we also applied for ID documents’, she 
continued (int. 2017). ‘For me’, she said, ‘the most important benefit of citizenship is 
travels, freedom, kusafiri’ (int. 2017). Like many of my interlocutors, Mama Sophia 
never faced problems with immigration officers or police but felt anxiety every time 
she travelled to visit her family in Katumba. Obtaining the certificate, she maintained, 
removed the anxiety and potential risks of entering and exiting the settlement.  
 
Similar thoughts were expressed by Dominik, a trader in Kariakoo who frequently 
travels to the settlements and to Burundi to buy and sell goods: ‘I never got any 
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problems travelling but nobody knows the future. You might get problems in the future 
even though you have not had problems until now. They might ask you when you are 
crossing the border or coming to the city for your documents. So you can be in trouble’ 
(int. 2015). His perspective, similarly to Mama Sophia’s, highlights that although they 
were both able to travel over the years without any disturbance, naturalisation has 
removed the underlying anxiety that something dangerous might potentially happen to 
them one day.  
 
The narratives of the younger urban refugees support this perception. Issa initially 
came to Dar es Salaam to work as a shopkeeper. When his boss moved to Mtwara (a 
town in the south of the country on the coast), he decided to stay in Dar es Salaam, 
because living in the city gave him more prospects for advancing his artistic career as 
a singer. He got his citizenship certificate in 2015, and since then he has never had to 
use it or show it to anyone. Still, he believes it was extremely important to get the 
certificate: ‘The moment you need to use the certificate is in case of emergency, it is 
when someone says you are a refugee, and you need to defend yourself, and then you 
can show the certificate’ (int. 2017). ‘I never had to use it’, he continued, ‘but it feels 
so good to have it’ (int. 2017). Another young man I spoke to several times in 
Kariakoo, the biggest market in Dar es Salaam, gave similar reasons as to why he finds 
having a certificate important:  
 
‘When I walk on these streets now, I walk confidently, knowing that even if 
somebody catches me, I have a certificate to show. I can live within this city 
freely without fearing anybody. This is a very great advantage’ (int. 2017).   
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Similar attitudes were expressed in almost every interview I had with urban residents 
who recently obtained their papers. What becomes apparent in these narratives is a 
notion that citizenship functions as a protection mechanism in case of emergency. On 
the surface, there is not much change in former refugees’ migration patterns since they 
received citizenship, as they migrated extensively and were rarely arrested or harassed 
by the authorities before naturalisation. However, my research shows that there is a 
significant shift in urban refugees’ sense of personal safety and the level of anxiety 
they experience on a daily basis, which I discuss further in the next chapter (Chapter 
8). What is important here is that access to citizenship documents decreases the sense 
of anxiety associated with illegal migration out of the settlements and it alters people’s 
experience of movement. In the next section, I turn to the question of why former 
refugees who never left the settlements and do not intend to do so, firmly believe that 
freedom of movement is the most important benefit of naturalisation.  
 
Movement and freedom  
 
On a rainy day at the end of April 2015, I went to visit an elderly Pentecostal preacher, 
whom I was introduced to during a Sunday mass. I was told that he prefers to speak 
Kirundi, and so my research assistant accompanied me to the house. It was a month of 
hope and anticipation, as the first round of distribution of citizenship certificates was 
just completed and the rainy season was good. When we arrived at the house, we found 
out that the preacher was away, but his wife was there, eager to welcome us. She was 
just peeling corn and insisted we join her at her tasks and tell her stories. We did as we 
were told, and we admired the garden, lush, full of flowers and fruit trees. We shared 
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stories, and she told us how surprised she was that some people repatriated, she 
obviously wanted to stay in Tanzania, to ‘live where there is peace’ (int. 2015). Like 
many older adults I met, Bernice remembered the horrors of killings in Burundi and 
did not believe that it was safe to repatriate.  
 
When we asked about what has changed for her since naturalisation, she replied: 
‘There are changes, yes, now we are free, we can move around, no one will catch us’ 
(int. 2015). When my assistant inquired if she was ever caught by immigration or faced 
any problems migrating, she told us that she never left the settlement and ‘in all 
truthfulness, I have not even been to the town center of Ulyankulu. I find it too hectic’ 
(int. 2015). The preacher’s wife’s story was not unusual – I met many older people in 
the settlement who insisted that freedom of movement is the most important benefit of 
citizenship, although they have never moved and do not intend to. Some never leave 
their villages and cannot recall the last time they went to the market in the center of 
the settlement.  
 
In these conversations, former refugees linked their newly acquired citizenship with a 
sense of freedom, which reflects Amartya Sen’s capability approach. In Sen’s (1994) 
conceptualisation, a person’s capability represents the effective freedom of an 
individual to choose between different functioning combinations – between different 
kinds of life – that a person has reason to value. The question of the ability to choose 
between different functioning, different kinds of life, is crucial for the capabilities 
approach. The conversation with Bernice reveals that access to freedom of movement 
can have ‘a capabilities effect’ without being acted upon. What she values is precisely 
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the recognition of her right to move and the fact that she can choose to remain in the 
settlement or choose to leave (even if she is not planning to do so). What transpires 
through these narratives is a strong link that former refugees make between their right 
to freedom of movement and citizenship, where freedom of movement signifies much 
more than the mere act of moving.  
 
From movement to mobility  
 
Past experiences of restricted freedom of movement and anxiety that comes with 
migratory decisions generated a conviction among the former refugees that true 
freedom of movement is an attribute of citizenship, and it cannot be attained in any 
other way. Identifying refugeehood with restricted freedom of movement translated 
into equating the opposite of refugee status – national citizenship – with mobility and 
all the benefits that come with it. In other words, protracted and collective experiences 
of associating migration with fear and anxiety generated a strong conviction among 
the former refugees that the main benefit of citizenship is the recognition of the right 
to move freely and improve one’s livelihood.  
 
Although people could leave the settlements and establish urban and rural livelihoods 
in other parts of the country in the past, these practices always came with a sense of 
potential risk and anxiety. Today, instead of simply moving, people are now mobile, 
meaning that their movement is safe, legal, and recognised by the state. These qualities 
mark the difference between movement prior and post-naturalisation and illuminate 
why former refugees contend that freedom of movement (understood as mobility) is 
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one of the most important benefits of citizenship. As the stories shared above indicated, 
however, the benefits of freedom of movement are still ‘probational’ and former 
refugees believe that mobility, in its expansive sense, will only fully materialise for 
the next generation. 
 
I argue that in this understanding of freedom of movement as mobility is where a 
formal/ statutory version of citizenship meets the substantive version. Having 
autonomy to choose (and that choice being recognised by the state) is crucial, and the 
right to choose (expressed in decisions of mobility), becomes a vehicle for claiming 
substantive citizenship rights. This process is neither linear nor immediate, and former 
refugees are aware that it might take another generation. What is important here is that 
even people who are not (and do not intend to) move away from the settlements, 
underline the importance of having a choice to stay or a choice to leave – for 
themselves and their children. The capability to improve one’s livelihoods through 
mobility becomes a defining feature of citizenship in this specific context of 
displacement. In the next section, I discuss how migration of former refugees out from 
the settlements has coincided with the migration of Tanzanians from the neighbouring 
regions to the settlement, and how does that process reinforce the importance of 
movement in people’s view of citizenship.  
 
7.3. Mobile citizens, mobile environments 
 
 
The implementation of TANCOSS policy gave rise to several migration channels. The 
first one, supervised by the UNHCR and sanctioned by both the Tanzanian and 
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Burundian state, was the process of repatriation of the families and individuals who 
opted to return to Burundi. The second channel comprised the outward migration of 
former refugees to cities and villages across the country. The third, less anticipated 
and less structured, was the movement of Tanzanians into the settlement. In this 
section, I discuss the processes of in-migration of Tanzanians to Ulyankulu and the 
affects it has on former refugees’ understanding of citizenship.  
 
Inward migration of Tanzanians   
 
Over the years, Tanzanians came to the settlement as civil servants, teachers, nurses, 
police officers, administrative officials, and businessmen. Many retired and settled in 
Ulyankulu. Initially, they constituted a very small percentage of Ulyankulu’s 
population. Following the implementation of TANCOSS, however, thousands of 
Tanzanians began to move into the area, and today their number is estimated at around 
12,000 (according to the village chairman of Kaswa village). This is an  estimation, as 
Tanzanians do not register with the settlement administration or the village 
government, and they usually settle clandestinely (although legally they are required 
to report to the Settlement Officer). Many come for business, claiming that 
entrepreneurial opportunities are prolific in the settlement due to the high population 
density. Moreover, according to the incoming Tanzanians, since the refugees obtained 
citizenship, they are more inclined to invest in improving their living conditions in 
Tanzania, which increases their spending capacity.  
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Before naturalisation, there was a law in place in the settlements which held that while 
having visitors, one had to report it to the settlement’s office. This was recalled in 
many interviews, and former refugees spoke about the humiliation that it brought to 
them: ‘It was a constant reminder that we live in a settlement’ (int. 2015). Listing the 
benefits of naturalisation, many people remarked how important it was for them that 
today they do not have to do this anymore, that they live in a space that is open – both 
for them to leave and for the outsiders to enter. These stories often led people to 
emphasise how important was the elimination of boundary control in Ulyankulu and 
how the recent increase in the inward migration of Tanzanians into the area was an 
indication of that transformation.  
 
The key pull factor that motivated many Tanzanians I met to come to Ulyankulu was 
the availability of ‘cheap’ land. Henry, a bicycle fundi (repairman) from Shinyanga 
town, told me one afternoon: ‘I came here because I heard that fertile land was being 
sold cheaply’ (int. 2015). We were sitting in the shadow of his house, drinking soda, 
as he explained how he bought the house and the land that we were looking at from a 
Burundian family that repatriated a few years ago. When he came to Ulyankulu in 
2010, he first stayed at a hostel and the next day met with a man who helped him to 
locate refugee families interested in selling their land.   
 
People’s stories indicate that while coming to the settlement they usually had friends 
or family members living there, or they used the services of a ‘fixer’ – someone who 
knew the area and could help them to access land. In the process of buying land, the 
incoming Tanzanians would first approach the seller and then inform only the 
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authorities at the lowest level – ten-cell leaders or street leaders. An agreement was 
then formulated and signed by all parties involved. Neither the village leader nor the 
Settlement Officer was informed about these transactions. The willingness of 
Tanzanians to engage in land transactions in the settlements functions as an indication 
of their recognition of former refugees’ customary rights to land based on shared 
cultural notions of long-term occupation and productive use of land (as I discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6). What is important here is that although Tanzanians often 
initially arrived temporarily for business purposes, many decided to stay and settle 
down in Ulyankulu.   
 
Crucial in this new migration pattern is how it was received and supported by the 
former refugees. The topic of inward migration of Tanzanians came up in every 
interview and conversation I had, as it was one of the most visible and debated issues 
at the time of my fieldwork. The process of integration between the former refugees 
and incoming Tanzanians should by no means be idealised. As many of the incoming 
Tanzanians are Sukuma pastoralists, conflicts over cattle, pasture, and damaged crops 
are ubiquitous. In the main market, competition for stalls has increased, and 
occasionally one hears rumours that Tanzanians only purchase goods from other 
Tanzanians. At the level of local governance, friction between the different groups 
became part of daily life. However, despite the challenges faced in this process of 
integration, former refugees insist that inward migration of Tanzanians is ‘ultimately 
a good thing’. My interviewees would go out of their way to make sure that my 
research assistant and I understood clearly that regardless of the number of complaints, 
confrontations and disagreements, they appreciate the presence of Tanzanians in the 
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settlement and, overall, the relationship between the groups is constructive. When I 
probed into the reasons behind this narrative, former refugees would tell me that the 
presence of Tanzanians legitimises naturalisation and functions as an evidence of their 
integration with the local communities.   
 
When the inward migration is taken into the picture, citizenship does not only denote 
individuals’ experience of being able to be mobile, to travel [kusafiri] but also means 
living in environments that allow for in-and-out migration of people. The experiences 
and insights of former refugees reveal that mobility is a crucial dimension of 
citizenship and that it stands for having a choice to go but also the choice to stay in an 
open environment. These are not mutually exclusive, rather, they reinforce each other 
and contribute to how former refugees think about citizenship. The benefits of 
mobility, however, are not equally distributed, and in the next section, I turn to the 
limits to mobility. 
 
7.4. The limits to mobility 
 
 
The narratives of former refugees discussed in this chapter strongly resonate with 
arguments of scholars who advocate for recognising and legalising refugees’ mobility 
as a solution to their economic and other livelihood needs (Long, 2010; Long & Crisp, 
2010; Monsutti, 2008). Migration scholars have shown that repatriation and local 
integration involve continued mobility within and across borders (Hammond, 2004; 
Stepputat, 2004; Long, 2010), and humanitarian interventions and immigration policy 
frameworks ‘must adapt to this reality by becoming, respectively, more mobility-and 
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refugee-friendly’ (Long, 2015, p. 1). My research supports the existing scholarship 
and shows that mobility has significant symbolic benefits that go beyond access to 
livelihoods. In the following section, however, I look at immobility as the flip side of 
mobility; discussing the limits of mobility and its ensuing consequences.  
 
Differentiation and immobility in displacement 
 
As I set out in Chapter 3, immobility, or being stuck, is an integral part of displacement. 
As Hammar (2014) shows, not all displacement involves physical removal or forced 
movement away from a particular place. For some people, it may mean various forms 
of what Lubkemann (2008) calls ‘involuntary immobility’. This may entail being 
forced to remain, to be ‘displaced-in-place’ with no ability to move (Jones, 2016). For 
others, it can mean confinement and inability to escape such as in the IDP camps in 
northern Uganda (Finnström, 2008). Finally, in relation to my study, immobility 
comes from simply having no means to move (Lubkemann, 2008).  
 
Lubkemann (2008) strongly argues against the implicit ‘conflation of migration with 
a displacement that currently serves as the definitional point of departure in forced 
migration/refugee studies’ (p. 454). He shows that in the case of Mozambican civil 
war, the focus on wartime migration has rendered invisible people who were not able 
to move and in result suffered a form of ‘displacement in place’. He puts forward an 
argument that paradoxically, migration resulted in forms of empowerment for at least 
some social actors, whereas involuntary immobility was the locus of disruption and 
disempowerment. Consequently, ‘those who suffered most dramatically were not 
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those who fled the country and became refugees or who relocated elsewhere within 
Mozambique (IDPs) but were actually those who were forced to remain ‘in place’ 
within the district throughout the war’s entire fifteen-year span’ (Lubkmann, 2008, p. 
455).  
 
In line with Lubkmann (2008), Omata (2017) has been pointing out to significant 
differentiation in people’s ability to move, access resources, access education, and 
secure livelihoods in displacement. The issue of differentiation among displacees, 
whether in camps or not, is an important point. Already in the 1990s, Allen and Turton 
(1996) warned of the risk of treating displaced populations as if they were a 
homogeneous group without internal differentiation. Displacement is experienced 
differently as mediated by age, gender, marital status, and personal goals. In the case 
of my research, both gender, age and wealth played a crucial role in people’s ability to 
take advantage of the benefits of naturalisation. According to the people I spoke to in 
Ulyankulu, naturalisation has increased the spontaneous and self-organised migration 
out of the settlement, and today more people are leaving Ulyankulu than ever before. 
However, over the months spent in Ulyankulu, it became clear to me that the benefits 
of mobility are by no means equally distributed. 
 
Gender is an obvious and well-documented cleavage regarding who can leave a 
refugee camp (Daley, 2001, p. 256; Sommers, 2001). The same patterns are true in the 
case of Ulyankulu, where men are significantly more likely to migrate individually. 
Young men tend to leave the settlements in higher numbers, and young women usually 
leave for reunification with their partner or parent and in rare cases for further 
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education. There are, of course, exceptions from that norm, and my primary 
interlocutor Mama Alice moved out from the settlement on her own and found a job 
as a secretary at a tobacco company. As she herself asserted, however, her story was 
unusual. Regarding age, all the older adults I interviewed maintained that they 
preferred to stay in the settlement. However, I met a few families that relocated their 
parents to Tabora town so they could be closer to medical facilities (Ulyankulu does 
not have a hospital). Both gender and age were definitely important determinants of 
people’s ability to move from Ulyankulu.  
 
However, the division that was most significant in the context of my research was the 
question of financial resources and connections. Van Hear (2014) has explored class 
as a less studied but equally significant indicator of migratory decisions in refugee 
camps. Class, in this context, is not understood in the conventional, sociological 
Marxist framing where people identify themselves as a certain class to gain resources 
and power from their class identification (Lafferty, 1996). In this analysis, I am using 
class in a broader sense, to reflect wealth, social connections and status. In line with 
Van Hear (2014), I understand class in the context of displacement as defined by the 
different kinds of economic and social resources or ‘capitals’ that people possess. Van 
Hear (2014) suggests that considering class in terms of authority relations and different 
endowments of capital is helpful for shedding light on the functionality of class in 
displacement. Following on these insights, I paid close attention to who does and who 
does not move from the settlements and what are the consequences of mobility and 
immobility.   
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Mobility and class in Ulyankulu 
 
In line with the existing research on migration and class (Van Hear, 2014; Gomes, 
2017; Fathi, 2017) my interviews highlight the correlation between people’s ability to 
move out of the settlements and their access to financial, educational and social capital. 
As a young farmer once told me: ‘Only people who have capital, who have money, are 
moving away from here’ (int. 2015). During my research, I met many people who 
proclaimed that they wish they could leave the settlement, but they cannot afford to 
acquire land outside the settlement and have no skills to find a job.  
 
Aloise, a young owner of a hair salon, told me that the problem with Ulyankulu is that: 
‘Some people have capital, and some don’t, and it is very difficult to acquire capital in 
the settlement. There is a shortage of work here, so people go out, to find capital, but 
then some come back’ (int. 2016). He went to Mwanza, Tabora and Urambo, worked 
as a manual worker for two years, saved up money, and then came back to Ulyankulu 
and opened a hair salon. When we discussed if he faced any problems leaving the 
settlement, he replied: ‘In my family we all got citizenship. We have freedom now; we 
do the same things as other citizens. Before naturalisation I went to school in Tabora, 
you needed a letter, were stopped by the police, they would question you, disturb. Now 
that’s over’ (int. 2016).     
 
The correlation between capital and movement, however, does not mean that all 
wealthier and better-educated individuals are moving out of the settlement. Some 
relatively well-off people decide to remain in the settlement because their business is 
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going well in Ulyankulu or because they find moving stressful. Others, like Aloise, 
find it easier to establish a business in Ulyankulu, where they have a strong social 
network and know their potential customers. Anna, a lady who owns a shop where she 
sells bread in the centre of Ulyankulu told me once: ‘If it continues to be good in the 
settlements, I will stay, if not, I will go, depends on the conditions here’ (int. 2016). 
Thus, having more capital does not necessarily mean that people will leave the 
settlement. Rather, the difference between the wealthier and the more deprived 
members of the community manifests itself in the potentiality of movement, the ability 
to choose. Those who have capital and connections might not decide to leave 
Ulyankulu, but migration is a choice they are privileged to make.  
 
Class does not only determine the initial capacity for migration, but it also determines 
the options available following arrival in urban centres. The types of jobs and 
accommodation refugees can access in cities depend on their initial capital, education, 
and the social connections they have. I met several young people in Ulyankulu who 
returned from Mwanza or Dar es Salaam because ‘life was too expensive’ and ‘they 
could not make it’. During the months of research with the 1972 refugee community 
in Dar es Salaam, most households I visited were struggling to make ends meet, and 
only a handful of families had a family member in a permanent job. I often talked to 
people about their friends and relatives who came from the settlements and live in Dar 
es Salaam, and these conversations indicated that the majority of urban refugees, like 
the majority of other urban poor in Dar es Salaam, struggle to survive. However, 
during my research I was also able to meet a handful of successful and well-off 
members of the Burundian refugee community. Over time, the class divide in the 1972 
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Burundian community became more and more clear to me, revealing a distinct 
separation between the elite and the urban poor refugees and its’ consequences. 
 
Consequences of immobility  
 
Conducting research in Dar es Salaam, I was struck by how many of my informants 
did not yet have citizenship certificates and did not participate in the earlier rounds of 
registration. It was explained to me that when the process was initiated they ‘did not 
trust it’, ‘were concerned that it was a way to discover those living in urban areas’, or 
simply were not informed on time and ‘did not arrive on time for the registration’. As 
the months passed and people realised that the exercise was genuine, they began 
impatiently waiting for the next round of registration. In January 2017, the government 
announced that they are going to do another round of citizenship registration in the 
Old Settlements of Katumba, Mishamo and Ulyankulu. The information was sent to 
the settlements and then disseminated within the urban communities through text 
messages and by word of mouth. People I met received the news with relief and 
excitement, and they began making plans to participate in the registration.  
 
In the process of planning the third registration, the Tanzanian Government consulted 
the elite members of the Burundian community about an opportunity to conduct 
another registration in Dar es Salaam in 201735, but the people consulted argued 
against it. The rationale was that conducting the registration in the city increased their 
 
35 Initially, one of the first rounds of citizenship distribution took place in Dar es Salaam, and many 
people I knew, including my research assistant and primary interlocutors, received their citizenship by 
registering in Dar es Salaam. The second round of registration took place in the settlements.  
 268 
visibility and could put them in danger. These concerns were primarily expressed by 
members of the refugee community who work in government employment or run their 
own businesses. For them, the long and expensive travel to the settlements was a more 
convenient option. Concerns of the more deprived members of the community, who 
were not consulted on the process, differed starkly from the elite members.  
 
The cost of a return bus ticket to Tabora is around 35 USD, whereas a train ticket to 
Katumba and Mishamo is even more expensive. Considering that many households 
have five or more family members, the expenditure amounted for them to more than 
200 USD per family. The majority of the families I interviewed do not have a 
disposable income or savings to pay for the tickets. Moreover, the government did not 
communicate the dates of the exercise clearly and eventually announced the dates only 
ten days before the beginning of the exercise. That left very little time for the families 
to save money and prepare for this major expense. Registration took place while I was 
still doing my research in Dar es Salaam, and I met many individuals and families who 
could not afford to travel to the settlements and in consequence missed the chance to 
register for citizenship.   
 
I met Jacob in a large Pentecostal Church where I did many of my interviews and met 
many people from the Burundian community. Jacob has been in Dar es Salaam for five 
years. His family rents a house from a Tanzanian owner who doesn’t know where they 
come from and he believes they are from Sumbawanga. Jacob has a wife and seven 
children who came with him from the settlement. He has never been to Burundi and 
from the beginning decided that he wants to naturalise: ‘My family is here, the children 
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are at school, they are in government schools which are free now, the schools are better 
here than in Katumba. We have family in Burundi, but I have never been, I would 
never go, I am scared. I want to stay in Dar es Salaam sana sana [Kiswahili very very 
much]’ (int. 2017). As we continued talking, I realised that no one in his family has 
citizenship documents. Jacob’s only job is selling coffee, and he told me that he could 
not afford the train tickets for his family to go to Katumba for registration. ‘Sina 
uwezo’ [Kiswahili for no ability, not being able to, not having capacity], he concluded, 
‘we know it’s very important and we would go, but we just can’t afford it’ (int. 2017).   
 
In a conversation with Albert, a street vendor and a friend of my research assistant, I 
asked him if he knows many people in Dar es Salaam who did not get citizenship. He 
said that most people he knew did not get the documents and also that they will not 
participate in the next registration:  
 
Many people won’t go for the registration now because of hard life and not 
being able to afford the costs of transport. Many. In the past, let’s say a father 
would go with a child, but mother and another small child would stay here 
[during the last exercise]. And remember, that was during Kikwete’s time and 
the economy was better, and people had more cash. So now, many people they 
will miss it. If it was done in Dar es Salaam, we could come more easily  
(int. 2017).  
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As I continued my research, I realised that he was correct, and many households sent 
one person to register for citizenship because they could not afford to pay for tickets 
for the whole family.  
 
My research assistant confirmed these findings, as some of his relatives and friends 
are in a similar position of being unable to go and register for citizenship. Many people 
told me that due to lack of funds only one or two members of the household would 
travel to register for citizenship. Paradoxically, migration to urban centres might 
eventually prevent some of the refugees from accessing citizenship. This tragic 
episode reveals stark division within the 1972 urban community, where more 
influential members advocated for a solution more convenient for themselves, 
subsequently depriving the poorest members of the community of the opportunity to 
register for citizenship.  
 
This episode is of enormous consequence. Humanitarian agencies and governments 
working with refugees/displaced people tend to entirely ignore differentiation and 
devise blanket policies for all displacees (Hammar, 2017). Omata (2013, 2017) 
exposes these dynamics in the context of repatriation of Liberian refugees to Ghana, 
where he shows significant differences in returnees’ capacities to settle in the country 
of origin. Drawing on the evidence, he urges UNHCR to rethink its approach to 
differentiation and to provide tailored assistance, especially for displacees who are 
likely to be exposed to new types of vulnerability following the implementation of 
durable solutions.  
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This argument resonates strongly with the case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania. 
Access to financial, social, and educational capital determined not only people’s initial 
ability to leave the settlement but it also shaped the types of opportunities available in 
urban zones. These opportunities, in turn, structured people’s access to cash and 
capacity to travel back to the settlements for citizenship registration. Among the 1972 
Burundian refugees in Tanzania, the condition of displacement accentuated the 
existing class divide, determining not only people’s access to employment and further 
education but also their access to citizenship. Here, the involuntary immobility 
(Lubkemann, 2008) of urban refugees might deprive them of a chance to apply for 





Although freedom of movement is a right granted to refugees under international 
conventions, in practice, refugees’ movement is monitored and restricted. In the mid-
1980s, the inhabitants of the Old Settlements were considered to be self-sufficient, and 
the international organisations handed over control of the settlements to the Tanzanian 
government. In the absence of other measures of control, control of freedom of 
movement in the Old Settlements became imbued with special significance. Although 
the area was not fenced, and the borders were not clearly defined and policed, leaving 
the settlements without an official permit was linked with potential danger and anxiety. 
The repressive isolation of the settlements and the lack of documentation allowed the 
Tanzanian government to control the movement of the refugees. Thus, in the Old 
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Settlements in Tanzania the lack of documents operated as a symbolic boundary but 
with real disciplining effects.  
 
Despite the strict restrictions imposed on their freedom of movement, Burundian 
refugees from the Old Settlements migrated in large numbers, mostly to urban centres 
of Tabora, Kigoma, Mwanza, Morogoro, and Dar es Salaam. The biggest advantage 
of Burundians in Tanzania is that they can easily blend in with the Tanzanian 
population and that the Tanzanian government only recently began issuing national 
identity cards. A combination of those factors enabled Burundian refugees to live 
outside of the settlements before naturalisation. Despite refugees’ ability to exit and 
enter the settlements, fear and anxiety defined their experience of migration.  
 
Drawing on people’s narratives and my own observations, I argue that with access to 
citizenship documents, the experience of movement in displacement began to change 
from migration to mobility. In this chapter, I outlined an idea of evolving process of 
transition from migration to mobility, where migration denotes movement from point 
A to B with a destination, and mobility, on the other hand, signifies the capacity to 
move without fear and anxiety, to practice freedom of movement with recognition of 
the state and other citizens, and to live in multiple places open to migration. I observe 
that in this understanding of mobility, having autonomy to choose (and that choice 
being recognised by the state) is crucial, and even people who are not (and do not 
intend to) move away from the settlements, underline the importance of having a 
choice to stay or a choice to leave. Mobility, in its expansive sense, becomes a crucial 
marker of citizenship in displacement.  
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The rights to choose (expressed in decisions of mobility) becomes a vehicle for 
claiming substantive citizenship rights. The transition from movement to mobility, 
however, is neither immediate nor linear, and former refugees are aware that it might 
take another generation. In that sense, although mobility carries enormous 
opportunities for the former refugees, many still have to hide their identity and they 
believe that the benefits of mobility will (hopefully) be realised for the next generation. 
The narratives about freedom of movement reveal an underlying temporality of 
citizenship in displacement, where certain rights are withheld for an undetermined 
period; reflecting the proposed tenets of ‘probational citizenship’. Moreover, research 
among the urban refugees in Dar es Salaam has shown that many could not afford to 
travel back to the settlements, and as a result missed the opportunity to register for 
citizenship. This tragic episode revealed a stark class divide in the 1972 community, 
highlighting the importance of social status in who can move and to what effect. With 
a significant percentage of the urban population missing the registration exercise and 
consequently with many families having a close relative or friend who did not receive 
citizenship, the citizenship status of the former Burundian refugees as a group remains 
imbued with uncertainty. In the next chapter, I shift my lens from mobility to the 
materiality of citizenship, exploring further the paradoxical interplay of safety and 





8. The tangible and intangible benefits of citizenship documents 
in displacement   
 
 
When you have a citizenship document, you walk confidently, with your back straight 
(int. 2017, Dar es Salaam). 
 
 
Citizenship is more than a document, but documents become more and more necessary 
to prove and assert one’s formal citizenship. Material and perishable, documents lurk 
behind citizenship status. Although legal status goes far beyond documentation, at the 
same time it relies on the materiality of documents for proof and validation. As the 
recent Windrush scandal36 in Britain has shown, legal status can sometimes depend on 
fragile paperwork and data files that might be destroyed or manipulated (Gayle, 2018). 
Even when people have a right to membership, without documents to prove it, their 
rights can become meaningless (Gordillo, 2006; Lochery, 2012). In the African 
context, biometric identification is on the rise, with major national and international 
stakeholders investing in ID programs across the continent (see Behrends, 2018 on 
Chad; Breckenridge, 2014 on South Africa; Makulilo, 2017 on biometric voter 
identification in Tanzania). As these developments advance globally, identity 
documents become more important for proving one’s membership in the nation-state. 
 
36 The Windrush scandal happened in 2018. It was a British political scandal concerning people who 
were wrongly detained, denied legal rights, threatened with deportation and wrongly deported from 
the UK by the Home Office. Many of those affected had been born British subjects and had arrived in 
the UK before 1973, particularly from Caribbean countries as members of the Windrush generation. 
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The implementation of naturalisation of Burundian refugees needs to be seen against 
that backdrop. 
 
The fieldwork for this research took place during the distribution of citizenship 
certificates and therefore the materiality of documentation played a crucial role in how 
my interlocutors narrated their experience of naturalisation. In this chapter, I show 
how former refugees treat their new citizenship documents in their material form and 
how close attention to these practices reveals an ongoing interplay of safety and 
uncertainty. Following Hammar (2018) and Kelly (2006), I believe that studying and 
looking at citizenship documents and the way people treat, use, and understand them 
can give insights into how they conceptualise citizenship itself. Paying close attention 
to the materiality of naturalisation highlights both the benefits of certification such as 
safety and ability to plan for the future, as well as the new uncertainties and 
vulnerabilities created with access to citizenship documents. 
 
In the past, researchers have shown that people can integrate without access to formal 
citizenship, and that documented citizenship often does not guarantee rights and 
privileges. This analytical approach has been widely applied by scholars researching 
the experiences of migrants and refugees who manage to claim rights despite the lack 
of legal and documented status (see Gasarasi, 1990; Jacobsen, 2017; Polzer, 2012). In 
this chapter, I argue that the case of former Burundian refugees contradicts these 
earlier perspectives, and drawing on the experiences of former Burundian refugees, in 
this chapter I explore the tangible and intangible significance of the materiality of 
citizenship documents in displacement. I argue that in contemporary Tanzania, and 
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many other countries in the world, access to documentation becomes more and more 
crucial for achieving integration even if the people concerned rarely interact with state 
agencies and services.   
 
In this chapter, I evaluate themes of safety, planning for the future, and uncertainty of 
certification. What transpires from analysing how people handle and understand their 
citizenship documents is ambiguous. On the one hand, former refugees see their 
citizenship status as unstable and uncertain. On the other hand, they assert that access 
to citizenship allows them to feel safe and make plans for the future in Tanzania. The 
literature on displacement (El-Shaarawi, 2015; Brun & Fabos, 2015; Horst & Grabska, 
2015; Turner, 2016) shows that the spatial and temporal aspects of uncertainty are 
central to the experiences of conflict-induced displacement, transit, and refugeeness, 
where both ‘radical’ and ‘protracted’ uncertainty is produced. In the final part of the 
chapter, I evaluate how the framing of ‘probational citizenship’ emerges directly from 
the narratives of former refugees, allowing to highlight the relations of power that 
make citizenship meaningful.  
 
8.1. Approaching citizenship through documentation 
 
 
During my fieldwork in Dar es Salaam, I met Francis, a former Burundian refugee and 
a friend of my research assistant. We were sitting drinking soda on the top floor of a 
busy building in Kariakoo market. Following a casual conversation about the weather 
and the traffic in the rainy season, I asked Francis why he opted for Tanzanian 
citizenship and what, if anything, has changed for him since naturalisation. Ignoring 
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my initial question, Francis replied: ‘Do you want to see it?’, and before I could 
respond, he started fumbling around in his pockets, searching for something. Then, he 
pulled out a laminated photocopy, put it on the table, straighten it, and we looked at it 
for a moment, in silence. After that brief encounter, followed by an exchange of smiles, 
the document was folded and hidden away again. It was a photocopy because, as I 
learnt later, people kept the original citizenship documents hidden in places they 
considered safe. As Francis’ told me on another occasion, he keeps the certificate far 
away down the coast from Dar es Salaam with his uncle, ‘who retired and has a nice 
house’ (int. 2017). Starting from this one and other similar encounters, I began paying 
closer attention to how people handle and use their citizenship documents in their 
material form and what insights can be learned from that.   
 
Evans-Pritchard (1950) drew attention to the problematic ways in which documents 
have been disregarded in structural-functionalist anthropology, which established 
participant observation as its privileged method. Thus, although bureaucratic 
documents have been late to come under ethnographic scrutiny (Hull, 2012), they have 
by now received a lot of attention in contemporary anthropology (Kelly, 2006; 
Gordillo, 2006; Gupta, 2012; Lowenkron & Ferreira, 2014). Anthropologists have 
highlighted the need to go beyond documents’ informational and instrumental 
dimension and use documents instead as producers of knowledge and effects (Stoler, 
2009). Overall, the fundamental insight from the literature on documentation is that 
documents are not simply instruments of bureaucratic organisations: they are 
constitutive of rules and the organisations themselves (Hull, 2012).  
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Chhotray and McConnell (2018) explore how identity documents of various types play 
a vital part in certifying and authenticating claims to citizenship. They bring together 
a range of disciplinary perspectives which undermine the notion of citizenship as 
absolute and fixed. Instead, looking closely at identity documents, the contributors 
seek ‘to theorise the very mutable ‘hierarchies’ and ‘degrees’ of citizenship’ (Chhotray 
and McConnell, 2018, p. 111). This approach is particularly productive in contexts 
where displacement or structural discrimination has created uncertain situations for 
individuals who struggle to obtain documents to ‘certify’ their citizenship, as 
Gordillo’s (2006) work on indigenous Argentinians demonstrates. Chhotray and 
McConnell (2018) elaborate on an idea of ‘certification of citizenship’ which is meant 
to capture the role of authority and recognition in the processes of asserting citizenship. 
I find the notion of ‘certification of citizenship’ productive in the context of capturing 
the evolving citizenship in displacement and I return to it in the latter part of this 
chapter.  
 
As Tobias Kelly (2006) writes in the context of Palestinians in the West Bank: ‘The 
forms of legal identification that they hold are central to the life chances of many 
Palestinians, as it is these documents that help determine the ability of the holder to 
move around the West Bank and access rights and resources’ (p. 90). At the same time, 
however, Kelly (2006) shows how identity documents are always partial and unstable, 
generating apprehension and suspicion of forgery. In other words, people gain a 
measure of security through holding the right documents, but simultaneously these 
same documents also mean that ‘their lives are shot through with fear and uncertainty’ 
(Kelly, 2006, p. 90). Kelly concludes that identity documents are an unpredictable and 
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unstable technique of governance, which produces considerable anxiety for all those 
subject to their use.  
 
Drawing on his extensive research in Palestine, Kelly (2006) argues that for many 
people in the region the forms of legal identification they hold are central to their life 
chances. Thus, documents should not be seen anymore as abstract entities, but ‘must 
be understood in the wider institutional and political context in which they are 
produced, verified, and take effect’ (Kelly, 2006, p. 92). Following Kelly’s insights, I 
pay close attention to how people handle and understand their citizenship documents 
in their material form to learn more about how they conceptualise and experience their 
new status. Studying and looking at citizenship documents and the way people treat, 
use, and understand them can give insights into how they conceptualise citizenship 
itself.  
 
8.2. The tangible and intangible consequences of certification 
 
 
Thinking about how former Burundian refugees treat their citizenship documents in 
their material form is grounded in the broader context of rapid roll-out of ID 
documents’ programs across the continent. The increasing importance of biometric 
identification and the awareness of the new dangers of lack of certification have a 
profound effect on how former refugees take care of and use their citizenship 
documents. This section shares stories of how people treat their citizenship documents 
in their material form and what does it tell us about the broader understanding of 
citizenship in the context of displacement.  
 281 
Documented peace of mind 
 
At the various stages of this research project, people I interviewed, when asked 
questions about the process of naturalisation, showed me the photocopy of their 
citizenship document in response to my queries. These encounters then led to more in-
depth conversations about how and when people use their documents, what it means 
to them, what has changed for them following naturalisation and what are their biggest 
concerns. What I observed was that across the urban and rural contexts, people treated 
their documents with outstanding care, always carrying photocopies and keeping the 
original document in places they considered safe, such as houses of well-off relatives 
in other regions of Tanzania or their family homes in the settlements. 
  
The opening conversations about the documents always centred around themes of 
safety and amani (Kiswhali ‘peace’, also used to refer to peace of mind). As Javi, an 
interlocutor who works as a teacher at a vocational school told me many times, 
‘obtaining citizenship certificate brought peace into my heart, before I have lived in 
fear’ (int. 2015). Javi told me that the feelings of insecurity escalated at the time of 
suspension of naturalisation (2010-2014), when it was unclear if following 
naturalisation people will be required to relocate to other parts of Tanzania, allowed 
to remain in the settlements or will the whole exercise of naturalisation be cancelled, 
and everyone will be repatriated to Burundi. It was a very tense time for the Burundian 
refugees, and when certificates were finally distributed, people welcomed it with 
relief. It is important to highlight that the delayed and confusing implementation of 
naturalisation aggravated people’s anxiety.  
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I met Sara, a middle age woman from Ulyankulu, during my first visit to the settlement. 
She was a family member of one of the teachers who assisted me during the first phase 
of my research. I saw her again when I returned to Ulyankulu two years later and I 
found out that she did not receive a certificate in the first round of distribution due to 
an administrative mistake. Sara has a learning disability and was dependent on her 
brother and his family. The relatives were extremely worried that she will be forced to 
repatriate on her own and will not survive in Burundi. Following an intervention from 
the local UNHCR office, Sara received the certificate in the second round of 
distribution one year later. In one conversation at a dinner at her brother’s house, she 
told me: ‘The certificate was important for me because it allows me to be here. When 
the government will do a search, without certificate you will be chased away. Before 
I feared they would chase me away’ (int. 2016).  
 
Both Javi and Sara experienced heightened anxiety regarding the final distribution of 
the citizenship certificates. When they eventually received the document, they told me 
repeatedly that it brought ‘peace to their minds’. What is important in these narratives 
is that people do not speak directly about ‘using’ the document to achieve certain goals 
or access services or opportunities that they could not access before. Rather, the 
majority of the people I met spoke about citizenship documents as protection against 
deportation, as a certification of their right to remain in the settlements or urban areas, 
as a proof of their right to carry on the life they established in Tanzania. As Alida, a 
woman from a remote area of Ulyankulu who managed to convince her husband that 
the family should not repatriate, put it into words: ‘Why are certificates important? 
Because they allow us to stay here, no problems will happen’ (int. 2016). 
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The same perspective was articulated by a young man in a focus group discussion: ‘If 
the police have an inspection, on a bus or in a hostel, looking for some criminals, they 
ask everyone to show ID and if you don’t have you get in trouble’ (int. 2016). When I 
inquired in the group if anyone has ever faced harassment due to lack of 
documentation, people admitted that it happened extremely rarely and none of them 
has ever experienced it personally. They agreed that the reason why it has never 
happened to them is because they are ‘careful’ and ‘know how to lie low’. Moreover, 
they argued, just because it has not happened in the past, it does not mean it will not 
happen in the future. Their narratives show how people gain a measure of security 
through holding citizenship documents. Even if they rarely or never use the documents 
in the sense of showing them to the authorities, the fact of having a citizenship 
certificate ‘brings peace to their minds’.  
 
There is something important to be said about the role of not-using the documents. I 
very rarely heard that someone had to show their naturalisation document unless they 
were applying for a passport. People rarely found themselves in situations where they 
had to use their documents in the sense of legitimising their identity. In fact, the power 
of the document lies in having it rather than actively using it for a specific purpose. 
The ‘peace of mind’ and sense of security described by my interlocutors comes from 
the sheer fact of having a document, which protects them from deportation and allows 
them to begin planning a future in Tanzania. In other words, the newly acquired 
citizenship documents carry essential psychosocial benefits of safety and certainty but 
with real material effects – as in being able to plan, hence invest in, the future. In the 
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next section, I look at the interrelatedness of the material and the psycho-social or 
symbolic value of the documents in displacement.  
 
Building for the future  
 
As Horst and Grabka (2015) show, displaced people often report ‘feeling “stuck” 
between places and in between past and possible future lives’ (p.1), and the case of 
naturalisation of Burundian refugees confirms these observations. The link between 
the inherent uncertainty of exile and the consequences it has on people’ ability to think 
about the future is crucial. In the interviews I conducted in 2014, when the process of 
naturalisation was temporarily suspended, the theme of planning for the future 
dominated many conversations. As one elderly father told me: ‘Life is well, but future 
is a problem, we cannot make long-term plans, how are we supposed to leave this 
world in peace if we don’t know how to prepare our children for the future, this hurts 
us’ (int. 2014). A teacher at a school in Ulyankulu expressed the same perspective: 
‘Elders pass away, they need to make preparations for their children, how are we 
supposed to do that if we don’t know what will happen, we don’t know how to prepare 
our children for the future in this country’ (int. 2014). In the same interview, he 
continued:  
 
People here don’t invest their potential fully, anytime you might be asked to 
leave, what will be our future, our destination, we never know, we live in fear, 
that brings a lot of stress, health problems, for those who are directly facing the 
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problem, they do not even sleep wondering what to do and what will happen 
(int 2014). 
 
This narrative mirrors the main arguments in the existing studies on displacement and 
uncertainty (Brun & Fabos, 2015; Horst & Grabska, 2015; El-Shaarawi, 2015). 
Drawing on cases from Georgia, Jordan, Egypt, Kenya and beyond, the authors 
observe that uncertainty about the future becomes a dominant characteristic of the 
experience of displacement, generating radical and protracted anxiety. They argue that 
it is the expectation that exile should be temporary, combined with the reality of 
protracted uncertainty, which leads to the disquieting experience of living in transit 
(Horst & Grabska, 2015). In my research, I observed that the distribution of citizenship 
certificates marked a point from which former refugees began to think about their 
future in Tanzania in more stable and secure terms. This shift manifested itself in a 
material form as a surge of building and construction activities across the settlement. 
 
The first round of distribution of citizenship certificates in Ulyankulu took place in 
early March of 2015. When I arrived in Ulyankulu a few weeks later, I witnessed a 
major transformation occurring in the settlement – both in spatial and affective ways. 
Following the distribution of the citizenship certificates, the area of the settlement 
began resembling a construction site, with roads being repaired, electricity poles being 
laid out, and a first bank going under construction. Moreover, many individuals and 
families began expanding and improving their existing houses. After the distribution 
of the certificates, people from the settlement and the nearby villages began 
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speculating that the Tanzanian government might even create a new administrative 
district of Ulyankulu37, which will bring further developments to the settlement.  
 
The dreams of development fuelled optimistic and vigorous public debates. The 
interviews I conducted at that time had an overwhelmingly hopeful outlook. As a 
leader of a choir in the Catholic Church told me: ‘Obtaining citizenship certificate 
brought peace into my heart. Before I lived in fear. Now we are free to go anywhere. 
It truly changed a lot’ (int. 2015). Another member of the church remarked: ‘Before 
we feared, now we feel confident’ (int. 2015). These conversations had an underlying 
collective and future-oriented tone. Many of the people I spoke to emphasized that the 
most important aspect is the safety of their children and opportunities that their future, 
as citizens, as Tanzanians, can bring for them. As Mzee Godfrey put it, the most 
important benefit and consequence of naturalisation was that: ‘After my death, my 
children will be living in peace’ (int. 2015).  
 
When citizenship certificates were finally distributed, some of the concerns and 
worries that dominated interviews at the early stages of my research had lost their 
purchase. Following naturalisation, former refugees began to think differently about 
their future, and these new ways of thinking about the future translated in new ways 
of engaging with the present. As already mentioned, the distribution of citizenship 
certificates was followed by vigorous investments in the improvement and 
construction of houses and other structures around the settlement. The extent of these 
 
37 It is a common practice in Tanzania to establish a new district when the population of a particular 
area increases – the aim is to encourage more efficient local governance (Rutinwa 2015).  
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activities was illustrated to me by a visit of a representative from the Institute of Adult 
Education.  
 
Mr Bilia came to Ulyankulu in late 2016 to see the settlement and survey some of the 
schools. I spent a few days with him, and we travelled around the settlement, visited 
different villages, and shared meals and interesting conversations. Before he left for 
Dar es Salaam, he told me:  
 
When I came here, I was wondering why, why, if people have money here as 
I hear, why the houses look so poor here. But then, that village chairman of 
Ikonongo told me that people only started building now, before they were 
scared. This was because they didn’t know how long they will be allowed to 
stay here. But now that they know, they buy piki piki [motorcycles], they build 
houses (int. 2016).  
 
The same observation was made by my research assistant, who grew up in Katumba 
settlement, but lives in Dar es Salaam and has not been back in the settlements for over 
a decade: ‘What I think is one of the advantages of people obtaining citizenship 
certificates’, he said, ‘is that now people started building nice houses. Before they 
feared, any time they could be returned to Burundi, but now they have started’ (int. 
2016). The energy with which people committed themselves to improve their 
livelihoods in the settlement was visible even to the outsiders.  
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These practices echo Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach, which suggests that the 
various kinds of resources that people need for survival should never be seen as goals 
in their own right. Rather, they are needed to achieve certain functionings broadly 
defined as ‘the various things, a person may value doing or being’ (Sen, 1999, p. 75). 
The potential functionings are unlimited, and they range ‘from very basic ones, such 
as being sufficiently nourished or having access to adequate housing, to complex ones, 
such as having self-respect or being able to participate in society’ (Pfister, 2012, p. 
242). Following this line of reasoning, the push for building and construction in 
Ulyankulu has been triggered by naturalisation, and it symbolises people’s ability to 
finally imagine and invest in a future in Tanzania.  
 
As I discussed in Chapter 6, the Settlement Officer has made attempts to ban and 
control the rise in construction projects across the settlement by introducing a building 
ban. Former refugees and Tanzanians living in the area, however, kept defying the ban. 
I argue that people’s commitment to improving their houses in the settlement 
following naturalisation is an indication that access to formal citizenship 
documentation allows people to make constructive decisions about their future, which 
in turn manifest itself in more active engagement with the present. Despite the 
obstacles and the vague prohibitions coming from the settlement’s office, people 
focused their energy on improving their surroundings following naturalisation.  
 
These processes highlight the material and symbolic implications of having or not 
having legal documentation. The initiation of construction projects in the settlements 
demonstrates that formalisation of status allows people to make decisions and 
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participate in activities which foster their integration in the host country. What is 
important, however, is that access to documents provided a sense of safety and 
security, and only then these feelings opened spaces for more engagement and 
investment in the present. In Sen’s (1999) terminology, building and construction can 
be seen here as functioning and ability to plan for the future in Tanzania is a capability. 
In the next section I show how despite the productive impact that certification has on 
people’s abilities to invest and plan for the future, it simultaneously generates feelings 
of uncertainty.  
 
The fragility of certification  
 
Mzee Godfrey and his wife Eliza are an elderly couple living in a neat, centrally 
located house in Ulyankulu surrounded by a small vegetable garden. They do not farm 
anymore due to their old age and they rely on support from their children. I got to 
know them well during the years of fieldwork, and the last time I saw them, they told 
me over a meal: ‘We use the certificate only when we need to travel. Otherwise, it 
stays inside, we were told we wouldn’t get another one if we lose this one, so we take 
good care of it’ (int. 2016). When I asked if I could see their certificates, I discovered 
that they laminated them, placed them into neat school folders and hidden away in 
boxes. To the couple, the possibility of losing the certificate causes major distress, and 
safeguarding it is a major source of anxiety. For them, the biggest fear is what would 
happen if their house burns and they lose the citizenship certificates. As my research 
progressed, I discovered that they were not an isolated case and that there were 
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complex and profound reasons behind people’s anxiety about losing or damaging their 
documents.  
 
In a focus group discussion with the village government in Keza, one of the most 
vibrant and outspoken villages on the outskirts of Ulyankulu, one participant 
remarked:  
 
We were told that if we lose the certificate if it burns, there is a fire at home, 
or whatever, we will have to pay 700,000 TZS [almost USD 300]. Until when 
will that be like this? Until when do we have to move around with that copy 
and guard these certificates? It does not seem fair (int. 2016).  
 
This topic was picked up by other people in the group, and they discussed it at length. 
What emerged from that discussion was that people are aware that at least in theory, 
they will remain Tanzanian citizens even in the event of losing or damaging the 
certificate. However, in practice, requesting a replacement of the certificate means 
spending an unimaginable sum of money, travelling to Dar es Salaam, and navigating 
a complicated and intimidating administrative system, which is all out of their reach 
due to educational and financial barriers.  
 
Former refugees living in urban areas expressed similar fears. Francis, whom I 
introduced at the beginning of this chapter, keeps his original citizenship document 
with his uncle who lives at the coast (Pwani region) because he does not think that the 
document is ‘safe enough’ in his rental room in Dar es Salaam. His story illustrates 
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many spheres where safety and uncertainty overlap. On the one hand, he believes that 
access to documentation offers him safety from deportation and harassment, and he 
explained to me that having the documents made him feel more secure living in the 
city. On the other hand, he does not completely trust the people and surroundings in 
which he lives. His fear stems from multiple sources. He is scared of what would 
happen if someone found his certificate and discovered that he comes from a refugee 
settlement. At the same time, he also fears that if he needs to change accommodation 
or gets robbed, his certificate might get lost or stolen, and that could put him in 
potential danger in the future. Weighing and considering his options, he decided to 
keep the certificate with his uncle hundreds of kilometres away from where he lives. 
In that way, he ameliorates the risks, and carrying only the copy of his certificate 
provides him with sufficient protection. 
 
At the heart of these narratives is an implicit tension related to the notion of 
certification. On the one hand, certification of citizenship (Chhotray & McConnell, 
2018) implies certainty and security facilitated by the established authorities. On the 
other hand, the certainties projected through holding ID documents are far from fixed 
and secure. As Hammar (2018) observes, ‘holding or ‘owning’ such documents is not 
always secure in itself: in precarious conditions, these may be lost, stolen, destroyed 
or confiscated’ (p. 241). Like Palestinians in the West Bank (Kelly 2006), former 
Burundian refugees assign both values of security and anxiety to the newly obtained 
documents. In the Palestinian-Israeli context, accusations of forgery as well as mistrust 
towards the types of documentation carried by Palestinians are the source of anxiety. 
In the case of Tanzania, however, former refugees report that the authorities respect 
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their new documents. The source of anxiety, in this context, comes from the belief that 
citizenship might be arbitrarily ‘taken away’, as well as from a related fear of what 
would happen if one accidentally loses one’s citizenship documents. Simultaneously, 
however, obtaining citizenship documents and the legal status that comes with it is for 
many an invaluable source of recognition and safety. 
 
Therefore, citizenship documents that former refugees so scrupulously guard are equal 
to citizenship because for the people concerned, losing the original documents is 
equivalent to losing citizenship. The existing studies in anthropology suggest that 
people can value documents to the ‘point of seeing them as objects whose potency 
emanates from their materiality rather than from social relations and conventions’ 
(Gordillo, 2006, p. 163). This perception does not adequately reflect the case of the 
former Burundian refugees in Tanzania. People I worked with indeed see citizenship 
documents as objects whose value derives from their materiality, but not because they 
do not understand that the document is a symbol of social relations and conventions. 
Rather, their care and reverence for the documents come from an acute awareness that 
in case of the certificates’ loss or damage they might not be able to replace them. The 
scrupulous ways in which people handle their citizenship documents are embedded in 
purely pragmatic concerns, as losing the document for many might equal losing the 
only proof of their citizenship. Seen in the political context of the rapid roll-out of ID 
programs in Tanzania, their concerns are pertinent. Whenever I asked my interlocutors 
about the hypothetical consequences of losing one’s naturalisation document, my 
questions were always met with solemn silence. In the following, I show how close 
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attention to how people speak about and use their citizenship documents exposes the 
new vulnerabilities generated in the process of certification. 
 
8.3. Certification and the new vulnerabilities   
 
In this section, I look at how the process of naturalisation and certification of 
citizenship has produced new vulnerabilities. Although the majority of the former 
refugees received their certificates, over a thousand applicants were rejected and 
currently remain in limbo, without access to either Burundian or Tanzanian 
citizenship. Other people never registered for naturalisation in the first place but 
remained in Tanzania. Moreover, some of the repatriates returned from Burundi and 
are now living in Tanzania, but they are not permitted to register for naturalisation. 
Taking the lens of the materiality of citizenship documents, I explore how these 
vulnerabilities were created, developed, and what effects they have on the lives of the 
people concerned.     
 
‘Pending cases’  
 
As discussed in the Introduction, one of the reasons behind the delay in the distribution 
of citizenship certificates was the decision of the Minister of Home Affairs (Lawrence 
Masha) to grant citizenship in an individual ‘fast track’ procedure rather than by a 
Presidential Decree to all refugees as a group. The ‘expedited’ procedure followed an 
individual screening but simplified some of the regular existing procedures and 
requirements that individuals who apply for naturalisation in Tanzania need to 
conform to. The idea behind this approach was to simultaneously mitigate negative 
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public opinion that citizenship is given away without screening and to establish a 
feeling among the refugees that Tanzanian citizenship is something they need to 
qualify for. As the report by Nordic Consulting Group (2010) reveals, due to shortages 
of resources, trained staff, and resistance among the local officials, almost half of the 
applicants were simply rejected by the local officials at a certain point in the process. 
The report (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010) argues that the rejections were 
speculative and not legally valid (p. 36). In order to address this issue, UNHCR has 
assisted MOHA by providing an electronic database to allow the ministry to categorise 
the different reasons for rejection. After that was completed, it was agreed that 
rejection on the grounds of being accused of ‘poaching, without evidence, trial, 
conviction, was not considered a valid reason for rejection’ (Nordic Consulting Group, 
2010, p. 36). At the time of my research (2016), I was told by a local UNHCR official 
that across the three settlements over 1,200 applicants remained in the rejected 
category.  
 
The existence of these ‘pending case’ played an important role in people’s 
understanding of citizenship as it generated suspicions and rumours around why 
certain people’s applications were rejected and what does that say about the security 
of citizenship status for those who received the documents. If the state can arbitrarily 
deny some people’s applications, can it also arbitrarily take people’s citizenship away? 
In conversations, people expressed their suspicion and disbelief by citing cases they 
heard of and could not comprehend. One story I heard many times was of a small child 
that had his citizenship denied on the ground that he was accused of poaching. Another 
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story was of a leader of a popular woman choir at a Pentecostal Church, who had her 
application denied while everyone else in her family received the certificates.  
 
I did not intend to dig deeper and uncover the truth behind these stories. What was 
more important to me was the impact that the existence of ‘pending cases’ and rejected 
applications had on how people spoke about their citizenship status in uncertain terms. 
In other words, the presence of outwardly innocent people who did not receive their 
citizenship documents was a physical reminder of the ambiguous and uncertain 
implementation of TANCOSS. The situation where some people have received 
citizenship certificates and others haven’t, created a new differentiation, a new 
boundary between the various members of the community which manifested itself in 
real, material form of documentation. Neighbours and relatives who all lived with a 
refugee status for decades are now facing a new distinction based on people’s access 
(or lack of thereof) to citizenship documents.  
 
People who had their applications rejected came to me for advice and support, hoping 
that as a white researcher I will be able to help them navigate the difficult terrain of 
Tanzanian bureaucracy. I tried to explain my lack of power in the process of granting 
naturalisation but I directed people to the right channels of authority and put them in 
touch with people who were able to help them file their appeals. In Ulyankulu 
settlement, due to the presence of a supportive UNHCR officer, many people were 
assisted in requesting reconsideration of their application. I was unable to follow up 
on people’s situations myself, but according to my research assistant, in late 2018 
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many people who applied for naturalisation remain without citizenship certificates. 
Another group that faces similar problems are the returning repatriates. 
 
Returning repatriates  
 
Returning repatriates are people from the Old Settlements who indicated an intention 
to repatriate and either repatriated and returned from Burundi or changed their mind 
and remained in Tanzania. In the database, they are registered as repatriates and are 
not allowed to re-register for naturalisation. During fieldwork in 2015, I met a family 
whose grandmother repatriated to Burundi with one of her sons. She said she did not 
know what was happening, but she saw people fleeing from the north, and so she took 
the grandchildren and returned to Ulyankulu. The UNHCR found out about her 
presence and declared that it was going to transport her and the children to the new 
camps close to Kigoma (Nyaragusu camp). She and the grandchildren were not 
permitted to reside in Ulyankulu, because they opted for repatriation, and this decision 
was not reversible. Yet asked if she wants to go back to Burundi when peace comes, 
the woman replied: ‘No, I prefer to stay, I do not want to go back again. They told us 
there was peace and safety to return to last time, and you see now’ (int. 2015). Every 
single person I interviewed in Ulyankulu knows someone with a similar story, 
someone who repatriated to Burundi, and now fled again to Tanzania because of to the 
current events.  
 
Some of the returning repatriates live in the settlements with their families, whereas 
others settled in villages and cities beyond the settlements. As a neighbour of my 
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research assistant told me in one conversation: ‘They [the repatriates] went to Burundi, 
faced serious problems there, those who had enough money could buy their house from 
current owners, others struggled. Now many of them are coming back; they are hiding, 
some of them here, some in other regions. They need protection’ (int. 2015). Similar 
views were expressed by a bicycle repairman whom I befriended in the central market 
of Ulyankulu. I often cycled in the settlement and had to fix my bike many times at his 
workshop. He was a Sukuma pastoralist but resided in Ulyankulu and ran a profitable 
bicycle business. In one conversation, he explained to me: 
 
Yes, some of the repatriates are coming back now, there is war in Burundi. 
Yes, they do. I know three who came back and were imprisoned. They are now 
in the arrest. Minister of Home Affairs warned that the ones to host and hide 
them would be held responsible too. I have neighbours, his parents repatriated, 
many old people repatriated, but now you see them here again (int. 2015).   
 
Together with my research assistant, we decided that meeting with these people could 
draw attention and expose them, and therefore he conducted the majority of the 
interviews with the repatriates on his own. The interviews revealed that people who 
indicated a wish to repatriate but eventually remained in Tanzania or repatriated to 
Burundi and then returned to Tanzania, are desperate to register for citizenship and are 
trying to find ways to make that possible by registering under new names in different 
settlements. As my research assistant reported: ‘They don’t have citizenship because 
they returned to Burundi. They are thinking about changing their names to access 
citizenship certificates in Tanzania. They could change their names by registering at 
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another village here in Ulyankulu or in Katumba’. Interviews conducted by my 
research assistant indicated that many returnees believe that establishing a secure 
future in Tanzania depends on access to documentation. Their risky and illegal tactics 
of trying to secure citizenship highlight the importance of citizenship certificates.  
 
The precarious situation of the returning repatriates strongly influences how former 
refugees conceptualise their evolving citizenship. People I spoke to often juxtaposed 
the value of their newly acquired citizenship with the unsafe situation in Burundi (as 
discussed in Chapter 6 in relation to land access). In these narratives, memories of the 
past are intertwined with contemporary events, giving an explanatory power to the 
current protests in Burundi. In that context, former refugees perceive their new 
citizenship documents as a symbol of security, both in terms of physical safety and the 
ability to plan for the future. Thus, the conceptualisation of citizenship in displacement 
is developed in relation to the uncertain situation in Burundi and the precarious 
situation of the returnees. It is a paradoxical context where we can observe a ‘gradation 
of uncertainty’ regarding citizenship status. Naturalised refugees face many 
insecurities and anxieties regarding their status, however they underline that their 
circumstances are considerably better than those of those who did not obtain the 





Marginalised urban refugees  
 
Finally, a large proportion of urban poor refugees did not get a chance to register for 
citizenship due to lack of access to information and financial limitations as discussed 
in Chapter 7. Urban refugees were initially apprehensive towards the citizenship 
registration, as they assumed that it was just a coax to identify the urban refugees and 
return them to the camps. As one interlocutor told me: ‘We didn’t trust that we will 
receive citizenship the first time when it was announced. You know Tanzanian 
Government, they say one thing, do another, we just did not trust’ (int. 2017). 
However, three years later when their family members, friends and relatives received 
the actual citizenship certificate, people became eagerly waiting for an opportunity to 
register. Unable to pay for transportation for all family members, only a few registered 
for citizenship. As I have shown in Chapter 7, the condition of displacement 
accentuated the existing class divide, determining not only people’s access to 
employment and further education but also depriving some of the opportunity to apply 
for citizenship. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I introduce a short caveat about Francis. As we 
continued speaking on other occasions, I found out that Francis’ wife, Cecilia, does 
not have citizenship documents. Francis told me that he met her when he went to visit 
his parents and siblings who repatriated to Burundi: ‘When I went to visit my family 
in Burundi, it was about three years ago, that’s where I met my wife and I married her 
there. Her family repatriated, but after we got married, we went back to Tanzania. She 
doesn’t have any documents’ (int. 2017). Cecilia was born in Ulyankulu settlement. 
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However, although she was born in Tanzania, she can’t register for citizenship because 
she opted to repatriate earlier with her family and that decision is not reversible. 
Francis told us that he understands that the documents are very important, and he tried 
to get them for his wife. He communicated with authorities both in her village in 
Ulyankulu and in his village in Katumba: ‘I failed, I asked people in the village if she 
can be registered for citizenship now, but they say no because she was on the list of 
those who repatriated’ (int. 2017).  
 
Francis was already naturalised when they got married, and the couple never faced any 
problems with the immigration officers or police, but they are concerned it might 
change in the future: ‘I don’t know how things will be in the future and that worries 
me’ (int. 2017). His last question, whenever we talked, was always about his wife, 
asking if my research assistant or I could help her in any way. He also asked my 
research assistant what he recommends for them to do and if there are any other 
documents she could obtain and use for protection. My research assistant told me that 
he knew of many other marriages that faced similar challenges.  
 
These pockets of incomplete registration for naturalisation generated new 
vulnerabilities, creating subgroups of refugees who for one reason or another did not 
register for citizenship and/ or did not receive their certificate. In the current volatile 
context of Tanzanian immigration politics (as discussed in Chapter 2), the lack of 
certification might lead in the worst scenario to imprisonment or deportation. For 
others, it might limit their access to higher education and formal employment. For 
many, however, it will mean that they will also be deprived of the less tangible benefits 
 301 
of certification, including increased sense of safety, peace of mind, and the ability to 
plan for the future. These indirect but fundamental ‘capabilities’ that come with 
naturalisation will be withheld from the marginalised groups discussed above.  
 
8.5. The evolving experience of ‘probational citizenship’   
 
 
What emerges from paying close attention to how people treat their documents is an 
inherent instability at the core of their conceptualisation of citizenship. On the one 
hand, the interviews conducted following distribution of the certificates indicate that 
people equate citizenship with safety and security. On the other hand, many of my 
interviewees expressed doubts about the security of their citizenship status, pointing 
towards the prolonged waiting for the distribution of the citizenship certificates and 
incomplete incorporation of the settlements into the Tanzanian government structure. 
As months passed, it became clear that the district of Ulyankulu will not be created, 
that land governance remains unclear, and that the settlement’s office remains in place. 
The high number of cases of people whose citizenship applications were rejected or 
who did not manage to register for citizenship further increased uncertainty 
surrounding the extent of naturalisation.  
 
When I was completing the last stages of fieldwork in 2017, a notion of ‘probational 
citizenship’ emerged in many interviews, often in forms of questions, doubts, and 




People still don’t believe if the citizenship is for real - we are given 5 years of 
the integration period, and there are many rights we can’t access. For example, 
we can’t own land. Also, there are rumours that if you don’t behave, you will 
be taken back - in seminars run by the government they told us that we are 
under probation period […] If we don’t show good traces, they will take our 
citizenship away. So do we have rights or not? (int. 2017). 
 
This narrative has been perpetuated by the authorities, including the Settlement Officer 
as well as the government officials who ran the initial seminars about naturalisation. 
In one interview, the head of the UNHCR mission in Ulyankulu said to me that 
according to the citizenship act: ‘Any citizenship given by naturalisation can be taken 
away… It happened to two people here already. It’s all a matter of security, if the state 
feels that someone is a danger for the country, they can take their citizenship away’ 
(int. 2017). This stipulation became well-known in the settlement and people would 
often ask me if it is true. In the final weeks of my fieldwork, the notion of ‘probation’ 
became the theme of many discussions and debates in Ulyankulu. My research 
assistant agreed with my observations, saying: ‘People still don’t trust the citizenship 
provided. We are told we are under probation and if we are not seen fit, they will take 
it away from us’ (int. 2017).  
 
Drawing on the narratives of the people I met, I developed a concept ‘probational 
citizenship’ to capture the temporality, uncertainty and ongoing struggles for 
recognition in displacement. The meaning of probation links to two interrelated 
discussions. On the one hand, probation links to practices of assessing, judging, 
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valuing. Here, the question is who can be put on probation and how, by whom, and to 
what effect. The conversations with former refugees reveal that they believe that they 
were put on probation by the government. The probation period indicates that they will 
be judged based on their behaviour and qualities. It is unclear, however, where this 
assessment comes from, who is assessing them and how, how long this ‘trial period’ 
will last, and what will be the consequences.  
 
This brings me to the second, performative meaning of probation. Being on probation, 
as a condition and as a state of mind, stands for uncertainty and insecurity. The 
condition of probation is characterised by radical temporality as the time on probation 
is uncertain, there is no evident end-date, it can be extended or might lead to unwanted 
or tragic consequences. The framing of ‘probational citizenship’ also highlights the 
relations of power that make citizenship meaningful. ‘Probational citizenship’ implies 
uneven power relations where an authority in power is able to limit the scope of rights 
and evoke feelings of temporality and uncertainty. Power, in the framing of 
‘probational citizenship’, is exercised precisely through the uncertain duration, 
boundaries and conditions of ‘probational citizenship’.  
 
To summarise, from the perspective of former refugees the process of naturalisation is 
characterised by a continuous interplay of anxiety and security. In a sense, the 
recognition given by the state (in the form of naturalisation and distribution of 
citizenship certificates) is key to generating a sense of security. At the same time, the 
state’s actions (such as initial suspension of naturalisation, pending applications) 
undermine the faith people have in the recently distributed citizenship. It is an 
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ambiguous reality, where citizenship is ‘probational’, but at the same time, it provides 





In my fieldwork, former refugees often relied on the materiality of citizenship to 
support their narratives and explain their perspective on naturalisation. Materiality of 
citizenship became important both in literal sense, as people showed me the 
photocopies of their documents to mediate their stories, as well as in a broader, 
metaphorical sense, where many discussions about naturalisation evolved around who 
received and who did not receive the citizenship certificate. These discussions often 
focused on people whose applications were rejected on seemingly arbitrary basis, 
which stirred debates about the validity of the new citizenship status even for those 
who already received it. Throughout the research, I paid close attention to how former 
refugees spoke about and treated their citizenship documents in their material form.  
 
Through conversations and observations of these practices, I came to realise that 
possession of citizenship documents brought simultaneously a sense of safety and an 
increased sense of anxiety. On the one hand, people treat their documents with 
profound care and maintain that access to legal documentation eliminated the fear of 
deportation and allowed them to begin planning and investing in a long-term future in 
Tanzania. On the other hand, however, people’s inability to reapply for the citizenship 
documents in the case of loss or damage generated further fear and anxiety. Although 
former refugees know that their citizenship goes beyond the material form of the 
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documents, they are scared that if they lose their only proof of citizenship, they might 
not be able to afford to have it reissued. The consequence of that scenario, especially 
for the less privileged and affluent members of the community, equates to losing the 
citizenship status itself. Moreover, ‘certification’ of citizenship has created a sub-
group of refugees who were rejected or unable to apply for citizenship in the first place, 
and thus face new vulnerabilities.  
 
The interplay of safety and uncertainty evident in former refugees’ treatment of their 
new documents highlights the inherent contradictions in how they conceptualise 
citizenship itself. What emerges from these narratives and observations is a notion of 
‘probational citizenship’. Temporarily fixed and aspirational in nature, ‘probational 
citizenship’ is conferred but not quite realised; it comes with recognised legal status, 
but it remains uncertain. The underlying conditions and boundaries of ‘probational 
citizenship’ are unclear, and the recipients believe that their status can be arbitrarily 
withdrawn. Thus, although naturalisation has brought undisputable benefits to the 
1972 Burundian community in Tanzania, the aftermath of this policy is riddled with 
continuous uncertainty. In that sense, looking at the materiality of citizenship 
documents helps to see the broader and less tangible challenges people face in 









In 2007, the Government of Tanzania and the Government of Burundi in partnership 
with the the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) adopted the 
Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy (TANCOSS). TANCOSS offered a 
choice between repatriation and naturalisation to 220,000 Burundian refugees and their 
families who had been living in three rural settlements in Western Tanzania 
(Ulyankulu, Katumba and Mishamo) since 1972. It was an unprecedented intervention 
and it garnered international attention and support (Milner, 2014). Initially, obtaining 
citizenship was meant to be conditional on relocation away from the refugee 
settlements. This plan, however, was renounced, and ultimately those who opted for 
citizenship were permitted to remain on the land of the settlements. Having been given 
a choice between repatriation and naturalisation, 79% (171,629) of people opted for 
naturalisation, whereas 21% (45,547) decided to return to Burundi (TCRS, 2012). 
This thesis shows that naturalisation was implemented incompletely, leaving issues of 
land governance, political incorporation and processing of all applications unresolved. 
Although legally Tanzanian citizens, the inhabitants of the settlements remain isolated 
from the development projects provided by the local government, they have no 
political representation, and their access to land – the main source of livelihood for 
many – remains unrecognised. At the same time, due to their new citizenship status, 
they are no longer a concern of the international community and are outside of the 
mandate of the UNHCR. This responsibility gap renders former refugees politically 
vulnerable and uncertain about the extent of their rights. A genuine concern for the 
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future of the people who shared their stories with me shaped the direction and the 
content of this research. 
Drawing on long-term ethnographic fieldwork, this thesis makes an important 
contribution to the understanding of citizenship in a context of displacement, bringing 
to light the complexity of evolving citizenship for those who are long-term displacees. 
This is achieved by bringing together a combination of the key aspects of citizenship 
in a context of displacement and settlement, which are not often addressed at the same 
time, namely: political representation, land, mobility and materiality of citizenship. 
Rather than deconstructing the concept of citizenship itself, the thesis explores how 
experiences and priorities of the displacees can shift and alter the established elements 
and understanding of citizenship. Importantly, this research moves the emphasis away 
from a technocratic approach to ‘refugee caseloads’ and ‘solutions to displacement’. 
Instead, it addresses a much deeper set of questions about citizenship among displaced 
people being a complex, multi-layered, multi-spatial and multi-temporal process.  
This thesis demonstrates that the decision of thousands of Burundian refugees to opt 
for Tanzanian citizenship was a courageous statement indicating people’s desire to 
establish safe and stable livelihoods in Tanzania. The incomplete implementation of 
naturalisation, however, undermined people’s aspirations, stirring up anxiety among 
an already scarred and marginalised population. In this concluding chapter, I bring 
together the empirical, methodological and conceptual contributions made in this 
thesis. Building on these contributions, I suggest that the concept of ‘probational 
citizenship’, developed through the narratives and experiences of former Burundian 
refugees, has relevance and significance in the wider, global context. 
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9.1. Research contributions 
 
 
Identifying a responsibility gap 
 
 
TANCOSS has initially been applauded for being a progressive and promising 
‘solution’ to displacement. It was meant to become a blueprint for other similar 
protracted displacement situations, offering a way out from the long-term impasses. 
The design and implementation of the policy, however, did not match the expectations. 
Due to the rapidly changing priorities of the international development industry and 
the bulk of the funding being redirected to other (more pressing) emergencies, as well 
as the political changes within the Tanzanian Government, TANCOSS has been side-
lined both in international and national context. Initially, the third pillar of TANCOSS 
outlined plans for resettlement of naturalised refugees. This proposal led to major 
disagreement between the different stakeholders, with the local governments refusing 
to host the new citizens and the international organisations viewing relocation as 
another layer of displacement. Ultimately, the plans for relocation were discontinued. 
The crux of the problem, however, was not the discontinuation of the resettlement 
pillar of TANCOSS but the absence of an alternative plan for local integration.  
Only in 2016, almost a decade since the initial inception of TANCOSS, the Tanzanian 
Government with the support of UNHCR and the World Bank drafted the Tanzania 
Strategy for the Local Integration Programme for New Citizens (TANSPLI). 
TANSPLI outlined ambitious goals. It has envisioned investments in degazetting the 
area, improving the infrastructure and engaging international stakeholders in a variety 
of projects. By the late 2018, the programme has not yet been launched and 
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consequently, the response by humanitarian and development actors has been very 
low. This has created a responsibility gap, where neither the government nor the 
international organisations which have initiated and initially backed TANCOSS feel 
responsible for investing in changing the local governance system, clarifying land 
ownership rights for the new citizens, and creating opportunities for further social and 
political integration of the area. Instead, the document of TANSPLI was put on a shelf 
and the new citizens remain in limbo; legally Tanzanian citizens but constrained by 
the arbitrary laws of camp governance. The lack of plans and investments in the post-
naturalisation integration processes created a responsibility gap, leading to an unclear 
transition from camp governance to local governance.  
From camp to local governance  
 
 
Although a lot has been written about refugees’ political organisation in camps not 
much attention has been given to a post-camp scenario, in which refugees access 
citizenship. The case of naturalisation of Burundian refugees in Tanzania allowed for 
contributing to these debates, bringing attention to the significance of active and 
participatory elements of citizenship status in displacement. In Chapter 5, I explained 
that although the new citizens were permitted to vote in national elections and join 
political parties, the Settlement Officer remained as the highest authority in the 
settlement. For many people, his arbitrary presence and the unrelenting display of 
power signify the incompleteness of the naturalisation process.  
It is clear from the literature on democracy and civic engagement in Africa that 
struggles for recognition go beyond electoral participation and that the right to vote 
does not immediately bestow other rights and privileges. The former refugees I met in 
 311 
Ulyankulu were acutely aware of these limitations and they strove to gain political 
voice and representation within and outside the settlement, despite the structural 
obstacles in place. Their efforts to assert political representation, however, were 
unsuccessful - they were permitted to vote but remained excluded from running for 
office. They are voters, but not yet citizens. This has had broader implications, as the 
systematic exclusion from politics has led former refugees to question the validity of 
their new status. 
Accessing land in displacement 
 
 
Linked to the exclusion from local politics and the continued presence of the 
Settlement Officer is the unclear and uncertain terrain of land rights for the new 
citizens. Burundian refugees in Ulyankulu have been granted access to land for 
housing and cultivation within the designated area of the settlement and over the past 
four decades they have established customary ownership of that land which is 
recognised by Tanzanians from the nearby areas. Over the years, many Tanzanians 
moved into the settlement and together with the refugees they established a 
functioning, albeit enclosed, land tenure system. Access to land became one of the key 
reasons why many of the Burundian refugees opted for Tanzanian citizenship and 
consequently it became crucial in people’s conceptualisation of citizenship.  
I observed how the established framework of autochthony, which dominates the 
literature on land access in contexts of migration and displacement, does not capture 
the complexities of this particular context. As Chapter 6 demonstrated, due to the 
specific history and governance of this area, autochthonous claims to the land in 
Ulyankulu are absent. Instead, the former refugees seek recognition of their rights 
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based on the long-term productive use of the land, land transactions with local 
Tanzanians, and engagement in land disputes. I suggest that the strategies that former 
refugees employ indicate that people are trying to convert land access, which they have 
enjoyed for decades, into land rights. Access to citizenship documents increased 
people’s sense of entitlement to the land in Tanzania, and it generated new 
opportunities and new avenues for claim-making. At the same time, however, the 
state’s engagement in the area following naturalisation has destabilised the previous 
tenure system, creating new uncertainties.  
From movement to mobility 
 
 
The next crucial marker of citizenship in displacement examined in this thesis was 
mobility. If land is the most immobile and tangible marker of citizenship, mobility is 
definitely more elusive and less researched. The existing studies have shown that 
mobility allows for access to a range of benefits and opportunities and as such it can 
be promoted as a fourth solution to displacement (Long, 2014). The evidence shows, 
however, that the right to freedom of movement for migrants and refugees is 
constrained by national regulations (Maple, 2016). In result, refugees are often 
confined within the designated camps and many break the law and migrate illegally in 
search of work, livelihoods, education and other opportunities.  
Using Sen’s (1999) Capabilities Approach, in Chapter 7 I defined mobility as a 
fundamental capabilities-enhancing freedom itself. Mobility, in the stories of my 
informants, is a key marker of citizenship and it stands for the capacity to move freely 
without fear and anxiety, to have one’s movement recognised by the state and other 
citizens, and to have the right and the choice to live in multiple places. An important 
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findings here was that in this expansive understanding of mobility, having autonomy 
to choose (and that choice being recognised by the state and other citizens) is crucial, 
and even the people who do not intend to move away from the settlements underline 
the importance of having a choice to stay or a choice to leave. Mobility, as ability to 
choose different livelihoods, becomes a crucial marker of citizenship in the narratives 
of the former refugees. The benefits of mobility, however, are not evenly distributed, 
and in Chapter 7 I critically examined how class and wealth differentiation impacted 
former refugees’ ability to take advantage of the opportunities created by 
naturalisation. 
Materiality of citizenship 
 
 
Thousands of Burundian refugees who registered for naturalisation did not receive 
their documents. Interviews with people whose applications were rejected or lost 
revealed the crucial significance that materiality of citizenship documents carries for 
the people in displacement. Many scholars of citizenship studies (Blitz & Lynch, 2009; 
Grace, 2013; Balaton-Chrimes, 2014) emphasize the substantive aspects of citizenship 
over the formal, national modes of belonging, arguing that formal citizenship often 
does not translate in access to rights. On the contrary, this case study exposed the 
tangible and intangible importance of the materiality of citizenship documents. The 
people I met and worked with, highlighted that the documents give them a peace of 
mind, make them feel safe and allow them to begin forming a different relationship 
with the future - giving them the courage to invest in their housing, farms, education 
and businesses. The security which comes with citizenship documents is a double-
edge sword. Issuing a new certificate, in case the original one is lost, damaged or 
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stolen, carries astronomical costs unaffordable to the majority of former refugees. In 
result, former refugees scrupulously guard their citizenship documents and see them 
as equal to citizenship.  
People’s care and reverence for the documents comes from an acute awareness that in 
case of the certificates’ loss or damage they might not be able to replace them. For 
them, losing the original documents is equivalent to losing citizenship. The anxiety 
over losing or damaging the documents is interlinked with the fear of 
‘denaturalisation’ in case of ‘disloyal behaviour’ or not being able to ‘prove’ one’s 
citizenship. Tanzanian law, like many other countries, allows for denaturalisation of 
citizens on the basis of vaguely defined crime, fraud, or disloyalty (GOT, 1995). 
Interviews with local government officials and the UNHCR staff in Ulyankulu 
revealed that the narrative of ‘taking citizenship away’ and ‘trial period’ has been 
propagated by the local authorities and was picked up by the new citizens.  
The ways in which the difference between citizenship by birth and by naturalisation 
has been communicated to former refugees, however, has been misleading and has led 
them to believe that they have been given a temporary, probational citizenship 
document that can be taken away from them arbitrarily. This powerful and dangerous 
narrative makes it seem like anyone can be deprived of their new status for no reason, 
which has planted a seed of insecurity among the former refugees regarding the 
validity of their citizenship status and the extent of their rights. To capture the 
complex, multi-dimensional and multi-temporal nature of citizenship in displacement 
as experienced by the former Burundian refugees, this thesis developed a concept of 
‘probational citizenship’.   
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9.2. Probational citizenship and its broader relevance  
 
 
The notion of ‘probational citizenship’ was inspired and shaped by normative 
knowledge produced from the standpoint of ethnography. Prioritising the narratives 
and perspectives of former refugees, I observed that their understanding of citizenship 
could not be captured by the existing theories. Drawing on observation and interviews, 
I suggested that the lived experience of displacement can shift the conventional 
markers of citizenship, reinterpreting the functions and benefits of citizenship itself. 
The unique experience of the decades of exile followed by an incomplete policy of 
mass naturalisation has placed former Burundian refugees in Tanzania in an 
ambiguous space, which challenges the conventional dichotomy between citizenship 
and refugeehood. What emerges from these experiences is an in-between state of 
‘probational citizenship’. 
The underlying condition of ‘probational citizenship’ is uncertainty. The new citizens 
believe that citizenship can be withdrawn, that they are put on probation, and their 
status is ultimately uncertain. ‘Probational citizenship’ is different from actual legal 
probation, as its requirements and boundaries are unclear. It can be described as an 
uncertain state, where the subject believes that citizenship status can be arbitrarily 
withdrawn for reasons that are undefined. The meaning of probation links to two 
interrelated discussions, namely probation as practices of assessing, judging, valuing, 
but it also has a performative meaning, where being on probation as a condition and 
as a state of mind, stands for uncertainty and insecurity. The condition of probation is 
characterised by radical temporality as the time on probation is uncertain, there is no 
evident end-date - it can be extended or might lead to unexpected consequences.  
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In the case of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, the ‘probational’ character of 
citizenship in displacement manifested itself in hundreds of pending applications, 
ambiguities in political participation, insecure land access in the settlements, and 
general sense of uncertainty about the validity and extent of the rights acquired through 
naturalisation. What is crucial here is that the essential and fundamental value of 
citizenship as a source of security and freedom is undermined in the experience of 
‘probational citizenship’. In other words, the intrinsic value of citizenship is nullified 
when freedoms become contingent instead of fundamental. Here, I want to suggest 
that this experience of uncertain and contingent citizenship narrated by Burundian 
refugees is not exceptional. Instead, it is becoming more and more common and it 
resonates with the circumstances of foreign-born citizens and their families, 
naturalised citizens, residents, and other first and second-generation migrants across 
the US and the UK.   
In June 2018, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (U.S.C.I.S.) had formed a 
task force and launched a team of investigators to complete the work of “Operation 
Janus” – an intervention aimed at identifying people who lied on their citizenship 
applications and denaturalising them (DeGooyer, 2018). The government efforts 
stretched back a decade to identify people who had gotten citizenship under false 
identities, committed crimes in the past which were not registered on their application, 
or lied on their application in any other way. The citizenship application forms are 
filled with questions that can be used against the applicants and even minor omissions 
or inconsistencies might provide basis for denaturalisation.  
Gessen (2018) shows that the problem with this new intervention is that naturalisation, 
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fundamentally, is meant to make naturalised citizens legally indistinguishable from 
other citizens. She argues that ‘the creation of the task force itself is undoing the 
naturalisation of the more than twenty million naturalised citizens in the American 
population by taking away their assumption of permanence […] all of us are second-
class citizens now’ (Gessen, 2018). A system which creates a retrospective, unclear, 
and ambiguous process which can lead to denaturalisation of naturalised citizens 
undermines the security of their citizenship. Echoing the narratives of former 
Burundian refugees, the possibility of denaturalisation makes it impossible for some 
of the naturalised immigrants in America to feel fully safe.  
In 2018, Britain was embroiled in a different scandal which raised very similar fears 
and questions. The members of the Windrush generation38, after decades of living and 
working in Britain, were wrongly classified as illegal immigrants. The majority of 
these affected had been born British subjects and had arrived in the UK before 1973, 
mostly from Caribbean countries (Wray, 2018). Journalists have discovered and 
reported dozens of unlawful detentions and deportations. An unknown number of 
British citizens was incorrectly classified as illegal migrants leading many to lose their 
homes and jobs, leaving them destitute and heavily in debt. Although the government 
apologised and promised to pay compensations, a year later, 29 people were again 
deported to Jamaica (Gentleman, 2019).  
Denaturalisation of American citizens and the unlawful deportations of the members 
of the Windrush generation stirred fears in all foreign-born nationals, naturalised 
citizens, and residents on both sides of the Atlantic, managing to instil a sense of 
 
38  The term ‘Windrush generation’ refers to a ship named Empire Windrush which brought one of the 
first groups of West Indian migrants to the UK in 1948.  
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vulnerability which rippled far beyond those who were directly affected. While the 
issue of denaturalisation of American citizens and the plight of these Jamaican British 
deportees are quite different, they in fact centre on the same questions: What does it 
mean to be a British or American citizen? And how easily can rights of citizenship be 
withheld depending on one’s origin?   
Professor Matthew J Gibney (2019), commenting on a recent case of denaturalisation 
of Shamima Begum39, a British citizen, pointed out that ‘no Western country […] has 
made its citizenship as easy to lose as the UK or used its laws with greater frequency.’ 
He argues that these trends weaken British citizenship, making it almost as easy to lose 
as the residence rights of those holding immigration permits. Although the case of 
Shimama Begum, a British citizen who was denaturalised on the grounds of ‘terrorist 
threat’, differs starkly from the other cases discussed above and it presents its own set 
of analytical challenges, it is linked to the same trend of increased use of legislation 
that effectively allows the state to disown its own nationals.  
Historically, no more than a few dozen individuals lost their citizenship under 
deprivation provisions between 1930 and 2014. Since 2006, the United Kingdom home 
secretary has revoked the citizenship of at least 373 Britons and deprivation of 
citizenship has become a more common practice (Weil & Handler, 2018). Therefore, 
Shimama Begum’s case, which dominated the news and sparked fierce debates, can 
be seen as part of a broader turn by the government to get rid of citizens considered 
undesirable. The result, as Sykes (2016) argues, is that citizenship is re-constructed as 
 
39 Shamima Begum was stripped of her British citizenship on the grounds of ‘terrorist threat’. She left 
Britain as a 15- year old to join ISIS in Syria. After losing two children in the war zone and seeing her 
husband surrender, she fled to a refugee camp and wanted to return back to Britain to ‘bring up her 
son’. She was denaturalised and shortly after her few months old baby passed away in the camp. 
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a privileged status that states are empowered to withdraw. In such a world, citizenship 
is ‘probational’ and can be removed as a punishment.  
These developments are troubling, as the right to be secure in one’s citizenship has 
been a ‘cornerstone of the post- war European liberal political order’ (Weil & Handler, 
2018, p. 296). Instead, in more and more countries, citizenship ceases to be seen as a 
right and is increasingly understood as a provisional privilege. The uncertain nature of 
citizenship extends not only to people who were naturalised but also those who were 
born in the UK and the US but whose parents were immigrants. As this thesis has 
shown in the context of former Burundian refugees, an atmosphere of fear and 
insecurity regarding one’s status has far- reaching tangible and intangible 
consequences and can circumvent access to other rights. For example, those wishing 
to exercise rights of political protest may feel scared to do this if the threat of removal 
of citizenship is hanging over them. 
As Britain nears the end of Brexit negotiations, many analysts and commentators are 
becoming concern that in the years to come, EU nationals might face the same fate as 
the Windrush generation. Rutter and Ballinger (2019) note that due to language barrier, 
lack of adequate documents, technological illiteracy and lack of information, 
thousands of elderly people, children in care, and other marginalised EU nationals 
might miss, misunderstand or not qualify for the EU Settlement Scheme40. If they miss 
the opportunity to register, they might, in the next few years, be identified as ‘illegal’ 
migrants. Although this comparison disregards the crucial racial dimension of the 
 
40 A scheme available to EU, EEA or Swiss citizen living in the UK to protect their rights to public 
services, public funds and pension after the UK exits the EU.  
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Windrush scandal, it raises an important point about the increasing insecurities in the 
processes of certification of status.  
The growing incidents of denaturalisation and deportation of American and British 
citizens in 2018 and 2019 have resulted in rising insecurity and anxiety among some 
migrants, residents and naturalised citizens in these countries. Arguably, this is to 
become a global trend, as in recent years Canada, Australia, France, and the 
Netherlands have either debated or enacted denaturalisation statutes (Weil & Handler, 
2018). It is apparent that the value of citizenship for naturalised citizens and their 
families is at a critical crossroad, making the experience and the concept of 
‘probational citizenship’ increasingly more relevant. From the central Tanzania to the 
cities and towns of the UK, the rights of many citizens and residents remain precarious 
and contested, depriving people of the sense of safety and security necessary to fully 
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 Date(s) of 
interview 
Pseudonym Gender Age 
range 






Fr Joshua  M 50+ Ulyankulu Parish priest at the Catholic Parish 
in Ulyankulu   























F 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Urambo,  
Tabora 





Leon  M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Village Chairman of Kaswa 
7 3/4/2014 
 
Grace  F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Tobacco farmer 










Edwin M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Teacher at a secondary school 
11 4/4/2014 
 
Juma M 50+ Ulyankulu  Leading pastor at the largest 
Pentecostal Church in Ulyankulu  
12 24/3/2014 
 















M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Teacher at a secondary school  





















Magnus M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Tobacco farmer 
20 26/3/2014 
 
Bariki M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Tobacco farmer 
21 26/3/2014 
 








F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Teacher at a secondary school and 
wife of research assistant  
23 2/5/2015 
 









Bernard M 30-50 Ulyankulu Former employee of TCRS, 








and his wife 
Eliza 
M, F 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
A retired teacher and his wife 
27 7/5/2015 
 




Jean Claude  M 50+ Ulyankulu  Retired teacher  
29 9/5/2015 
 
Martha F 50+ Ulyankulu  Traditional healer  
30 11/5/2015 
 
Boniface M 50+ Ulyankulu  Guard at a secondary school  
31 11/5/2015 
 
Pascal M 0-30 Ulyankulu  Teacher at a vocational school  
32 12/5/2015 
 
Elija  M 0-30 Ulyankulu  Bicycle repairman, Sukuma 
33 12/5/2015 
 





M 0-30 Ulyankulu  Bicycle repairman, Sukuma 
35 15/5/2015 
 




Dominik M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Businessman   
37 16/5/15 
 






Gloria F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Choir singer and farmer  
39 17/5/2015 
 
Jean Pierre M 50+ Ulyankulu  Farmer  
40 17/5/2015 
 
Aloyce M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Pastor  
41 17/5/2015 
 
Eliezel M 50+ Ulyankulu Farmer  
42 17/5/2015 
 
Emelyne F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Choir leader  
43 19/5/2015 
 
Arsan M 30-50 Ulyankulu  UNHCR Staff 
44 21/5/2015 
 
Eric  M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Repairman, Sukuma  
45 21/5/2015 
 
Kelvin  M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Repairman, Sukuma 
46 22/5/2015; 
12/6/2017 
Mr Mnacho M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Former Settlement Officer  
47 23/5/2015 
 
Arthur M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmer  
48 23/5/2015 
 
Jenifer F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Tailor  
49 23/5/2015 
 
Morris M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmer  
50 23/5/2015 
 




Kyle M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmer  
52 24/5/2015 
 
Sara F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Parent 
53 23/7/2016 Aloys M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Lawyer, NGO worker  
54 25/7/2016 Mzee Philip M 50+ Ulyankulu Retired village chairman of Mbeta 
55 25/7/2016 Anna F 30-50 Ulyankulu Farmer, businesswoman  
56 25/7/2016 Simoni M 50+ Ulyankulu Retired village leader from Kaswa 
57 25/7/2016 Baraka M 50+ Ulyankulu Retired village government 
member, farmer  
58 25/7/2016 Sara F 30-50 Ulyankulu Farmer 
59 26/7/2016 Johnny  M 0-30 Ulyankulu  Farmer  
60 26/7/2016 Oscar M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmer  
61 26/7/2016 Zak M 50+ Ulyankulu Kaswa Village Secretary  
62 26/7/2016 Aisha F 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Mbeta  
Farmer  
63 31/7/2016 Harry M 30-50 Ulyankulu Carpenter; ten cell leader, Sukuma 
64 31/7/2016 Gilbert M 50+ Ulyankulu  Farmer, from Kahama,  
65 31/7/2016 Donna F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmer, from Songea 
66 31/7/2016 Elisa F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmer from Mara 
67 31/7/2016 Isabel F 50+ Ulyankulu  Businesswomen, cantine owner; 
from Mara  
68 31/7/2016 Ben M 50+ Ulyankulu  Farmer, from Uyoa,  
69 31/7/2016 Maurice M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Bicycle repairman from Mwanza  






Upendo F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmer, Businesswoman, former 
leader of a Pentecostal church  
72 1/8/2016 Blessie F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Ten cell leader, member of the 
village committee  
73 2/8/2016 Alex M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Ten cell leader  
74 2/8/2016 Aloyze M 50+ Ulyankulu  Former Street Leader  
75 2/8/2016 Mzee 
Kagoma 
M 50+ Ulyankulu Former counsellor of Mirambo 
Division, contestant to Ulyankulu 
elections 2015,  
76 2/8/2016 Victor M 50+ Ulyankulu  Leader of the market place in 
Ulyankulu centre  
77 3/8/2016  Jean  M 50+ Ulyankulu  Street leader  
78 3/8/2016 Guy M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmer, assistant to a 10 cell 
leader, Sukuma 
79 3/8/2016 Deo M 50+ Ulyankulu  Former chairman of Kaswa, 
candidate in ward elections 
80 3/8/2016 Tobi F 30-50 Ulyankulu  General secretary of CCM women 
in Kaliua district, from Shinyanga 
81 4/8/2016 Tiger M 50+ Ulyankulu  Fisherman, farmer, former street 
leader in Uyoa 
82 4/8/2016 Casey M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Tailor  
83 4/8/2016 
15/10/2016 
Daniel M 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Kanindo 
Farmer and primary school 
teacher 
84 5/10/2016 Alida   F 50+ Ulyankulu Farmer 
85 5/10/2016 Sofia F 30-50 Ulyankulu Farmer  
86 7/10/2016 Adam M 30-50 Ulyankulu Teacher at a vocational school 
87 8/10/2016 Fergus M 0-30 Ulyankulu  Magistrate  
 348 
88 9/10/2016 Jeffery M 30-50 Ulyankulu  Baptist preacher 
89 11/10/2016; 
17/11/2016 
Max M 30-50 Ulyankulu Settlement Officer Mbanga 
90 12/10/2016 Emina F 30-50 Ulyankulu Pentecostal church women leader, 
entrepreneur  
91 13/10/2016 Marcus M 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Kanindo 
Leader at the Catholic Church 
92 14/10/2016 Marcella F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmer, from Moshi 
93 15/10/2016 Stanley M 30-50 Tabora Catholic Priest  
94 20/10/2016 Kieron M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Usigala 
Pastoralist, Sukuma 
95 20/10/2016 Miriam F 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Usigala 
Farmer 
96 20/10/2016 Ian M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Usigala 
Leader, competed for councillor 
position, won for Kanindo  
97 21/10/2016 Chester M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Imara 
Pastoralist, Sukuma 
98 21/10/2016 Liam M 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Imara 
Pastoralist, Sukuma 
99 22/10/2016 Martin M 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
Businessman, market leader 
100 22/10/2016 Alexandre M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
NIDA official, Tanzanian 
101 24/10/2016 Stephen M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
Businessman, Tanzanian  
102 27/10/2016 Tim M 0-30 Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
Farmer, former factory worker 
103 28/10/2016 Aloise M 0-30 Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
Hair salon owner  
 349 
104 31/10/2016 Dr Bilia M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa  
Representative Adult Education 
Centre  
105 1/11/2016 Mama Fau 
 
F 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
Farmer  
106 2/11/2016 Michael M 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
Veta Director  
107 3/11/2016 Sebastian M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Mbeta 
Village chairman 
108 10/11/2016 Niall M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Mbeta 
Former village chairman  
109 10/11/2016 Charles M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Kanindo 
Teacher  
110 11/11/2016 Chris M 50+ Ulyankulu Fisherman, farmer, from Tabora 
111 11/11/2016 Simoni M 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Makonge 
Farmer, businessman, village 
leader 
112 14/11/2016 Ken M 30-50 Tabora Tobacco company manager, 
Tanzanian 
113 16/11/2016 Percy M 0-30 Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
Cattle owner, Sukuma 
114 16/11/2016 Paul M 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
Supervisor of cattle market, from 
Kilimanjaro 
115 17/11/2016 Peter M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Mbeta/Kaswa 
Farmer, seller of fertilizers  
116 18/11/2016 Richard M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Mbeta 
Farmer 
117 21/11/2016 Terry M 50+ Ulyankulu  Cattle owner, businessman, 
Sukuma 
 350 
118 22/11/2016 Emilio M 30-50 Ulyankulu 
Mapigano,  
Village chairman  
119 24/11/2016 Lucy F 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Kanindo  
Farmer  
120 24/11/2016 Karl M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Kanindo 
Village Chairman  
121 24/11/2016 Julian M 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Kanindo 




Table 2. Focus group discussions and group interviews conducted in Ulyankulu, Urambo and Tabora.  
 
 
 Date(s) of 
interview 




Location Occupation  
1 31/3/2014 Focus group 
discussion with 
Women’s Group 
at the Pentecostal 
Church in Kaswa 




choir members at 
the Catholic 
Church 
3 2 F, 1 
M   





3 M  30-50 Ulyankul, 
Ikonongo 
village  




Interview with a 
couple at the 
Adventist Church 















worshippers at the 
Pentecostal 
Church 
5 4 M, 1 
F  





her son  
2 F, M 50+ 
 
Ulyankulu  Farmer and a 
guesthouse owner  
8 21/5/2015 
 
Interview with a 
couple 
2 F, M 0-30 Ulyankulu  Farmers  
9 22/5/2015 
 
Interview with a 
farmer’s family 
4 2 F, 2 
M  
30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmers  
10 24/5/2015 
 
Interview with a 
couple 
2 1 F, 1 
M 
0-30 Ulyankulu  Farmers and 
leaders of the 
Catholic Church 
choir  




7 4 F, 3 
M  
50+ Ulyankulu  Former village 
leaders and one 
Anglican preacher  
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12 25/7/2016 Interview with a 
married couple 
2 1 F, 1 
M 
0-30 Ulyankulu Farmers 
13 2/8/2016 Focus group 
discussion with 
women from the 
Women’s Group 
at the Pentecostal 
Church 
6 F 30-50 Ulyankulu  Farmers and small 
business owners  








5 2 M, 3 
F  
30-50 Ulyankulu  Church leaders and 
farmers   
15 5/10/2016 Family interview 
with grandparents 
and grandchildren 





Ulyankulu Farmers and 
students 






2 F, M 0-30 Ulyankulu  Small business, 
selling fruit 
17 11/10/2016 Focus group 
discussion with 
church leaders  





Focus group with 
church leaders 
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18 11/10/2016 Interview with a 
couple  
2 F, M 0-30 Ulyankulu  Farmers 
19 13/10/2016 Interview with a 
couple, mixed 
marraige   
2 F, M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa  
Primary school 
teacher and a 
carpenter 
20 16/10/2016 Family interview, 
grandparents, 
parents and a 
granchild  





Urambo  Farmers, small 
shop owners, 
family 
21 17/10/2016 Focus group 
discussion 
3 F 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Keza 
Farmers  
22 17/10/2016 Focus group 
discussion  
6 M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Keza 
Farmers  
23 20/10/2016 Focus group 
discussion  









7 M 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Usigala 
Village leadership 




Imara village   





26 21/10/2016 Focus group 
discussion 




27 1/11/2016 Focus group 
discussion with 
7 M 50+ Ulyankulu, 
Makonge  





28 1/11/2016 Focus group 
discussion with 
family of a single 
mother with four 
sons 







29 11/11/2016 Interview with a 
family in 
Makonge village 






Farmers, family  
30 12/11/2016 Interview with a 
family in Tabora  




Tabora  Catechist and his 
parents (David and 
Simona) 
31 14/11/2016 Interview with a 
family 




Ulyankulu  Farmers and tailor 
daughter  
32 15/11/2016 Interview with 
two sisters  
2 F 0-30 Ulyankulu, 
Kaswa 
Tailors  




9 F 30-50 Ulyankulu, 
Mapigano 
Farmers 
34 25/11/16 Focus group 
discussion with 
Sukuma men  












 Date(s) of interview Pseudonym Gender Age  range Location Occupation  
1 17/4/2014 
Key informant and 
research assistant 










3 3/1/2017 Benedict M 30-50 Dar es Salaam, 
Kariakoo  
Maize seller  
4 4/1/2017 Albert M 0-30 Dar es Salaam, 
Kariakoo 
Sugarcane seller  
5 5/1/2017 Patrick M 30-50 Dar es Salaam, 
Kariakoo  
Fruit seller  
6 7/1/2017 Alex M 30-50 Dar es Salaam, 
Temeke  
Tailor  
7 13/1/2017;  
13/6/2017 
Key informant 
Simon M 50+ Dar es Salaam, 
Mwanyanamala   
Pastor 





9 14/1/2017 Innocent M 30-50 Dar es Salaam, 
Sinza 
Pentecostal 
preacher, leader  







11 15/1/2017 Sophia F 30-50 Dar es Salaam, 
Mwananyamala 
Secretary at a 
Japanese NGO, 
leader 
12 16/1/2017 Jacob M 50+ Dar es Salaam, 
Kariakoo  
Coffee seller  
13 19/1/2017 Imani M 0-30 Dar es Salaam, 
Kariakoo  
Clothes seller  
14 24/1/2017 Issa M 0-30 Dar es Salaam, 
Buguruni  
Teacher and singer  
15 25/1/2017 Akil M 30-50 Dar es Salaam, 
Mwanyanamala  
Coffee seller  




17 25/1/2017 Juma M 30-50 Dar es Salaam, 
Mwanyanamala 
Contract worker  





Francis M 0-30 Dar es Salaam 
Kariakoo  
Coffee and fruit 
seller  
20 2/2/2017 Lydia, 
Francine, 
David 
F, F, M 30-50, 0-30 Dar es Salaam 
Buguruni 
No occupation   
21 3/2/2017 Gerard M 0-30 Dar es Salaam 
Kariakoo  
Small business  
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22 3/2/2017 Alexis M 30-50 Dar es Salaam 
Kariakoo 
Businessman  
23 4/2/2017 Renatte and 
Melchor 








Table 4. Interviews with GOT officials, academics, and NGOs’ staff. 
 
 Date(s) of 
interview 
Pseudonym Gender Age range Location Occupation  
1 17/3/2014 Noel M 30-50 Dar es Salaam  Employee at Asylum Access 
2 18/3/2014 
 
Lin F 30-50 Dar es Salaam  UNHCR Head of Mission  
3 19/3/2014 Abdul M 0-30 Dar es Salaam Employee at the Department of 




Salim M 0-30 Dar es Salaam  UNHCR  





Mr Mseke M 30-50 Dar es Salaam  Director of the Refugee 
Department at the Ministry of 




Edwin M 50+ Dar es Salaam  University of Dar es Salaam/ 







Izengo M 50+ Dar es Salaam  Operational Manager at TCRS, 
formerly based in Ulyankulu 
8 11/4/2014 
 





Teddy F 30-50 Dar es Salaam 
Msasani 





Mr Mzirai M 30-50 Dar es Salaam  Vice Director of Refugee 
Department, Home Affairs 
Ministry  
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11 7/2/2017 Eloyz M 30-50 Dar es Salaam  International NGO, 
Lawyer, project 
coordinator 
12 7/2/2017 Sylvia F 50+ Dar es Salaam  UNHCR, UNHCR 
representative 
13 7/2/2017 Gerard M 30-50 Dar es Salaam UNDP, Project 
coordinator 
14 8/2/2017 Charlotte F 30-50 Dar es Salaam International NGO, 
Lawyer  
15 8/2/2017 Mrs Kweka F 30-50 Dar es Salaam University of Dar es 
Salaam, Academic  
16 9/2/2017 Larissa F 30-50 Dar es Salaam European Union, 
EU representative to 
Tanzania 









Appendix 2. Recommendations for improving other prospective 
naturalisation policies.  
 
Burundian refugees living in the Old Settlements should have been engaged in public 
consultations regarding the design and the negotiation of TANCOSS, and their needs 
and insights should have been taken seriously. Instead, former refugees were asked to 
answer closed questions in a pre-designed survey, which gave them a binary choice 
between naturalisation in Tanzania and repatriation to Burundi, disregarding 
transnational connections and livelihoods. Although majority of my informants 
insisted that they want to remain in Tanzania and the choice between naturalisation 
and repatriation was straightforward for them, many highlighted that they wish they 
had an option to choose a citizenship status that reflects their sense of belonging to 
both Burundi and Tanzania.  
 
Burundian refugees were aware that Tanzania does not allow for dual citizenship, but 
many of my informants insisted that a solution respecting transnational belonging 
could have been achieved under the shared East African Community (EAC) passport. 
Generally, former refugees expressed substantial trust in opportunities offered by the 
East African Community. As a primary interlocutor told me: ‘What could help 
Burundi? We could dilute it, stronger East African integration, more Burundians 
moving to other countries and more people moving in, diluting ethnic tension by 
migration!’ (int. 2015). According the former Burundian refugees, the principles of 
EAC should have been guiding the design of TANCOSS. 
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Second crucial lesson from this case study is that any similar prospective policy needs 
to be developed in more detail, accounting for and ensuring recognition of rights such 
as political representation and land rights. TANCOSS was designed to accommodate 
the initial plan for refugees to be resettled to other parts of Tanzania before they 
received citizenship. As discussed, that approach was eventually renounced, and 
Tanzania Strategy for the Local Integration Programme for New Citizens (TANSPLI) 
was formulated to facilitate the full integration of the settlements into the Tanzanian 
state structure. This strategy, however, was delayed and the international organisations 
which were previously involved in TANCOSS did not approve the budget proposed 
and did not commit to implementation.  
 
In result, the agreements of TANCOSS and TANSPLI left it ambiguous who would 
be responsible for implementing the administrative, developmental and social 
programs that were designed to turn former refugee settlements into properly 
integrated towns and villages. Without accountability mechanisms, the recipients of 
TANCOSS policy were unable to hold the humanitarian organisations accountable. 
The incomplete and problematic implementation of the various pillars of TANCOSS 
left the former refugees in a precarious and uncertain condition of a responsibility gap. 
What was initially advocated as a ‘comprehensive solution’ led to an uncertain and 
unstable citizenship status for the people concerned. 
 
To sum up, if prospective naturalisation policies intend to successfully and with 
integrity protect the well-being of refugees, the people concerned need to be engaged 
in the design of the policy itself. Moreover, the policies need to be planned with 
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attention to political participation and property rights. Step-by-step actions necessary 
for implementation need to be built into the agreements. The exact processes for 
transition must be outlined and responsibilities must be clearly defined. Furthermore, 
accountability mechanism that allow the beneficiaries of the naturalisation policy to 
keep the government and the international organisation accountable should be 
integrated and effective. Finally, funding for the various stages of implementation 
needs to be secured from the beginning, regardless of the changing priorities and trends 
of the NGO industry.  
